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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA or ACA) Public Law No: 111-
148, substantially changed health insurance access in the United States. One group that 
the law particularly affects is young adults, defined as individuals between the ages of 19 
to 26. Specifically, the expansion of young adult dependent coverage was one of the first 
provisions that went into effect after the ACA’s enactment. This dissertation 
comprehensively studies the impact of the ACA’s dependent coverage provision on 
young adults. Across three empirical chapters, the dissertation examines outcomes related 
to health insurance coverage, labor market outcomes, and educational enrollment. 
Chapter 1, titled “Impact of the Affordable Care Act on Young Adults Insurance 
Coverage,” documents the changes in health insurance take-up for the young adults 
population, which has historically had the lowest rates of such coverage. Changes in 
coverage are also evaluated separately for sub-groups of young adults. Chapter 2, titled 
“Labor Market Outcomes for Young Adults,” evaluates whether the law altered 
employment decisions and earnings for this group. It also assess whether the ACA led to 
increased job mobility for young adults. Finally, Chapter 3, titled “Does having 
Dependent Coverage from the ACA impact Educational Enrollment,” evaluated changes 
in educational enrollment levels for young adults following the expansion of parental 
dependent coverage. The research conducted in this dissertation provides evidence of the 
ACA’s impact on health insurance coverage, employment, and education. It also provides 
support for the claim that the ACA covers insurance gaps that young adults might 
experience as they go through life transitions when they are likely to lose coverage. 
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     INTRODUCTION 
 
Health insurance access in the United States has changed over the years, with 
movement towards expanded coverage for all. The typical channel to health insurance 
access was through employer sponsored insurance (ESI) and private insurance for those 
who could afford it. Programs such as Medicaid, Medicare, and military care for the poor, 
elderly and veterans covered the rest. These prior provisions were, however, not enough 
to provide coverage to everyone. Many groups such as children, divorced women, and 
those who relied on dependent coverage found themselves to be uninsured or 
underinsured.  
This dissertation examines the role of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA or ACA) of 2010 on one such group that previously had the highest 
uninsured rates among any age group. Young adults, aged between 19 and 26, experience 
a drop in insurance once they reach the age of 19 and lose dependent coverage. The lack 
of insurance coverage continues for those young adults who don’t have access to ESI. 
These tend to be individuals who are not in collage and working in low paying jobs.  
The ACA has a number of provisions that makes it easier to get health insurance 
coverage. For instance, the ACA legislates the individual mandate, enacted since 2014, to 
prohibit insurers from denying coverage based on health status of individuals. The ACA 
mandates each state to establish a health insurance exchange, also referred to as an 
Affordable Insurance Exchange, that allows individuals to compare insurance plans, and 
select the plan that works best for them. In addition, Medicaid eligibility is expanded 
under the law to extend coverage to more individuals.  
 
  xii
The ACA gives individuals tax credits as a cost reduction incentive to purchase 
insurance from exchanges and insurers aren’t allowed to charge higher prices due to pre-
existing conditions.1 In 2014, the law required premiums for health insurance coverage in 
the individual and small group market to be based on age alone regardless of coverage 
type (individual, family, or location). Tax credits are offered for small employers and 
penalties for those who fail to comply. The law further benefits small businesses as it 
allows for a creation of small business exchanges.  
Young adults are considered to be in a transition stage in their life where they 
move from having parental household safety net to moving out on their own and trying to 
achieve economic independence. This also implies transitioning out of dependent health 
insurance coverage to getting their own coverage. Having health insurance coverage has 
implications for this group as they were previously tied down (experiencing job-lock) to 
their employment when on ESI. This changed as some states started to expand coverage 
to this age group and the ACA completely overhauled the way this group could access 
health insurance2. Having insurance from a source other than ESI is expected to increase 
job mobility for this group. It also meant greater freedom to seek employment elsewhere 
or be enrolled in college.  
Given the major change in access to insurance and the wide-ranging changes that 
young adults are expected to undergo, it is important to understand how the extended 
coverage mandate will impact their health insurance outcomes as it is the only provision 
in the law that targets a specific population. It also becomes important to understand 
                                                        
1 The ACA expanded Medicaid to 133 percent of the Federal Poverty Level while providing tax credits and cost-sharing reductions to 
reduce out of pocket premium costs for individuals purchasing insurance from exchanges.  
2 Between 1995 and just before the ACA enactment, 29 states enacted expanded coverage for young adults with conditions. These 
conditions included having no children, being unmarried, and had strict state residency guidelines; the ACA removed all these.  
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other implications of the mandates that will affect young adults such as their labor 
outcomes and education.  
Prior health provisions such as SCHIP expansion targeted different populations 
such as children and low-income mothers with children by providing them with coverage 
options and increasing their take-up of Medicaid. The new mandate under the ACA 
targets a more specific population, and is different. The prior mandates were funded by 
public money while the ACA offers dependent coverage through parental health 
insurance, which is usually private.  
 
Health insurance in the United States  
 
Health insurance access in the United States comes from public and private 
sources. These two sources accounted for approximately 85 percent of health insurance 
coverage in 2012 (Cohen & Martinez, 2012). A major chunk of the health insurance 
provided in the Unites States comes from ESI, according to DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & 
Smith (2012) and covers nearly half of those insured. In 2010, 55 percent of Americans 
received health insurance coverage through their employers (GAO, 2011). Medicare 
covers those aged 65 and over while Medicaid and SCHIP enable the poor and children 
to get coverage.  
With increasing healthcare costs owing to high cost of treatment, prescriptions, 
and deductibles, health insurance has steadily become out of reach for many. A large 
group of individuals became uninsured due to spiraling costs in health care and incomes 
that did not keep up with these rising costs. While median income in the United States for 
a family of four increased from $76,000 in 1999 to $99,000 in 2009, the increase was 
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offset by spending on health care (Auerbach & Kellerman, 2011).3 Therefore, cost 
increases have led to changes for those who access health insurance through their 
employers. Additionally, as Gruber and Washington (2005) find, subsidizing employee 
premiums leads employees to choose more expensive plans, which leads to further 
increases in costs. Health insurance through employment also does not imply continuous 
coverage. As Short & Graefe (2003) find few to have continuous coverage in a study 
done over a four year period, which can lead one to conclude that these gaps in insurance 
have implications on the health and financial well being for those experiencing it. 
The risk of losing insurance however, is not limited to one group and is spread 
across groups. Coverage levels vary by income and educational attainment. Even though 
the number of firms offering benefits declined from 66 percent in 1999 to 57 percent in 
2013, those with college degrees were more likely to have insurance when compared to 
those with high school diplomas (Majerol, Newkirk, & Garfield, 2014). A total of 41.3 
million non-elderly were uninsured in 2013 citing affordability as the main reason 
(Majerol, Newkirk, & Garfield, 2014).  
Individuals with incomes below poverty levels as well as those with incomes at 
100 to 200 percent of Federal Poverty Level (FPL) experienced higher uninsured rates  
(27 and 25 percent respectively) compared to those with higher incomes (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2014).4 Adults were more likely to be uninsured compared to children. And 
minorities were more likely to not have insurance when compared to whites (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2014).  
 
                                                        
3 Gross annual income 
4 In 2013 the FPL for a family of two adults and one child was $18,751 
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Ageing out and health insurance 
 
Changing circumstances during life transitions can lead to gaps in health 
insurance coverage. Health insurance gaps are usually seen as a snapshot in time (Short et 
al., 2012). To understand how life transitions impact insurance, one needs to consider 
individual level health insurance coverage over time. This is because the uninsured 
population is not static and can cycle in and out of coverage in a given time period as a 
result of life transitions (Jacobs et al., 2011) 
Life transitions can include events such as marriage and divorce, change of 
employment (leading to changes in income), widowhood, aging out (turning 19), 
disability, etc. These have the potential to change an individual’s health insurance 
coverage. A change in employment, for instance, can impact access to health insurance 
coverage if coverage is linked to an employer.  
Changes in the labor market over time have resulted in changes in access to health 
insurance. Over the last decade, the labor market in the United States has undergone 
shifts where non-standard employment such as part-time work, temporary and contract 
positions, and independent contracting have eroded full time employment with benefits 
(Kalleberg, 2000). These non-standard positions, particularly, part-time and temporary 
positions are generally associated with individuals with lower education levels who are 
more likely to move from job to job. Job security has declined and employers have shown 
greater inclination to reduce or eliminate benefits as the manufacturing sector shrinks and 
the service sector grows.  
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Studying health insurance outcomes resulting from life transitions becomes 
essential to understanding why some groups have higher uninsured rates. The extended 
coverage provision of the ACA requiring young adult coverage is a clear example of 
targeting a specific age group transitioning from their parents’ dependent coverage to 
ageing out once they reach 19. Studying the mandate and its outcomes for young adults is 
important in understanding how policies are designed to expand insurance coverage and 
access to certain populations that might be in greater need. The purpose of this 
dissertation is to examine health insurance for young adults and their labor and 
educational outcomes as this age group transitions into adulthood.  
 
 
Three essays on the impact of ACA on young adults 
 
The purpose of the three essays in this dissertation is to investigate health 
insurance changes for young adults, as they go through life transitions, and the ACA’s 
impacts on their employment and education. The essays also show how policy changes 
can impact and make a difference for this age group. Disparities in access to coverage are 
well documented. There is ample evidence of unequal care by socioeconomic status. 
Changes in health care laws have tried to target those who are most in need. The three 
substantive chapters presented in this dissertation highlight the disparities in access to 
health insurance coverage of young adults. This groups tends to be in a weaker position 
due to lower socioeconomic status and lower levels of education. As a result they 
experience the lowest levels of insurance coverage of any age group.  
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The three chapters in this dissertation focus on the instability in coverage 
experienced by young adults and how having a steady source of coverage can impact 
outcomes for this group. It becomes important to understand who is affected, as there is 
expected variability in outcomes. For instance, young adults from lower socioeconomic 
backgrounds will experience lower rates of insurance coverage and higher levels of 
instability in coverage. Having higher levels of instability and gaps in insurance coverage 
has potential implications for increasing financial burden and risk as well as the 
possibility of accumulating medical debt. Even though young adults perceive themselves 
to be in better physical state and forgo care as long as possible, this behavior can 
compound medical conditions and have ramifications for their health. Recent studies such 
as Finklestein et al. (2011) consistently find having health insurance has significant 
effects on health outcomes for those with lower socioeconomic status and those more 
vulnerable to experiencing gaps in coverage.  
The ACA overhauls the healthcare system in a way that is expected to achieve 
near universal coverage in a number of ways. Provisions expand coverage of programs 
such as Medicaid and subsidies to the poor and uninsured while the individual mandate 
(effective January, 2014) aims at covering every eligible individual. The extended 
dependent coverage provided to young adults under the ACA is expected to increase rates 
of insurance for this age group. To further investigate the impact of the ACA on young 
adults, I analyze data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a data set 
from the U.S Census Bureau and collects data on individuals and households. The CPS 
collects a large sample of data on several key health insurance variables such as health 
insurance source, type, and coverage status. Additionally, it also provides other key 
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variables such as employment, hours worked, levels of educational attainment, self 
reported health status, earnings, and other variables required for the analysis, which are 
discussed in the three chapters.  
In Chapter 1, titled “Impact of the Affordable Care Act on Young Adult 
coverage” I assess how the ACA changes health insurance for young adults. While it is 
expected that young adults will experience increased levels of insurance, the chapter 
takes the analysis further by examining not only the overall health insurance status post 
ACA but also presents subgroup analysis to examine differential coverage across 
different groups of young adults. It is expected that some groups will have greater take-
up rates as a result of the reform compared to others. I evaluate outcomes by gender, 
marital status, race, education, and age subgroups within the young adult population. 
Lastly, I assess the self-reported health status for young adults to evaluate if they report 
better health status after the reform. I also examine changes in reported health status for 
the aforementioned subgroups Chapter 1 findings show that the ACA had a significant 
impact on health insurance coverage of young adults. The estimates from the analysis of 
sub-groups indicate differences by gender, race, and marital status. Also, the law has 
larger impacts on young adults with lower education levels. Lastly, the law results in an 
improved self-reported status among young adults indicating a positive response about 
their health.  
In Chapter 2, I evaluate the impact of the law on the labor market outcomes for 
young adults. Having health insurance has implications for employment and this age 
group is no different. However, young adults are different from the rest as they have 
greater job mobility (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015).  Having health insurance from a 
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source different than ESI also eases job-lock and increases job mobility (Antwi et al., 
2013; Depew, 2015).  This chapter examines whether young adults experience a change 
in their labor outcomes due to the reform. Outcomes measured are full time vs. part-time 
employment, number of hours worked, overall employment, and job mobility. 
Additionally, I estimate employment changes by sub-groups. I find that the law has 
significant impact on certain outcomes and no statistically significant impact on others. 
Overall, employment for young adult declines as a result of the law, as does full-time 
employment. However, the results are not significant for job mobility. Men are more 
likely to separate from their jobs compared to women and unmarried women are less 
likely to work part-time.  
Ease of job-lock and increased job mobility can give young adults several options 
such as reducing the number of hours they work, becoming self employed, working for a 
smaller firm which might not offer benefits, or work on their education by being enrolled 
in college. Also, decline in full-time employment could mean increased educational 
enrollment. In Chapter 3, I evaluate the impact on education outcomes. Among the young 
adult population, non-college going individuals are likely to be impacted the most by the 
law; they are also more likely to have lower educational attainment. Therefore, it is 
possible that these young adults will head back to college or university since they have 
freedom from ESI (Sommers et al., 2013; Barbaresco, Courtmanche, & Qi, 2015). I find 
that the ACA increases 2-year public college enrollment while leading to a decline in 4-
year public college enrollment. Full-time college enrollment also declines. Overall 
enrollment rates for men are higher than for women and men are also more likely to be 
enrolled in part-time and in two-year colleges. Unmarried young adults are also more 
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likely to have higher enrollment rates compared to married young adults. Lastly, 
Hispanics show greater enrollment rates in 4-year colleges possibly due to traditionally 
lower enrollment rates in 4-year colleges.  
 
Contribution 
 
My dissertation explores how the Affordable Care Act of 2010 impacts those 
undergoing life transitions, in this case ageing out. The health insurance market in the 
United States has traditionally resulted in unequal coverage. People with higher 
socioeconomic status have higher rates of coverage and are more likely to be covered by 
their employers or have private coverage. The focus of my study, young adults, is one 
group that the traditional insurance market seems to have overlooked. This group is less 
likely to be educated or have employment with benefits. Each chapter of this dissertation 
addresses how the ACA improves different outcomes for young adults since this group is 
considered most vulnerable to loss of insurance.  
This dissertation contributes to the literature in a number of ways. My study is the 
first to examine the differences between the overall impact of the law and on the 21 states 
and District of Columbia that didn’t have prior dependent coverage mandates. There is a 
difference between the prior state mandates and the Federal mandate. Prior plans, also 
known as the grandfathered plans, were different and more restrictive. Prior state 
provisions to expand coverage to young adults only applied to state regulated plans and 
not employer funded plans. The state mandates didn’t have consistent effects on health 
insurance coverage for young adults since state laws imposed restrictions based on age, 
marital status, student etc. as discussed earlier. Also, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
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code was amended effective March 2010, effectively changing the reporting of additional 
dependents on tax returns5. Lastly, prior state mandates expanding coverage did not apply 
to self-insured plans because of the exemption from Employee Retirement Income and 
Security Act (ERISA). It was also highly likely that state provisions weren’t understood 
as well or that people even knew of the existence of such plans. These are strong 
arguments for not only including all states in the analysis but also studying the 
differential impacts of the ACA on states with prior dependent coverage provisions and 
those without any.  
Second, for all three chapters, I use the most recent CPS data. My chapters also 
use more years of data compared to some other studies. I use specific data for the three 
chapters. For chapter 1, I use the March CPS since this has all the information about 
health insurance. For chapter 2, I use the monthly CPS data as this gives me detailed 
information on employment variables. For chapter 3, I use the October Supplement of the 
CPS as this contains the educational supplement that no prior study on ACA has used.  
Third, I examine the heterogeneity of the law in different sub-groups for each of 
my chapters. I conduct a comprehensive analysis of the sub-groups by evaluating impacts 
by gender, race, marital status, educational status, employment status, and age. In my first 
chapter I examine the impact of the law on the self-reported health status of young adults 
to assess whether the law changes how young adults view and report their health. I also 
examine the self-reported health status by subgroups to provide the most comprehensive 
estimates for differential impacts of the law on the young adult population.  
                                                        
5 IRS: Tax free employer provided health coverage now available for Children under age 27 (IRS.GOV): Effective March 2010 health 
coverage for an employee’s children under the age of 27 is tax free to the employee (IRS.GOV).  Employees with children under the 
age of 27 are eligible for new tax benefits beginning March 30, 2010 if they are on dependent coverage. The ACA amends the IRS tax 
code for dependent coverage to those with eligible children who can be a son or a daughter but also, a stepson, stepdaughter, a legally 
adopted child, or an eligible foster child 
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Fourth, I include event study models in all three chapters as checks to ensure my 
estimates weren’t influenced by pre-existing trends in the market. An event study model 
provides estimates over an event period to assess whether any trends other than the policy 
itself influence the outcomes.  
Fifth, my chapters provide a comprehensive analysis of employment outcomes. 
While some prior work has limited labor outcomes, my chapter builds on basic estimates 
and goes into greater detail. I estimate changes in job separation, hours worked, private 
sector employment vs. self-employment, working more than one job, and wages.  
Sixth, my chapter on educational outcomes is the first study to assess ACA’s 
impact on education. No other study, to my knowledge, has been done on this topic. My 
study evaluates the impact on educational outcomes such as part-time/full-time college 
enrollment, 2-year/4-year college enrollment, and vocational training.  
 
 
Additional Information  
 
The ACA has radically changed access to health insurance by expanding coverage 
through the dependent coverage mandate. The individual mandate, effective January 
2014, covers even more individuals and provides subsidies to those who cannot afford 
coverage and have incomes up to 400 percent of the Federal Poverty Level. The 
individual mandate along with the earlier dependent coverage provision is one of the 
several ways in which the ACA tries to strive for universal coverage. Another way is the 
expansion of Medicaid eligibility for those with incomes up to 133 percent of the Federal 
Poverty Level. State exchanges have made it possible for individuals and small 
businesses to compare plans before deciding on one. Access to coverage cannot be denied 
  xxiii
based on pre-existing conditions and providers cannot charge individuals more based on 
geographic variability.  
The three chapters of this dissertation identify disparities in health insurance 
coverage for young adults while also documenting instability in coverage between 
different subgroups of the young adult population. While it has been over six years since 
the implementation of the extended coverage provision of the ACA, it has only been 
three years since the individual mandate of 2014. This calls for additional research and 
new studies looking into health insurance coverage for young adults. Previously, young 
adults with no access to parental coverage could not get on a dependent coverage plan 
and continued to lack coverage despite the 2010 provision. Additional research will be 
needed to examine the effects of the full implementation of ACA to assess whether the 
individual mandate played a role in further reducing disparities in coverage for young 
adults. 
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Chapter 1: IMPACT OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON YOUNG ADULT 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
One of the primary provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA or ACA) is the extended coverage provision for young adults. This provision 
permits young adults up to the age of 26 to be covered as dependents on their parents 
insurance.6 Prior to the provision, 31.4 percent of young adults between the ages of 19-25 
lacked coverage since most private insurers drop dependent coverage when a dependent 
beneficiary turned 19; young adults experienced a gap in insurance coverage once they 
reached the age of 19 till they could find another option for coverage which increased 
their probability of being uninsured as a young adult (DeNavas, Proctor, & Smith, 2012;  
Levy, 2007).  
Extended coverage provided by the ACA is expected to change health insurance 
for young adults. Prior to the extended coverage option in the ACA, most young adults 
transitioning from dependent insurance to their own health insurance often lost coverage 
if they weren’t enrolled at university or had a full time job that provided benefits (Collins 
et al., 2012). Even college going students often found themselves to be uninsured soon 
after graduation. Choices such as State Children’s Health Insurance Plan (SCHIP) were 
                                                        
6 Dependent coverage ended at 18 prior to the ACA. The extended coverage provision changes this and allows individuals 19 years 
and older to remain on their parents health insurance plan (dependent coverage) till they turn 26. Prior to the law, young adult 
coverage was dependent on the state of residence as some states had dependent coverage laws with restrictions such as residency 
requirements, not being married, not having any kids etc. Other than that, young adults had to rely on employer insurance if available, 
parental coverage up to the age of 22 if in college, private insurance if they could afford it, or go uninsured. 
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not an option due to age ineligibility and COBRA insurance being unaffordable for most 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014).7 
The ACA has significantly changed the way young adults access insurance. The 
present provision allows young adults to be on their parent’s private insurance, which 
reduces their uninsured rates. The expanded coverage under ACA builds on prior state 
mandates enacted by several states that sought to expand coverage for young adults. 
Although 29 states had mandated extending coverage to young adults there was 
variability in these laws across states. The ACA removed any variability and required 
health insurance plans to cover young adults and allowed them to remain as dependents 
on their parents insurance up to the age of 26. Also, they could no longer be denied 
insurance on account of being married or employed8. 
The extended coverage provision of the ACA was passed in September 2010. 
However, early implementation happened, as some plans were required to start providing 
access as early as September 23, 2010.9 Most health plans are annual and vary by plan 
start date. Due to differences in the timing of plan implementation, the biggest impacts of 
the extended coverage provision were expected in early 2011 as it took a few months 
from the time the law was implemented to the time the law had effects.  
Three studies provide early estimates of the aggregate changes in rates of 
uninsured young adults. Two of these studies use Current Population Survey Data (CPS) 
while the third one uses the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). DeNavas, Proctor, 
& Smith (2011) find young adults to be the only age group to experience a decline in 
                                                        
7 Employer Health Benefits, Annual Survey 2014. Kaiser Family Foundation.   
8 Plans prior to ACA known as grandfathered plans did not require young adults to be enrolled if they were offered employer 
sponsored insurance which changed after the ACA as these plans now are required to offer insurance even if young adults are offered 
insurance through work. 
9 September 22, 2010 is when most prior plan years ended. 
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uninsured rates. Using the CPS they find early estimates of the decline from 31.4 percent 
to 29.8 percent. A study conducted by the same authors in 2012 finds that the uninsured 
rates for the same group at 27.7 percent. In another study using the CPS, Sommers and 
Kronick (2012) look at preliminary data to find a net gain of 2.9 percentage points for 
young adults. 
According to a 2012 study conducted using National Health Interview Survey, 
15.4 percent of the overall population was uninsured in the first three months of 2012. 
Among the young adults population, 27.5 percent were uninsured in 2012 compared to 
35.6 percent in the third quarter of 2010. Private coverage too increased for young adults 
from 49.3 percent in 2010 to about 55 percent in 2012 (Cohen & Martinez, 2012). Other 
results from the same study find declines in uninsured rates for both male and female 
young adults as well as for Hispanic young adults who have the highest uninsured rates. 
These early findings make a compelling argument for further studying the impact of the 
law on this age group.   
This chapter examines the impact of the ACA’s extended coverage provision on 
young adults insurance by comparing their rates of insurance before and after the reform 
using nationally representative data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The 
subsequent analysis looks at several subgroups of young adults to show the difference in 
policy impacts by gender, marital status, education, and race. The final section looks at 
the self-reported health status of this age group to estimate the change post-ACA, overall 
and by young adult subgroups.  
The models presented in this chapter control for factors that might influence 
health insurance outcomes and also includes time varying characteristics. The difference 
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in differences (DD) modeling uses younger (16-18 years) and older (26-30 years) 
individuals as comparison groups. The older comparison group follows similar trends to 
young adults when it comes to making employment and insurance decisions whereas the 
younger control group reflects the changing circumstances of employer-dependent 
coverage.10 Over time, employers have exhibited a pattern consistent with a decline in 
benefits to their employees, which in turn also impacts dependent coverage. Keeping 
these trends for the two comparison groups in mind, I use CPS data from the March 
supplement for the years 2007-2013 (calendar years 2006-2012) allowing for a more 
comprehensive analysis than some prior work on the same topic.11  
 
Contributions to the literature 
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature. First, using more years 
of data from the March CPS than some other studies allows me to follow the impact of 
the law starting in the early implementation years to the most recent post enactment year. 
This allows me to breakdown the impact of the law over time, starting in the early 
enactment period (2010-2011) and all the way through to the final enactment period 
(2012-2013) to estimate the greatest increases in take-up rates of health insurance 
coverage for young adults in the years immediately following 2010. It also allows me to 
assess the impact of the law on key outcomes such as individually purchased health 
                                                        
10 While including the younger comparison group lets me test the sensitivity of results, including it as a comparison group reflects the 
changing nature of employer dependent coverage. Employer provided health insurance benefits show a declining trend over time that 
might impact this age group. According to Gould (2008) the rates of employer provided benefits have declined from 68.3 percent in 
2000 to 61.9 percent in 2008 translating to 7.5 million people becoming uninsured. Parents who lack continued coverage or work in 
low-income positions can also impact their children’s insurance. Therefore, when included as a comparison group in the model, it is 
expected this group will show no change in rates as a result of the ACA’s extended coverage mandate.  
11 Discussed in more detail in the data & methods section 
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insurance, private insurance, and public insurance over the post implementation period 
and to see how these outcomes changed. No prior study to my knowledge does this.  
Second, I examine the difference between states with no prior dependent coverage 
laws and compare them to states with prior dependent coverage laws. Prior work does not 
separate out the two sets of states even though studies claim a difference might exist.12 I 
test the sensitivity of the results by running separate models for pre-ACA and post-ACA 
states and by including only the older comparison group.   
Third, I examine the heterogeneity of the law’s impact on different subgroups to 
see whether the law impacts some groups more than others. I do a comprehensive 
analysis of the subgroups looking at gender, race, marital status, educational status, 
employment status, older (23-25 years) vs. younger (19-22 years) young adults, and self-
reported health status. I look at the self-reported health status as an indicator of whether 
health of young adults has improved as a result of the ACA. For this purpose, I estimate 
the overall health status for young adults and subgroups (men vs. women, married vs. 
unmarried, Hispanics vs. non-Hispanics, employed vs. unemployed). This analysis 
provides the most comprehensive estimates for differential impacts on subgroups of the 
young adult population.  
Fourth, I include an event study model as a robustness check to confirm that the 
ACA’s dependent coverage mandate was responsible for the increase in insurance and 
not any pre-existing trends prior to the ACA. An event study model provides estimates 
over an event period to assess whether pre-existing trends prior to the actual event affect 
                                                        
12 Prior studies show either all states in their analysis or have claimed the post ACA states to be different as the ACA is a new law and 
therefore should be separately studied. The reasons for these differences are discussed later in the chapter. In this chapter, I run 
separate models for states with prior dependent coverage mandates as well as states with no prior dependent coverage mandates. 
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outcomes, in this case the ACA signed in 2010.  I compare rates of any available 
coverage or private coverage for young adults to those for the two comparison groups. 
No prior study on the topic has looked at an event study model to analyze the change as a 
result of the law.  
 
Summary of results 
I find that the ACA had a significant impact on insurance coverage for young 
adults. The impact of the law broken down by 21 states and District of Columbia with no 
prior mandate and the remaining 29 states with prior mandates shows statistically 
significant results for both. The impacts are not very different for the states with no prior 
mandates – at a little over 3 percentage point increase in coverage compared to a 2.8 
percentage point increase for all states following the passing of ACA. However, the 
results when only the 29 states (pre-ACA states) are included show an estimate that’s 
different indicating smaller effect size compared to post-ACA states. The results also find 
a small increase in coverage between 2010 and 2011 suggesting that when the dependent 
coverage law was signed in September of 2010, it took a few months before any impact 
could be felt. The majority of the increase in coverage was between 2012 and 2013 as 
more young adults opted for dependent coverage and a declining trend in individually 
purchased insurance was estimated for this group. Testing my results to the sensitivity of 
the control group, I find when only the older comparison group gets included, the effect 
size increases suggesting the older comparison group closely follows young adults when 
it comes to health insurance decisions.  
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The results by subgroups find differences in the impact by gender, race, marital 
status, education and age group. Take up rates for insurance are higher for men than for 
women as men tend to have lower coverage. Women also have higher rates of private 
health insurance coverage compared to men. The difference in coverage however 
between the two is not significant as indicated by the results. Hispanics who traditionally 
have low rates of insurance experience greater increases in coverage compared to non-
Hispanics although the take up rates of private coverage for Hispanics are much lower. 
The results by marital status show a strong significant outcome; unmarried young adults 
experience greater take-up of coverage compared to those who are married. Other results 
by education and age subgroups show those with lower education being more impacted, 
and the younger young adults having higher take up rates, and an improved self reported 
status.13  
The rest of the paper is as follows; section 1.2 provides the background and 
discusses some of the prior work on the topic of ACA and young adult insurance, also 
mentioned is the plan for this chapter. Section 1.3 discusses data and methodology used 
in this chapter. This section also includes the measures that are used to estimate the 
outcome. Next, the chapter discusses results in section 1.4. The results section is broken 
down by a discussion of the demographic characteristics of the population, aggregate 
changes in health insurance coverage, the main DD regression results, heterogeneity in 
policy impacts by sub-groups, and lastly some robustness checks for the validity of the 
estimates. The chapter concludes with section 1.5 with a discussion of the results and the 
policy’s impact on young adults.    
                                                        
13 Younger young adults (19-22), older young adults (23-25) 
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1.2 Background 
 
Health Insurance 
 
While young adults are known to be in better shape and healthier than other age 
groups such as children or the elderly, they are still at risk if they experience gaps in 
insurance and forgo or postpone care (Quinn, Schoen, & Buatti, 2000). A major reason 
cited for this age group to forgo coverage was inability to afford medical costs (Collins & 
Nicholson, 2010). Not having health insurance can mean financial instability and can lead 
to bankruptcy as young adults can need access to medical services for cancer, child birth, 
sexually transmitted diseases, etc.  
According to the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS), over 30 
percent of young adults were uninsured prior to the ACA in 2010, which represents one 
in five of the overall uninsured population. Gaps in health insurance can prove costly. For 
most age groups, a loss of insurance can imply loss of health and overall wellbeing. It 
also means reduced medical care and use of emergency rooms when care is required. 
This gap is more frequent for young adults than any other age group (Collins et al., 2012; 
Short et al., 2012). And like other age groups, they are equally, if not less prone to getting 
sick and require care at some stage. Those who are uninsured usually have a harder time 
paying their medical bills and the young adult age group is no different. 
 
 
Coverage prior to ACA 
 
Before the ACA, young adults were highly likely to lose dependent coverage if 
they couldn’t afford private coverage, college coverage, or insurance received through 
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their employers. In a study by Levy (2007) using the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) found a sharp increase in uninsured rates in young adulthood at the 
time of losing dependent coverage after controlling for employment and marital status. 
They found that this age group took longer to gain economic independence and in turn 
get their own insurance. 
Prior to the ACA, 29 states had mandated extended coverage provision for young 
adults14. State mandated activity pertaining to young adult coverage began in Utah in 
1995. The state mandated laws were conditional on being unmarried, not having any 
dependents, and strict residency requirements. There was some variability in eligibility 
age of the state mandated plans and these did not apply to those who had an option of 
getting coverage through their employers. In 2012, an average of 40 private coverage 
mandates existed in each state (Bunce, 2012).15  
A study done by Monheit et al., (2011), finds that implementation of state policies 
to expand health insurance coverage of young adults resulted in small increases in 
coverage of between 1.5 and 3.8 percentage points which represents an increase between 
8.5 percent and 11.9 percent relative to the base. However, these increases were largely 
offset by declines in Employer Sponsored Insurance (ESI) for the same group. Levine et 
al. (2011) find that state dependent coverage mandates increased health insurance among 
young adults by 3.3 percentage points. They find introduction of SCHIP and state 
mandated extended provisions were effective in increasing rates of insurance for children 
below poverty levels and for young adults.  
 
                                                        
 14 See appendix Table 1 for states and date of mandates  
15 See appendix Table 2 
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Coverage after the ACA 
 
Recent work on the impact of ACA on health insurance status of young adults 
finds the provision has reduced the proportion of uninsured. A study done by Antwi et al. 
(2012) using SIPP data suggests that the extended provision in the ACA increased 
insurance by 3.2 percentage points for young adults between the ages of 19-25. Another 
study by Cantor et al. (2012a) includes controls for state mandated laws while examining 
the impact of ACA. They also find an increase in coverage for young adults. 
Results from the early release of estimates from the National Health Interview 
Survey suggest a substantial impact of the ACA as Cohen and Martinez (2012) find rates 
of uninsured 19-25 year olds on the decline with the onset of the ACA. Similar studies 
such as Fronstin (2012) find employment-based coverage increasing for young adults in 
2010 and also an increase in private insurance and a decline in the percent uninsured. The 
number of additional young adults insured between September 2010 and June 2011 
jumped to 2.5 million according to Schwartz and Sommers (2012). 
The evidence supports studying the impacts of dependent coverage in states 
before the ACA separately as well as for including them with post-ACA states. Even 
though 29 states had passed some kind of mandate extending coverage to young adults, 
there are several reasons to study the impact of the Federal mandate.16 The state mandates 
had effects that could not be uniformly assessed due to different state requirements and 
variability in age limits. States also imposed several restrictions such as requiring prior 
creditable insurance coverage, being single, strict residency requirements etc. Another 
                                                        
16 As stated earlier, this chapter contributes to the existing literature on the topic by delineating the differences between post-ACA and 
pre-ACA states. The idea being to isolate the impact of the Federal mandate only on those states with no prior dependent coverage 
laws. While some other studies estimate one overall model, the chapter estimates separate model for states with and without dependent 
coverage.  
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major area of difference between the state and the Federal mandate is that the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) code was amended starting March 2010, which effectively 
changed how adding dependents was reported on taxes17. Lastly, prior state mandates 
expanding coverage did not apply to self-insured plans because of the exemption from 
Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA). It was also highly likely, 
according to Cantor et al. (2012) that state provisions weren’t well understood and people 
were not aware of the existence of such plans.  
 
Subgroups 
 
Previous work on subgroup analysis has examined certain subgroups that will 
benefit more from the law particularly, non-college going young adults who don’t have 
the option of getting insured through their employer, and those with chronic conditions. 
People with chronic conditions find having insurance valuable in taking care of their 
long-term conditions that might not have been possible before and therefore, benefit more 
from insurance than those not suffering from similar conditions (Sommers et al., 2013). 
Among subgroups based on race and ethnicity, Hispanics are more likely to be 
uninsured than non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks and non-Hispanic Asians. In 
2012, Hispanic young adult uninsured rates were 50.3 percent compared to 32.5 percent 
for non-Hispanic blacks and 18.6 for non-Hispanic whites (Cohen & Martinez, 2012). 
Another study done by Callahan, Hikson, & Cooper (2006) finds disproportionate rates of 
access to care for Hispanic young adults. Using National Health Interview Survey data 
                                                        
17 Tax-free employer provided health coverage is now available for children under the age of 27 (IRS.Gov). Effective March 2010, 
health coverage for an employee’s children below the age of 27 is tax free to the employee. Employees with children under the age of 
27 are eligible for new tax benefits beginning March 30, 2010 if they are on dependent coverage. The ACA amends the IRS code for 
dependent coverage to those with eligible children who can be a son or a daughter but also a stepson, stepdaughter, a legally adopted 
child, or an eligible foster child.  
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for 19-29 year olds, they find Hispanic young adults are more likely to be uninsured and 
that the rates are greater for non-citizens.  
Evaluating the subgroups of young adults, O’Hara & Brault (2013) use data from 
the American Community Survey to study the law’s impact on the young adult 
population. Their findings are consistent with some of the other work. They find net 
increase in private insurance coverage was greater for non-Hispanic whites compared to 
Hispanics. Non-citizens and those with limited English ability were more likely to 
experience lower gains in insurance.  
 
 
Current Chapter 
 
This chapter builds on prior research examining impact of the ACA on young 
adults.  Using data from 2007-2013 ensures more post implementation data than earlier 
studies and increases the power to detect differences between the sub-groups that are 
being analyzed in this chapter. Some of the major studies have used limited post 
implementation data. For instance, Cantor et al (2012) and Antwi et al. (2013) use one 
year of post implementation data. Sommers et al. (2013) uses less than one year of post 
implementation data, limiting their analysis to include only the first three quarters of 
2011. The importance of evaluating subgroups to see the differences in impact can be 
attributed to previous studies that conclude increases in levels of insurance for young 
adults based on early mandates passed at the state level as well as some studies conducted 
after the ACA but do not mention the differential impact within the young adult 
population. These estimates tell us that the ACA increased levels of coverage; but that it 
is also possible that some groups will keep experiencing insurance instability and gaps 
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while others will not reach the same levels of coverage. In other words, levels of 
coverage will differ between subgroups. Limited prior analysis of sub-groups finds that 
the law has a differential impact. In a study by Sommers et al., (2013) the differences in 
policy impacts between some of the sub-groups are statistically significant. Given the 
additional years of post-implementation data in this chapter, similar significant 
differences between sub-groups are expected with bigger effect sizes. This chapter 
examines the impact of the ACA on several subgroups. It assesses the health insurance 
status of young adults by gender, marital status, and race. It also compares the self-
reported health status of young adults, their education, employment, and the difference 
between the younger (19-22 years) and older (23-25 years) young adult groups. 
Next, the extended provision for young adults is only as good as the number of 
young adults who can get covered. For instance, those who face difficulties in enrollment 
onto dependent coverage due to not having access to it can experience gaps in coverage, 
which can expose them to substantial financial and health risks.18 Hispanic young adults 
are at a higher risk of not having coverage as they traditionally have the lowest insured 
rates. It also implies that compared to those with coverage, Hispanics will have lower 
access to medical care which could mean a higher potential for decline in health in the 
long run. The sub-group analysis in this chapter examines the differences between non-
Hispanic whites and other races to see if there is a difference in policy impact by race. 
The analysis will also look at the difference in the type of coverage for the two groups by 
comparing private coverage with any other source of coverage.  
                                                        
18 In particular Hispanic young adults will be less likely to enroll in dependent coverage as their parents are less likely to have 
employer sponsored insurance or their own coverage.  
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In summary, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the overall change in health 
insurance coverage for young adults from 2007-2013. It estimates the differences 
between the impacts of the mandate on different young adult sub-groups. It is expected 
that some young adults will experience different levels of coverage or place greater value 
on insurance. This might include those with chronic health conditions who place a greater 
value on insurance as well as those with lower socioeconomic status who might not 
benefit as much from the law. This chapter looks at sub-groups by marital status, gender, 
race, and education. Lastly, it also assesses whether the ACA has improved the self- 
reported health status for this age group by examining the difference between their health 
status before and after the mandate. The self-reported health status of young adults by 
subgroups is also examined to assess if some young adults subgroups report improved 
health status compared to others. Insurance coverage is expected to improve the self-
reported health status for this age group. Prior to the ACA, the uninsured faced poorer 
health conditions and restricted access to coverage and hence, were more likely to report 
poor health status. We might expect this to change as gains in insurance will improve 
access and lead to improved self-reported health status for this age group.  
 
1.3 Data and Methods  
 
Data 
 
This chapter uses the March supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
data from 2007 up through 2013, which allows for more years of post-implementation 
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data and a total of seven years of data.19 The CPS is a joint effort by the Census Bureau 
and the Bureau of Labor Statistics and includes data on topics such as employment, 
earnings, health insurance, and a set of comprehensive demographics. The CPS collects 
data from all 50 states and District of Columbia and is representative of the non-
institutionalized civilian population. Data is collected for each individual of the 
household making it a comprehensive survey. The March CPS, also know as Annual 
Social and Economic (ASEC) supplement is a key component of the CPS which surveys 
participants every year on topics related to health insurance coverage, poverty, and 
income making it one of the most widely used data sets.   
This dataset has certain advantages for estimating health insurance status for 
young adults. The yearly data available in the CPS gives the user a snapshot of health 
insurance and employment status of young adults in that particular year. This allows the 
examination of health insurance status and employment characteristics before and after 
the ACA. Next, the dataset allows identification of the source of young adult insurance 
(employer, public, private coverage etc.) which helps to delineate the change in the type 
of insurance for young adults before and after the ACA as well as to estimate the highest 
take up rates by type of insurance. The March CPS also oversamples to include a 
Hispanic ethnicity sample, and those covered by State Children’s Health Insurance 
(SCHIP) program. This allows for additional analysis as it helps estimate the type of 
insurance by ethnicity and by coverage through public programs other than Medicaid and 
Medicare. Data collection in the CPS is at the national, regional, state, and metropolitan 
                                                        
19 Several studies on the topic only utilize limited post implementation data (a year to less than a year in some cases), which reduces 
the power to detect differences between subgroups. Some of the studies using limited post implementation data are mentioned in an 
earlier footnote. 
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levels. This allows for separating the analysis for pre-ACA state versus post-ACA states. 
Lastly, in addition to being the primary source of information on the United States 
population, the CPS supplement also provides information on summary health insurance, 
which combines different types of insurance questions from the survey to create summary 
health insurance variables. These get used in the analysis as they provide an overall 
measure of insurance availability (yes or no) that is a combination of private, public, 
employer, or any other type of insurance.20  These get collected annually and are an 
integral part of the March CPS.    
Analyzing the data begins with an examination of the health insurance status of 
young adults aged 19-25. This includes examining the type of insurance this age group 
has for a particular year – private insurance versus other type of coverage. The CPS has 
some shortcomings when it comes to measuring insurance. Since the survey of health 
insurance variables is yearly and not monthly or quarterly, it is not possible to capture the 
month-to-month changes in insurance status. The March CPS data just provides a 
snapshot of the health insurance status for a particular point in time.  
To evaluate the changes brought about by the policy, the data spans the pre-
implementation stage from the years 2007-2010 and the post implementation stage from 
2011-2013. Since the March CPS survey’s respondents on last year’s health insurance 
status, my post implementation year starts in 2011 even though some insurance 
companies started implementing the provision in 2010. Some of this early 
implementation gets captured in the March 2011 CPS. However, a time lag in insurance 
                                                        
20 Summary health insurance variables are constructed using other health insurance coverage variables. For example, any insurance 
variable is constructed using any type of insurance, public or private. Similarly, any private insurance is constructed using all variables 
that indicate any kind of private insurance (employer, individually purchased, etc.) 
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take up is also expected as more young adults learned about the provision and sign up for 
dependent coverage.  
The CPS-based analysis dataset includes all individuals aged 16-30. The total 
number of observations is 283,551 and includes all states and District of Columbia. 
Young adults comprise 119,773 observations while 16-18 year olds comprise 72,398 
observations and 26-30 year olds comprise 91,380 observations. For the post-ACA states, 
I drop 29 states with prior mandates, which give me a total of 119,798 observations 
comprising 21 states and Washington, D.C. This includes 50,974 observations for 19-25 
year olds, 29,840 for 16-18 year olds, and 38,984 for 27-30 year olds. The 29 states that 
had prior state health insurance mandates are not included in this dataset. Appendix Table 
1 lists these 29 states. These states will be used to compare results with the states that did 
not implement the reform and waited for the ACA. The data set comprising these 29 
states has a total of 163,753 observations out of which 68,799 are aged 19-25, 52,396 are 
aged 26-30, and 42,588 are aged 16-18.  
 
Outcomes Measures 
 
This section of the chapter discusses the measures used for estimating change in 
the health insurance rates. I analyze health insurance coverage overall for young adults 
and by type of coverage, young adult subgroups, and their reported health status. Health 
insurance outcomes are measured in the following ways. First, I assess whether 
individuals have any health insurance. Second, I examine the type of insurance 
individuals have. This includes public, private, or individually purchased.  My next 
measure assesses insurance coverage by subgroups using binary indicator variables to 
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estimate the impact of the ACA on different groups of young adults. My last measure 
evaluates the change in self-reported health status as a result of the provision. These 
measures are discussed below.  
Health insurance coverage: The first set of measures includes health insurance 
coverage for the respondent as of last year as the key outcome variable. This variable is a 
binary indicator variable, coded 1 if covered by any kind of insurance last year and 0 if 
not covered. This initial measure does not distinguish between different types of 
insurance (public, private, employer) and helps to examine differences in overall health 
insurance coverage trends. Other binary health insurance indicator variables include any 
private coverage, individually purchased coverage, and public coverage. For the purposes 
of coding, these variables get coded as 1 for being covered (private, individual, public) 
else 0. The health insurance coverage type variable estimates coverage by private, public, 
individually purchased to examine differences in the take up rates of insurance and the 
change in type of coverage for the young adults over the analyzed time period.  
Table 1.1 shows the insurance coverage (for any type of insurance) trends for 
young adults between 2007 and 2013. We see increasing rates of coverage starting in 
2011. Table 1.2 shows only private coverage. Both tables show a declining trend in 
coverage leading up to the year when the ACA was passed, after which an increasing 
trend in coverage is noted. The rates of coverage go from a high of 69 percent coverage 
of any type in 2007 to a low of 65 percent in 2010. This rises to 72 percent by the year 
2013. Similarly, private coverage dips to 52 percent coverage from a high of 58 percent 
in 2007 and goes back up to 58 percent in 2013.  
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The initial comparison of uninsured rates over time by age group is shown in 
Table 1.3. The table shows the years 2007 to 2013 and compares the uninsured rates for 
treatment group to those of the comparison groups. The table shows change in uninsured 
rates over time for the treatment and the two comparison groups. Young adults have the 
highest uninsured rates in 2007 out of the three groups; this number slowly declined from 
about 31 percent in 2007 to 28 percent in 2013. The rates remain relatively constant for 
the comparison groups. The younger comparison group’s uninsured rates remain between 
14 and 12 percent whereas the uninsured rate for older comparison group remains 
somewhat stable at 30 percent in the years after the reform.   
Subgroups: This chapter examines the differences in policy impact by gender, 
marital status, race, age (19-22 vs. 23-25 year old young adults) and education. The 
provision is expected to have differential impacts for different subgroups of the young 
adult population. Hence, I explore whether the provision has same effects for men and 
women, those who are married vs. single, non-Hispanic whites vs. others, and by levels 
of education. The purpose of the subgroup analysis is to look at the differential impact of 
the provision across different sub-populations of young adults. All the subgroup variables 
in subgroup analysis are binary indicator variables.21 
Self-reported Health status: Having insurance might change how young adults 
report their health status. It is likely that they would report better health status when 
insured. Self-reported health status is coded from 1 to 5 in CPS (1= excellent, 2=very 
good, 3=good, 4=fair, 5=poor) and indicates how respondents rated their health status on 
a five-point scale. I code health status as a binary variable where 1 indicates excellent and 
                                                        
21 Gender: 1 = male, 0 = female; marital status: 1 = married, 0 = unmarried, race: 1 = Hispanic, 0= non-Hispanic; education; 1 = 
Bachelors and greater, 0 = education less than a bachelor’s degree.  
  20
very good and 0 indicates good, fair, poor. Self-reported status is included in the analysis 
as a measure of how young adults felt about their health in the years prior to the ACA 
compared to the years after the ACA. Prior to the ACA, young adults experienced high-
uninsured rates and were more likely to report an unfavorable health status.  This is likely 
to change post-ACA, as young adults are more optimistic about having better health 
outcomes with access to medical care. Health status is examined in two ways in this 
analysis. First, I report overall health status of young adults to assess whether their self 
reported health status changed as a result of the ACA. Second, I estimate health status for 
subgroups of young adults to assess the differences by gender, race, marital status, and 
education. This allows for a detailed inquiry into the change in self-reported health status 
as a result of the mandate.  
 
 
Methods 
 
To estimate the impact of the ACA on young adult health insurance, the change in 
insurance rates for 19-25 year olds is compared to the change for two comparison groups 
– a younger group (16-18 years) and an older group (26-30 years).22 The comparison 
groups will account for other factors that might have caused the treatment group to 
experience different rates in insurance coverage post ACA.  
This analysis compares the change in insurance status for the years prior to the 
reform (2007-2010) with the years post reform (2011-2013). A Difference in Differences 
(DD) regression is used to estimate the effects. A DD regression uses a treatment and a 
comparison group along with two time periods (pre and post reform). DD models 
                                                        
22 The selection criterion for the two comparison groups is discussed earlier. An advantage of selecting two comparison groups is that 
the sensitivity of the results can be tested using each comparison group separately.  
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estimate the differences in the means for the treatment and control groups across the pre 
and post time periods.  
A DD regression is used to evaluate the differences in means between the groups 
selected here and to assess how the ACA changed the coverage for young adults. Using a 
quasi-experimental method such as DD is advantageous as it allows me to analyze the 
difference between the young adults and the comparison groups (16-18 & 26-30) by 
types of coverage (private, any source) while controlling for any unobserved variation or 
transition over the course of the year due to non-policy related factors that may affect 
coverage or eligibility.  
The underlying assumption of DD is that the comparison group will account for 
other time varying factors that would have led the treatment group to experience different 
insurance rates post-reform. Difference-in-differences relies on the parallel trend 
assumption; this is seen in Figure 1.1. It is imperative that the treatment and comparison 
groups, in the absence of the treatment, follow similar trends when using a difference in 
differences model. In situations where this is not the case it can give us an outcome that is 
not consistent with the true impact of the policy. The two comparison groups follow 
parallel trends to the treatment group prior to the intervention. Prior to the ACA, young 
adults experienced the highest uninsured rates while 26-30 year olds experienced 
relatively lower uninsured rates and the younger control group the lowest rates. Post 
ACA (2010) we see a decline in uninsured rates for young adults while uninsured rates 
for the comparison groups remain unchanged.  
Using the two comparison groups may lead to a more comprehensive analysis; it 
can also imply other potential benefits. For instance, the older age group having similar 
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characteristics to the young adults when it comes to making insurance and employment 
decisions qualifies it as a good comparison group. Similarly, including the younger age 
group as a comparison group reflects change in employers declining generosity in 
benefits (Gould, 2010;Yamauchi et al., 2013).23 Models testing the sensitivity of results 
based on the comparison groups are included in the results section of the chapter. In 
young adults and the older comparison group assessing whether the two groups had 
similar or different sources of insurance and employment can be useful. Since young 
adults are more likely to work part time jobs and less likely to have higher levels of 
education compared to the older age group it is possible that they don’t have insurance 
access at the same level as the older age group. ESI is tied to full time work, which is 
more likely for the older age group, which accounts for some differences in labor markets 
between the two groups. Similarly, the younger comparison group is more likely to have 
dependent coverage, as they are more likely to be covered through parental insurance, 
which most young adults do not have.  
Figure 1.2 shows the private coverage rates. These rates are highest for the 
younger comparison group and lowest for the treatment group, a trend that shows change 
post 2010. There is a steady rise in private coverage for young adults while rates of 
coverage remain somewhat stable for the two comparison groups. Towards 2013, young 
adult private coverage rates are almost similar to the older comparison group.  
 
 
The overall DD model specification is 
 
iststistttist XTreatPostACATreatPostACAY εσςββββ +++++++= )*(3210  
 
                                                        
23 See footnote 5 
  23
 
Where: 
  denotes the insurance coverage for an individual i in year t and in state s. This can be 
any coverage, private coverage, or public coverage.  
 denotes demographic factors such as gender, race, marital status, educational 
attainment, employment, all of which can impact health insurance and are controlled for 
in the model.24  
The year dummies are denoted byς t and state dummies are denoted by  accounting for 
any state variability such as differences across states in population composition.  
The dummy variable for age is Treat, which is equal to 1 for the 19-25 age group and 0 
for the other two age groups. When only using one comparison group, the variable Treat 
gets coded as 1 for the treatment group and 0 for the comparison group.  
PostACA denotes another dummy variable for the years after the reform and is coded as 1 
for the year 2010 and later else 0 for the years prior to 2010.  
The coefficient of the interaction term denoted by β3, the interaction between age and 
time dummy variables (PostACA*Treat) captures the reform impact after implementation 
by comparing it with coverage before implementation. For the ease of estimation, all 
models are estimated using linear probability models.   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
24 The controls included in the model are gender (male/female), race (white, black, Hispanic, others), marital status (married, divorced, 
single, separated, widowed), education status (some high school, high school, some college, bachelors and above), employment status 
(employed, unemployed).  
Yist
X ist
σs
  24
1.4 Results  
 
Descriptive characteristics 
 
In Table 1.4, demographic characteristics are shown for the treatment and 
comparison groups. As expected, there are similarities and differences between the age 
groups with the older age group following the treatment group closely. Uninsured rates 
are highest for 19-25 year olds followed by the older age group. Over 70 percent of 
young adults have some kind of insurance compared to 87 percent for 16-18 year olds 
and 72 percent of 26-30 year olds. The trends are also similar for private insurance with 
young adults having the lowest rates for private insurance coverage while those aged 16-
18 having the highest levels of coverage. However, young adults are more likely to have 
private insurance coverage in their own name (23 percent) compared to the younger 
comparison group while almost 46 percent of the older comparison group had private 
insurance in their own name. Approximately 44 percent of young adults have ESI 
compared to 56 percent of 26-30 year olds, young adults were also morel likely to be 
unemployed compared to the 26-30 age group. Among the young adults, 73 percent 
reported a health status as excellent or very good compared to 70 percent of 26-30 year 
olds and 77 percent of 16-18 year olds.  
 
Aggregate changes in coverage 
 
On examining trends in health insurance coverage over time, we see a marked 
decline in uninsured rates after the passage of the ACA along with increases in private 
coverage. Insurance rates for young adults were at approximately 70 % coverage in 2007 
and around 67 % in 2010. By 2013, these rates increased to 73% overall coverage. The 
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comparison groups reflect similarities in insurance with the treatment group as shown 
earlier. After the reform both comparison groups show some decline in uninsured rates. 
However, the treatment group shows a greater decline compared to the two-comparison 
groups. Also there is an increasing trend in private insurance coverage for the young 
adult age group as seen in Figure 1.2. This represents the growing take up of dependent 
coverage for young adults. Between 2010 and 2013, private insurance for young adults 
increased by 4.5 % while it stayed relatively unchanged for the two comparison groups. 
Post ACA, the young adults age group moved closer to the older comparison group as 
their differences in private coverage narrowed.  
The overall increase in insurance rates for young adults is in agreement with other 
studies. Overall insurance rates increased by 3.2 percentage points, which is consistent 
with the results found by (Antwi et al., 2013), who used the 2008 Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) panel. It also reflects closely the numbers collected by the 
National Health Interview Survey Data (NHIS) by Cohen and Martinez (2012) who find 
approximately 30 percent of young adults to be uninsured prior to September 2010 and a 
subsequent decline in uninsured rates after September 2010. From the above analysis it’s 
evident that the overall rates of insurance coverage for young adults steadily increased 
post-ACA relative to the two comparison groups based on results from the three different 
data sets (CPS, SIPP, NHIS). There’s also an increase in private insurance rates for this 
age group indicating that the policy had a significant effect on the target population.  
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DD estimates 
 
Some prior research indicates that states with some law mandating coverage for 
young adults wouldn’t be impacted by the ACA and therefore, should not be in the 
analysis. Other research indicates there isn’t any difference between states enacting early 
laws and those with enacted provision post-ACA. Differences in requirements for the 
earlier laws such as age, residency, marital and family status restrictions, etc. made these 
older mandates different from the ACA. Also, as mentioned earlier the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) code was amended effective March 2010, which changed how adding 
dependents got reported on taxes. Lastly, the exemption from Employee Retirement 
Income and Security Act (ERISA) no longer applied to self-insured plans.   
Keeping these prior requirements in mind, separate models are run. All models 
presented here control for non-policy related variables such as race, sex, education, 
employment, and other state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level 
and all regressions are weighted using person level weights. The outcome variable is 
having insurance coverage and the average impact of the policy is the interaction of the 
dummy variable for treatment and the dummy variable for time after the implementation.     
The first two models in Table 1.5 only include post-ACA states (21 states and 
District of Columbia). These are states that didn’t have any prior mandates and dependent 
coverage laws only came into effect after the ACA was signed. Model I looks at the 
overall change in insurance of young adults with the two comparison groups while Model 
II only includes young adults and the older comparison group aged 26-30 since the older 
age group reflects closer trends in insurance to the treatment group. In Model I, we see an 
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overall increase in insurance for young adults by approximately 3.2 percentage points 
relative to the comparison group for the post-ACA states. This changes when we consider 
only the older comparison group to approximately 4.5 percentage points (in Model II). 
Both the results are significant and show an increase in coverage stability for the 
treatment group when controlling for all other non-policy related factors.  
Model III includes the pre-ACA states only and both comparison groups. In total, 
29 states that had already some provision prior to the ACA.  Most of these states passed 
some reform prior to 2010 that mandated various options for young individuals to gain 
some kind of dependent coverage. The results indicate that compared to the younger and 
older comparison groups, there is a significant increase in coverage for young adults (by 
2.5 percentage points) in these states.  This is not as high at the states that passed reform 
post-ACA but still shows gains in coverage implying that prior state mandates did make 
some difference to dependent coverage for young adults despite restrictions on who could 
get covered under the state dependent coverage and how much knowledge individuals 
had regarding these state based mandates.  
Model IV includes all states regardless of prior extended coverage mandates for 
young adults. From the first three models, we see that despite the late and early adopting 
states, there has been an increase in coverage between 2 to 3 percentage points for young 
adults since the ACA was enacted. The estimates from Model IV shows a different 
coefficient compared to Model III indicating a small increase in take-up rates estimated at 
approximately 2.8 percentage points25.  
                                                        
25 The 2.8 percentage point’s increase translated to approximately 910,000 young adults getting coverage. This number is higher when 
only considering those with access to parental dependent coverage.  
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To summarize, when all 50 states are included in the model, the estimates, while 
being significant, are different from post-ACA states. In Table 1.5, the coefficients from 
model III and IV are different compared to the coefficients for post-ACA states 
indicating greater effect sizes for post-ACA states. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
dependent coverage mandate had a greater impact on health insurance coverage of young 
adults in states with no prior dependent coverage mandates.  
 
In Table 1.6, an alternate specification is presented that splits the time of the post 
implementation years of the ACA into three periods. The post implementation period is 
split as the following: the first period being immediately after the implementation (2010-
2011); the second, between 2011 and 2012; and third, between 2012-2013. Coverage is 
split into having any source of coverage, private coverage, and individually purchased 
coverage. 
 
As expected, insurance rates increase in later time periods compared to the time 
period immediately following the law. In the 2011-2012 period most insurance providers 
were expected to comply with the dependent coverage mandate. This drastically 
increased the take up rates in private insurance during this period. The last period (2012-
2013) shows the largest coefficient at 4.8 percentage points while as the 2011-2012 
period shows the largest take up rates for private insurance at 4.6 percentage points. 
Individually purchased insurance declined the most during the 2012-2013 phase by about 
.8 percentage points compared to the estimates from earlier time periods although this is 
not statistically significant. These results imply that even as some providers offered early 
coverage to young adults, the actual impact of the law was not felt until a much later 
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stage. The impacts were not immediate but took some time before any impacts could be 
felt.  
The rates of change are shown graphically in Figure 1.3; the percentage insurance 
rates starting from the year of implementation for the three groups are shown. Young 
adults have the lowest rates of insurance amongst all three age groups in 2010 however, 
this changes as can be seen in the post implementation years with the other groups remain 
relatively unchanged while young adult insurance showing an increase every year. The 
gap between young adults and the older comparison group decreases every year and this 
difference in rates of coverage is the least in 2013.  
In conclusion, the ACA not only increased insurance coverage for young adults in 
states that implemented reforms after 2010 but there’s also evidence that states that had 
enacted prior dependent coverage reforms also saw some increase in coverage rates. The 
rates of coverage in pre-ACA states are a lot less when compared to the rates of coverage 
of only post-ACA implementation states which leads one to believe that states mandating 
grandfathered plans prior to the ACA did not have similar levels of coverage due to 
severe restrictions imposed on them. It is also possible that these plans were not well 
known or mandated strictly enough to result in large numbers of young adults enrolling in 
health insurance.  
 
 
Heterogeneity by Sub-groups 
 
The results presented in the previous section represent all young adults in the data 
set from 2007-2013 regardless of gender, marital status, or race. The law is expected to 
have different impacts on the take-up rates of insurance coverage for various sub-groups 
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among the young adult population. For this purpose, this section shows the impacts by 
different subgroups of the young adult population: by gender; race; employment; marital 
status, health status; education; and by age (19-22 and 23-25) to see if older young adults 
will experience different rates of coverage. The results from the subgroup analysis are 
presented in Table 1.7.  
The first column of the table estimates any source of coverage. The second 
column provides private coverage estimates only. The last column in the table is the 
difference between the two sources of health insurance coverage and results of a test of 
whether the difference in coefficients is significant. The difference is based on 
assumptions that some groups will benefit more on account of having private insurance 
through either parents or a spouse compared to those with no access to private dependent 
coverage.   
The differences highlight the heterogeneity of the law’s impact on different sub-
groups within the young adult population. The results indicate that men gained more from 
the law than women. Traditionally, men have lower insurance rates compared to women. 
The post-ACA impact for men is an estimated increase in take-up of coverage by 4.7 
percentage points compared to 4.2 percentage points for women. This difference is small 
and not statistically significant. However, women show higher take-up rates of private 
coverage than men, as they could be dependents on their spousal insurance. In Figure 1.4, 
males and females follow somewhat parallel trends in insurance coverage; both show 
increases post-ACA. However, men show a steeper increase in coverage immediately 
after the ACA because they historically have had lower rates of coverage compared to 
women. 
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Comparing Non-Hispanic whites to other races indicates lower take-up rates in 
coverage for Non-Hispanic whites as they are more likely to have higher rates of 
coverage. Young adults from other races such as Hispanics and African Americans have 
traditionally lower rates of insurance and are more likely to be effected by the mandate. 
The estimates indicate higher take-up of coverage both from any source and from private 
coverage for those who are not Non-Hispanic whites. These coefficients in Table 1.7 
indicate statistical significance however; the difference between the coefficients is not 
significant.  
The differences are more significant when one compared married and unmarried 
young adults. Married young adults are more likely to have reached financial 
independence and married women are also more likely to have insurance through their 
spouse. The results in Table 1.7 indicate a statistically significant difference between the 
coefficients of married (.002) and unmarried (.052) young adults, which indicates 
unmarried young adults traditionally have lower rates of insurance and show a greater 
change in take-up rates of coverage as its expected that they do have any alternatives. It is 
also possible that unmarried young adults are less likely to have established financial 
independence and careers and hence, experience greater increases in take-up rates. Figure 
1.5 shows the trend over time for the two groups. Unmarried young adults show an 
increase in coverage rates post-ACA compared to the relatively stable rise for married 
young adults even as their insurance rates continue to remain low compared to married 
young adults.  
Comparing estimates for employed and unemployed young adults, both groups 
show a coefficient that’s significant. Those who are employed are more likely to have 
  32
health insurance coverage through their employer. As a result, unemployed young adults 
have greater take-up of private coverage compared to employed young adults as they 
traditionally have lower rates of private coverage.  
CPS data does not specify chronic health conditions that could impact health 
status of individuals, however a self-reported health status variable is available for the 
sample and coded 1-5 (Excellent-Poor). Typically, young adults are more likely to report 
a very good or excellent health status compared to others, however, not having insurance 
will also determine health status as the inability to get required medical care can result in 
a reported health status that is more likely to be poor. Approximately 73 percent of young 
adults reported their health status as excellent or very good.  
Figure 1.6 shows an increase in an excellent or very good self-reported health 
status over time and a similar decline in a self-reported health status that’s good, fair, or 
poor. The two follow somewhat parallel trends but show an increasing (for excellent or 
very good) and a declining trend (for good, fair, or poor) respectively after 2010. The 
self-reported health status coefficient (Table 1.7) is larger for those reporting a good, fair, 
or poor status due to a larger base compared to those reporting an excellent or very good 
status. Testing the difference between the coefficients shows the coefficients are not 
statistically different from each other as shown in Table 1.7.  
As Table 1.7 shows the difference in coefficients between excellent and very 
good reported health status and good, fair, and poor health status is small but the large p-
value indicates the lack of statistical significance between the two outcomes. The larger 
coefficient on those reporting a poorer outcome is due to this group having a lower 
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coverage rate to begin with compared to those in “excellent” health conditions and hence, 
shows greater take-up rates of coverage.26 
There is also a significant difference between different age groups among the 
young adult population. Young adults in the19-22 age group are significantly influenced 
compared to the 23-25 year age group since older young adults have greater access to ESI 
while younger adults could have parental coverage provided they were full time students 
due to prior laws that allow full time students to be on dependent coverage up to the age 
of 22. Even though the individual impact is significant for both, the younger young adults 
show greater take-up rates for both types of coverage.  
The level of education too is seen as influencing insurance take up rates. The 
difference between those with an education lower than a bachelor’s degree compared to 
those with bachelors or higher is significant. Those with lower levels of education might 
be impacted more compared to those with higher levels of education because higher 
education is associated with full time employment and thus access to ESI whereas those 
with less education are more likely to work in part time positions or in places that don’t 
offer any benefits.  
The above estimates only show overall change in health status for young adults. 
In a second set of analysis shown in Table 1.8, estimates reporting health status of 
subgroups of the young adults’ population are compared. The table shows differences in 
health status reported by gender, race, marital status, education, employment, and age. 
The comparison between genders shows men reporting a greater improvement in their 
self-reported health status compared to women. This result is a statistically significant 
                                                        
26 This implies those reporting a health status as good, fair, or poor also being more likely to not have coverage.  
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increment of almost 3 percentage points compared to the insignificant result for women. 
This is also consistent with the prior estimates showing men to have greater take up rates 
in health insurance compared to women. The results are not significant by race and 
employment status, however. When health status is compared by marital status a weaker 
level of statistical significance is estimated; unmarried individuals report an improvement 
in health status, which is significant at the 5 percent significance level. Younger young 
adults also reported an improvement compared to older young adults while those with 
higher education reported an improved health status. These results provide some 
consistency as they indicate that those subgroups that were more likely to report not 
having coverage show greater levels of improved self-reported health status in some 
cases. For instance, men and unmarried individuals who have had lower rates of coverage 
in the past report an improvement.  
 
 
Robustness checks 
 
When using a difference in differences model certain assumptions have to hold or 
else the net estimate of the policy impact will be biased. For instance, making sure the 
comparison groups follow similar trends. In situations where this is not the case it can 
give us an outcome that is not consistent with the true impact of the policy. This 
limitation is an inherent weakness of the model as it’s only as good for random events 
conditional on time varying changes that are consistent for both treatment and 
comparison groups. Therefore, time varying variables should not change between pre and 
post time periods, and if they do change, the changes should be in an identical manner. 
Hence it becomes imperative to control for conditions that lead to policy changes and 
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other unobservable outcome variables that can change pre and post treatment (Besley & 
Case, 2000). To test the results, this section presents additional models for robustness 
checking.  
Several models were run to check the robustness of the estimates. First, a model 
was run with only the younger comparison group. A second specification was run with 
reduced age bandwidth for the older comparison group from 26-30 to 27-29 years and a 
third specification increased the age threshold of the older comparison group to 34 years. 
When only the younger comparison group is included, the effect size is much smaller 
compared to when only the older comparison group is included. Model 1 in Table 1.9 
shows the estimates when only the younger comparison group gets included. The impact 
of the ACA is small and not significant. When comparing any source of insurance, using 
the older comparison group leads to greater effect sizes compared to the younger 
comparison group. If only private insurance is considered the effect size is greater for the 
younger comparison group. Changing the age bandwidth to 27-29 and 26-34 leaves the 
outcomes relatively unchanged, this is show in Table 1.9 as Model II & III. The results 
are very similar to using 26-30 year olds as a comparison group. When the age bandwidth 
is reduced to 27-29 years as a comparison group, overall insurance for young adults 
increases by 5 percentage points compared to the comparison group, when the age 
bandwidth is expanded to 26-36 the coefficient is still statistically significant and 
indicated increase in overall coverage by 4.2 percentage points. 
A placebo regression estimates a placebo effect and can be run using a variable 
that indicates time (years) before the ACA mandate. Here, the coefficient of interest is the 
DD estimator, which measures the average difference in the treatment group and the 
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comparison group. For a placebo regression, we assume that the dummy variable for time 
of enactment is replaced by another time period that represents the time before the ACA. 
If the coefficient of interest (the DD estimator) is not very close to 0, then that implies 
that the treatment and comparison group experienced similar outcomes even before the 
ACA was mandated. This method is a good way to check for robustness of the model and 
can tell whether the mandate actually made any impact. For this purpose the year of 
implementation is changed to 2009 and running the model yields an estimate, which is 
small, statistically insignificant and very different from the DD estimates from the main 
model. These results are presented in Table 1.9 as Model IV.  
 
Event study analysis 
An event study analysis is a specification that can be run as a robustness check. 
The event study specification defines the event of interest and identifies the period over 
which changes in insurance get analyzed. The period over which events get examined is 
known as an event window. For the purpose of running this specification, I look at all age 
groups in the analysis starting from 16-29, leaving the 30 year olds out for comparison. 
The purpose of running an event study is to ensure that results are not driven by pre-
existing trends that could have impacted health insurance coverage. The specification 
used here includes age dummies and a dummy=1 for the post-ACA time period along 
with the interaction between the age dummies and the time dummy.27  The model 
specification is presented below.  
 
                                                        
27 For example age 19 is coded as 1 if individual is 19 years old else 0 and so on. Time dummy is coded as 1 denoting time after the 
ACA else 0.  
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Yit = β0 + β117i + β218i + β319i + β4 20i + β521i + β622i + β723i + β824 i
+β925i + β1026i + β1127i + β1228 i + β1329i + β14PostEnactt + β15(16i * PostEnac t )
β16(17i * PostEnactt ) + β17(18i * PostEnactt ) + β18(19i * PostEnactt ) + β19(20i * PostEnactt )
+β20(21i * PostEnactt ) + β21(22i * PostEnactt ) + β22(23i * PostEnactt ) + β23(24 i * PostEnactt )
+β24 (25i * PostEnactt ) + β25(26i * PostEnactt ) + β26(27 i * PostEnactt ) + β27(28i * PostEnactt ) + β28(29i * PostEnactt ) +ε it
 
 
 
 
Where Yit denotes health insurance coverage (any type and private coverage).  
The coefficients of age dummies are denoted by β1 to β13 and are coded as binary 
variables indicating age.  
The dummy denoting time after the ACA is denoted by PostEnact and β15 to β28 denotes 
the coefficient of the interaction of age and time dummies. The coefficients of these 
interactions give me the coverage status after the ACA for ages 19 to 29.   
  
The results from the specification are presented in Table 1.10, which shows the 
change in any coverage and change in private coverage for all ages. Post ACA results 
show an increase in coverage rates with highly statistically significant results for private 
coverage for the treatment group. For instance, post-enactment, 22 year old’s take up 
rates of any type of insurance increased by almost 5 percentage points and by 7.5 
percentage points for private coverage. Similarly, those not in the young adult age group 
such as someone aged 17 or someone aged 27 shows no statistically significant results for 
take up rates of insurance. Therefore, results indicate young adults experiencing increases 
in coverage relative to the comparison groups who do not experience any increases as a 
result of the law.  The table shows pre and post trends for any kind of insurance coverage 
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and private coverage only. The estimates for the treatment and the comparison group 
show differential effects; coverage becomes significant for the treatment group while it 
stays insignificant for the comparison group. And an increase in the private coverage 
indicates an increase in take up rates in dependent coverage for young adults.  
 
 
1.5 Discussion 
 
This chapter uses data from the CPS (2007-2013) to examine how young adult 
insurance coverage changed after the ACA. The extended provision allowing young 
adults to be on their parents insurance until the age of 26 increased insurance rates for 
young adults. Additionally, the policy decreased the proportion of uninsured young adults 
as uninsured rates for this age group declined by almost 4.5 percent after the 
implementation. Using four separate models, this chapter illustrates the differences in 
insurance rates for the young adult group when compared to older and younger 
comparison groups. The chapter looks at pre and post implementation states to evaluate 
the difference between states with earlier dependent coverage mandates and those with 
enacted mandates after the ACA. This chapter uses more post implementation data than 
previous studies, which increases the power to detect differences between subgroups of 
young adults.  
The ACA increased coverage of young adults; it impacted post-ACA 
implementation states more than pre-ACA implementation states (states that already had 
some health care coverage mandates prior to the ACA). The effect of the law increased 
over time, it steadily increased coverage from 2010-2011 to 2012-2013. There is a small 
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decline in individually purchased insurance, which could possibly reflect a switch from 
purchasing own insurance to obtaining coverage as a dependent.  
The greatest increases in take-up rates of coverage were for young adults who 
were between the ages of 19-22. Males had higher rates of increases in insurance take-up 
rates compared to females although the difference between the two is not statistically 
significant. Unmarried individuals also experienced greater increases in insurance 
stability. Married individuals are expected to be independent and to have reached some 
levels of financial stability while unmarried individuals are more likely to being 
uninsured and lack financial stability. Unmarried young adults show increased gains in 
both private as well as any types of coverage.  
Differences in education also influenced coverage. Those with a BA or more 
education did not experience significant changes as much as those will lower levels of 
education. This leads to the conclusion that with lower education the probability of 
finding other options of coverage or having private insurance is also very low as ESI is 
often tied to full time work. Those with lower levels of educational attainment are more 
likely to be working in positions that don’t offer benefits.  
The results also show that while an improvement in self-reported health status 
was expected, the results point to a small increase in improvement over time with a self-
reported health status of excellent and very good while a decline in a reported health 
status of good, fair, and poor. As discussed earlier, the difference between the 
coefficients are not significant. Those reporting a self-reported health status of  “good”, 
“fair”, and “poor” have a larger base but with lower rates of coverage and hence, report 
  40
bigger coefficients compared to those reporting an “excellent” or “very good” health 
status.  
The law significantly increases coverage for those who might be economically in 
a weaker position. While it does significantly increase coverage for unmarried young 
adults, it also has a greater impact on those with lower education. These young adults are 
vulnerable and more exposed to experiencing gaps in insurance or not having any 
insurance at all when compared to those with higher education. Also, younger young 
adults are impacted more than older young adults who could be more financially stable.  
The take up rates of non-whites are higher when compared to non-Hispanic 
whites, and these groups are more likely to have lower coverage to begin with. Their 
rates dramatically increase after the ACA however; the law doesn’t change much for 
Hispanic young adults. While non-Hispanic blacks and other races show an increase in 
coverage, Hispanics show a decline in coverage. This is likely due to traditionally lower 
insurance rates in the family and access to dependent coverage not being possible on 
account of Hispanic parents having lower access to individually purchased coverage or 
ESI. The individual mandate that went into effect in 2014 is expected to increase 
coverage for such groups.  
This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the dependent coverage 
provision of the ACA on the target group of the population. It also evaluates the 
heterogeneity in impact between different subgroups of the population to examine who is 
more likely to have greater rates of coverage as a result of the law. The chapter provides a 
comprehensive breakdown of some of the subgroups along with other estimates 
measuring the impact. 
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Despite these estimates, there are issues that could set back getting coverage for 
some.  Some of these issues involve adding additional dependents to existing coverage 
plans, which depends on the cost of adding additional members. These additional costs in 
the form of increased premiums might be borne by the employers but eventually costs 
could shift to the policyholder.  
Other problems such as price differentials for health plans have always been a 
tool for employers to differentiate between types of coverage offered. In a typical plan, 
the employee pays one premium for themselves and while those purchasing coverage for 
a family or a spouse pay a higher premium. Employees can choose different tiered plans 
based on the number of individuals getting coverage. For instance, a two tiered plan that 
covers the employee and family and offers two different prices. Similarly, a four tiered 
plan, which covers the employee; employee and spouse; employee and children; 
employee, spouse, and children will offer four different premiums based on selection. 
When adding dependents to the coverage, the cost of adding young adults to these two or 
four tiered plans will be zero provided another dependent is already enrolled since plan 
rates don’t change if a dependent is already enrolled into the plan. However, there is no 
guarantee that premiums won’t change or increase year to year. As already seen, plans 
under the ACA have increased premiums every year making it hard to have consistent 
coverage. 
It is possible that despite its impact, the ACA might not successfully enroll young 
adults if getting enrolled into dependent coverage plans is not easy. Not being able to get 
added on to their parental coverage as they transition into young adulthood could leave 
young adults vulnerable to experiencing a gap in coverage. Also, the marginal cost of 
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adding young adults to dependent coverage is relevant in determining whether young 
adults are more likely to opt out of parental coverage. In situations where the marginal 
benefits of getting added are high while marginal cost are low, young adults would be 
more likely to opt for dependent coverage. For instance, individuals who need coverage 
more than others such as the chronically ill will opt for coverage compared to those who 
are relatively healthy as their marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs.  
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Table 1.1: Overall insurance trends for 19-25 year olds 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Have 
insurance 
.692 .696 .700 .656 .690 .704 .720 
Note: Weighted tabulations of the 2007-2013 Current Population Survey 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2: Insurance coverage by private insurance for 19-25 year olds 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Private 
coverage 
.580 .579 .575 .524 .545 .561 .579 
Note: Weighted tabulations of the 2007-2013 Current Population Survey  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.3: Percentage uninsured, by age group 
Age groups 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
16 -18 .146 .135 .131 .140 .125 .125 .120 
19-25 .308 .303 .300 .343 .311 .295 .281 
26-30 .287 .267 .274 .300 .309 .295 .300 
Note: Weighted tabulations of the 2007-2013 Current Population Survey 
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Table 1.4: Demographic characteristics by age group 
    16-18 years  19-25 years  26-30 years 
Age (average)   17   22   28  
 
Health Insurance (HI) 
Covered by any HI   .869   .701   .722  
ESI    .560   .446   .558   
Private Insurance   .660   .565   .605 
Public Insurance    .279   .178   .153 
Private Insurance in   .028   .227   .458 
Own name 
 
Self-reported  
Health Status 
1 (excellent, very good)  .774   .730   .700    
                      
Sex (percent) 
Male    .507   .491   .479 
Female    .492   .508   .523                                
                                                     
Race (percent) 
NH-White    .546   .500   .530    
NH-Black    .130                                     .130   .118 
Hispanic    .205   .233   .220                    
Other     .119   .137   .132   
                                        
Married (percent) 
Single    .990   .813   .456              
Married    .009   .160               .471                     
 
Education (percent) 
Some high school   .860    .134   .129                   
High School   .077               .320                  .289 
Some college   .061   .432    .298 
Bachelors and above   .001   .113   .286  
                                                         
Employment (percent) 
Employed    .225   .613   .741                         
Unemployed   .774   .387   .259                             
Fulltime     .056   .446   .682        
Part time    .245   .271   .133               
Note: Tabulations of the 2007-2013 March Supplement of the Current Population Surveys. Self reported health status is coded 1 for 
excellent and very good reported health status and 0 for good, fair, and poor.  
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Table 1.5: DD regression estimates of the impact of ACA for young adults 
 Post-ACA states only Pre-ACA states All states 
 Model 1 Model II Model III Model IV 
PostACA -0.00651 -0.0193*** -0.00670 -0.00663* 
 (0.00408) (0.00483)  (0.00467)  (0.00315) 
Treat -0.0741*** 0.0199** -0.0701*** -0.0718*** 
 (0.00639) (0.00685) (0.00801)  (0.00520) 
PostACA*Treat (DD) 0.0319***  0.0450***  0.0254*** 0.0281*** 
 (0.00475) (0.00626) (0.00468) (0.00346) 
N 119,798 89,958 163,753 283,551 
Notes: The table contains coefficients and standard errors in parentheses.  
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 The average impact (ACA) is the interaction of the dummy variable for a treatment group and a 
dummy variable for the time period after the implementation of the ACA. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and all 
regressions are weighted using person level weights. Model 1 and Model II only include states with no prior mandates (21 states and 
District of Columbia). Model 1 includes both the treatment groups (16-18 & 26-30) while model II only includes the older comparison 
group (26-30). Model III includes states that had passed early mandates (29 states passed pre-ACA mandates) allowing young adult’s 
dependent coverage. Model IV does not distinguish between the pre and post ACA states and looks at the impact when all states are 
included from the time period 2007-2013. All four models control for sex, race, education, employment, and other state fixed effects.  
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Table 1.6: DD regression estimates of the impact of ACA for young adults post 
implementation 
 Any source Private Individually Purchased 
Between 2010-2011 0.0128 0.00669 -0.00409 
 (0.00720) (0.00650) (0.00676) 
Between 2011-2012 0.0286** 0.0460***  -0.00406 
 (0.00882)  (0.0108) (0.00565) 
Between 2012-2013 0.0475** 0.0453**  -0.00782 
 (0.0127) (0.0139) (0.0106) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The variable for time includes three separate dummies for each time period and all three 
indicate post implementation period.  
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Table 1.7: Effects of ACA on young adults, results by sub-groups 
Sub-groups Any source (I) Private (II) Net difference (I) p-value 
(1) 
Net difference 
(II) 
p-value 
(II) 
Gender       
Male 0.0467*** 0.0484***   
.500 
 
 
.59 
 
-.003 
 
.55  (0.00785)   (0.00721) 
Female 0.0418***  0.0520*** 
 (0.00761) (0.00971) 
Race       
NH-White 0.0378***  0.0453***  
-.015 
 
.27 
 
-.009 
 
.47  (0.00646) (0.00736) 
Others 0.0526***  0.0542*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0131) 
Marital Status       
Married 0.00234 -0.00188   
-.050 
 
0 
 
-.0500 
 
0  (0.0104) (0.0169) 
Unmarried 0.0524***  0.0487***  
 (0.0074) (0.00908) 
Employment       
Employed 0.0354** 0.0395**  
-.007 
 
.68 
 
-.013 
 
.41  (0.0103) (0.0125) 
Unemployed 0.0430** 0.0532*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0102) 
Health status       
1 (excellent, good) 0.0423***  0.0441***  
-.010 
 
.44 
 
-.011 
 
.51  (0.0063) (0.00547) 
0 (good, fair, poor) 0.0530*** 0.0558** 
 (0.0137) (0.0196) 
Age       
19-22 0.0529*** 0.0543***  
.022 
 
.11 
 
.014 
 
.31  (0.0137) (0.00726) 
23-25 0.0297* 0.0402** 
 (0.0113) (0.0133) 
Education (23-25 
only) 
      
Less than B.A 0.0347*** 0.0464***  
.019 
 
.57 
 
.016 
 
.47  (0.007) (0.00835) 
B.A or greater 0.0162 0.0277 
 (0.0333) (0.0297) 
Notes: Estimates based on weighted samples from the 2007-2013 CPS. Any source indicates health insurance from any type of 
insurance and is a dummy indicating 1 for covered and 0 otherwise while private indicates having private insurance coverage.  The 
difference column is split into net difference and p-values. The net difference is the difference between the sub group coefficients. For 
example, the difference between gender, race, or any other subgroup here by type of coverage labeled as 1 and 2. The last sub-group 
education only included young adults aged 23-25. Standard errors in parentheses  
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 1.8: Health status by subgroups 
Subgroup Health status (1= excellent and very good) 
Gender  
Male  0.0272** 
 (0.00915) 
Female 0.00163 
 (0.00977) 
Race  
NH-White 0.0166 
 (0.0117) 
Others 0.0107 
 (0.00849) 
Marital Status  
Married -0.00774 
 (0.00667) 
Unmarried 0.0169* 
 (0.00630) 
Employment Status  
Employed 0.00766 
 (0.00667) 
Unemployed 0.0203 
 (0.0123) 
Age  
19-22 0.0186* 
 (0.00797) 
23-25 0.00503 
 (0.00588) 
Education  
Less than B.A -0.0144 
 (0.0165) 
B.A or greater 0.0254** 
 (0.00725) 
Notes: Estimates based on weighted samples from the 2007-2013 CPS. The last sub-group education only included 
young adults aged 23-25. Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 1.9: Models for robustness checks 
 Model I  Model II Model III Model IV 
PostACA 0.0173* -0.0264*** -0.0200*** -0.00526 
 (0.00715)  (0.00450) (0.00409) (0.00549) 
Treat -0.248*** 0.0111 0.0156*** -0.0662*** 
 (0.00901) (0.00728) (0.00394) (0.00674) 
PostACA *Treat (DD) 0.00574 0.0508*** 0.0418*** 0.00808 
 (0.00625) (0.00571) (0.00355) (0.00499) 
Notes: Model 1 only includes the younger age comparison group (16-18) for the analysis. Model II included a reduced bandwidth for 
the older comparison group and only included 27-29 year olds as the comparison group. Model III expands the age for the older 
comparison group and includes all between the ages 26-34. Model IV uses a placebo date and assumes the reform took place in a 
different year (2009). Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 1.10: Event study results 
Age    Any insurance    Private insurance 
16    0.151***    0.0175 
                                                                        (0.00953)    (0.0107)  
17    0.142***    0.0261* 
                                                                        (0.00952)    (0.0107) 
18    0.0926***    -0.00178 
                                                                        (0.00965)    (0.0109) 
19    -0.00127    -0.0522*** 
                                                                        (0.00991)    (0.0112) 
20    -0.0179    -0.0647*** 
                                                                        (0.00973)    (0.0110) 
21    -0.0650***   -0.0976*** 
                                                                        (0.00967)    (0.0109) 
22    -0.0667***   -0.106*** 
                                                                        (0.00970)    (0.0109) 
23    -0.0572***   -0.0809*** 
                                                                         (0.00967)    (0.0109) 
24    -0.0605***   -0.0818*** 
                                                                         (0.00975)    (0.0110) 
25    -0.0546***   -0.0774*** 
                                                                         (0.00967)    (0.0109)  
26    -0.0416***   -0.0652*** 
                                                                         (0.00967)    (0.0109) 
27    -0.0249**    -0.0457*** 
                                                                         (0.00967)    (0.0109) 
28    -0.0114    -0.0316** 
                                                                         (0.00962)    (0.0108) 
29    0.00524    -0.00871 
                                                                        (0.00963)    (0.0108) 
PostEnact    -0.00865    -0.0535*** 
                                                                        (0.0104)    (0.0117)  
(16*PostEnact)   0.0196    0.0106 
                                                                        (0.0145)    (0.0164)  
(17*PostEnact)   0.0211    0.00589 
                                                                        (0.0145)    (0.0164)  
(18*PostEnact)   0.0307*    0.0296 
                                                                        (0.0147)    (0.0166) 
(19*PostEnact)   0.0290    0.0271 
                                                                        (0.0150)    (0.0169) 
(20*PostEnact)   0.0290*    0.0487** 
                                                                        (0.0146)    (0.0164) 
(21*PostEnact)   0.0429**    0.0734*** 
                                                                        (0.0146)    (0.0164) 
(22*PostEnact)   0.0497***    0.0755*** 
                                                                        (0.0146)    (0.0164) 
(23*PostEnact)   0.0123    0.0449** 
                                                                        (0.0146)    (0.0165) 
(24*PostEnact)   0.0133    0.0315 
                                                                        (0.0148)    (0.0166) 
(25*PostEnact)   0.0128    0.0552*** 
                                                                        (0.0148)    (0.0166) 
(26*PostEnact)   -0.00485    0.0192 
                                                                        (0.0147)    (0.0165) 
(27*PostEnact)   -0.0187    0.0125 
                                                                        (0.0147)    (0.0166) 
(28*PostEnact)   -0.0181    0.00112 
                                                                        (0.0147)    (0.0166) 
(29*PostEnact)   -0.0129    0.00398 
                                                                         (0.0146)    (0.0165) 
Notes: Ages in both the treatment and comparison groups are included and coded as dummies; age 30 is left out 
as the comparison. Post is a dummy variable indicating years after the reform implementation. The interaction 
between Post and age gives the coefficients for insurance coverage for the specific ages after the ACA. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Figure 1.1: Percentage insured any coverage (2007-2013) 
Note: Tabulations of the 2007-2013 Current Population Surveys 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Percentage insured private coverage (2007-2013) 
Note: Tabulations of the 2007-2013 Current Population Surveys 
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Figure 1.3: Percentage change by age group post-implementation 
 
Note: Tabulations of the 2010-2013 Current Population Surveys 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Percentage young adults insured male vs. female 2007-2013 
 
Note: Tabulations of the 2007-2013 Current Population Surveys 
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Figure 1.5: Percentage young adults insured married vs. unmarried 2007-2013 
 
Note: Tabulations of the 2007-2013 Current Population Surveys 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Self-reported health status among young adults 2007-2013 
 
Note: Tabulations of the 2007-2013 Current Population Surveys 
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Chapter 2: LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES FOR YOUNG ADULTS POST-ACA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 examines the impact of the ACA’s extended coverage mandate on the 
health insurance status of young adults. In this chapter, I take the inquiry a step further by 
evaluating the labor market outcomes for young adults as a result of the ACA. As 
discussed in chapter 1, in the absence of extended coverage laws, health insurance 
providers will drop coverage when the beneficiary turns 18. Those who are not college-
bound might get insurance through alternative sources such as Employer Sponsored 
Insurance (ESI), if available, or private coverage. It is also very likely that young adults 
might not have any insurance at all. While earlier state dependent coverage provisions, 
enacted in 29 states did allow young adults to get coverage, as discussed in Chapter 1, it 
wasn’t as comprehensive as the ACA.  
Most Americans rely on employer provided health insurance as a form of 
coverage. This type of insurance is subsidized by the employer and costs the employees a 
lot less to purchase in comparison to purchasing private coverage.28 Smaller employers 
are less likely to offer health insurance citing affordability as a major reason. Almost all 
employers with more than 200 employees offer coverage. Employers with less than 200 
employees tend to offer coverage through health exchanges or a small business exchange 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014).29 Due to this majority coverage rule, insurance 
                                                        
28 According to the 2010 census, 55 percent of Americans received some kind of employer provided health insurance coverage. 31 
percent received coverage from public programs such as Medicare and Medicaid and about 12-14 percent were uninsured. Most of 
these plans are subsidized. Workers were responsible for 18 percent of the costs for individual coverage and 29 percent for family 
coverage in 2014 (KFF.Org). 
29 Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014. Employer Health Benefits Survey 2014 Annual Survey 
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coverage through employment creates a lock-in effect.30 Prior work on health insurance 
and employment provides strong evidence of this lock-in effect and studies have shown 
employees are influenced to stay in their jobs in order to keep their insurance. As a result, 
the ACA is expected to ease job lock and increase job mobility.  
The importance of understanding why easing job lock can have implications for 
workers can be narrowed down to worker productivity and their ability to move between 
jobs. Freedom from job lock creates opportunities for workers and allows them to not be 
tied down to a specific job on account of health insurance coverage. While many factors 
such as wages, education, and personal choices impact job mobility; health insurance is 
seen as one of the major factors that determine a worker’s willingness to stay on the job.  
The ACA provides a number of provisions that make access to quality health 
insurance possible at an affordable price. The employer mandate encourages employers 
to provide affordable health insurance to employees and incentivizes them by offering tax 
credits for smaller employers, play-or-pay for larger firms, and establishing health 
insurance exchanges specifically for small businesses to purchase affordable coverage. 
More specifically, the ACA impacts outcomes by covering those with pre-existing 
conditions by creating a federally funded high-risk insurance pool program for those who 
didn’t have access to health insurance from an employer or were ineligible for any 
government programs.31 Health insurance providers are prohibited from denying 
insurance or charging higher premiums. The law also reduces premiums on plans and 
                                                        
30 The majority of insurance coverage being provided by employers creates less incentive to leave work for employees 
31 High-risk pool is for those uninsured for more than 6 months. The program ended on January 1 2014 with the onset of the individual 
mandate.  
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incentivizes employers to provide insurance.32  All these provisions play a part in 
increasing coverage and easing job lock.  
In this chapter, I focus on understanding how the ACA changes labor market 
outcomes for young adults. The above arguments for freedom from job-lock along with 
the literature review provide a strong justification for exploring how extended coverage 
mandates impact young adults. This chapter will examine whether the impacts on 
employment, job mobility, hours worked, and wages remain consistent with prior 
literature or differ due to the unique nature of this age group.  
Traditionally, young adults are more likely to have lower levels of education and 
work in part-time positions or work multiple jobs to make up for low income. They are 
also more likely to work fewer hours (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015). This makes 
them a unique age group compared to others, as access to health insurance might have an 
different impact on young adults compared to older individuals with higher educational 
levels or those with significant work experience.   
As a result of extended coverage mandates, the value attached to employment for 
this age group may decline. Prior reforms such as the Massachusetts Health Reform of 
2006 indicate declines in uninsured rates by 36 percent relative to the base and change in 
levels of employment (Kolstad & Kowalski, 2010; Heim & Lurie, 2014). Since health 
insurance is usually provided to full time workers, it is possible that having a source of 
insurance other than employer sponsored insurance (ESI) might lead young adults to 
                                                        
32 The law allows states to expand Medicaid to 133 percent FPL that will increase coverage. Providers are expected to carry the bulk 
of reimbursements for services; they are expected to cover 80 to 85 percent of the reimbursement for clinical services and on 
enhancing the quality of care. Those with incomes between 133 and 400 percent FPL will be provided tax credits to lower costs for 
buying insurance coverage. All individual plans and small group plans are required to offer health benefits package that will cover 
specific benefits and will not charge a deductible on preventive services. Premiums on plans will be based on age, location, tobacco 
use, and whether the coverage is purchased for individual or a family. Individuals are expected to have some creditable coverage and 
employers are expected to provide minimum essential coverage or pay a penalty. Tax credits are provided for small businesses with 
less than 25 employees.  
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work part time, become self-employed, or not work. It is also typical of larger employers 
to provide ESI compared to smaller firms, hence, having a different source of health 
insurance might make working for smaller employers less prohibitive. These outcomes 
have implications for the labor supply of young adults as they could potentially change 
their employment decisions.  
Prior work on health insurance and labor supply finds workers depending on ESI 
are less likely to separate from their jobs compared to workers with alternatives to ESI. 
However, prior work focused on several different age groups of men and women, find 
that having employer-sponsored insurance creates a job-lock and discourages workers 
from switching jobs.33 Earlier work also found mandates leading to increases in health 
insurance by providing an alternative to ESI, reduced job-lock and increased job 
mobility.34  
Those with access to spousal insurance also experience greater job mobility; 
married individuals are less likely to separate from their jobs when they rely on ESI. 
Married individuals are more likely to leave when they have access to spousal insurance. 
Similarly, those with certain chronic and pre-existing conditions are also less likely to 
leave work if they depend on ESI.35 Although insurance providers can no longer deny 
coverage based on pre-existing conditions, this group pays a lot less in premiums when 
covered through ESI as employers cover the majority portion of the costs associated with 
coverage plans.  
                                                        
33 Job lock refers to employees being unwilling to leave work for another alternative job, self-employment, or retirement due to costs 
incurred as a result of having own health insurance. 
34 Includes earlier mandates in Medicaid, SCHIP, and dependent coverage in states prior to the ACA 
35 Some of these studies get discussed in the literature review 
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In this chapter, I evaluate the impact of the dependent coverage mandate on labor 
market outcomes such as job transitions, hours worked, type of employment (full time vs. 
part time), number of jobs worked, and wages for young adults. I make the following 
contributions in this chapter. First, using five years of post-implementation data and a 
total of 10 years’ worth of data, I examine trends in the labor market for young adults. 
Prior work done on examining the impact of ACA on labor market outcomes for young 
adult is limited to one study and only uses a year of post-implementation data.36  
Second, this is one of the first studies to undertake a comprehensive analysis of 
the changes in labor outcomes for young adults as a result of the law. Prior studies 
evaluating labor impacts on young adults as a result of the ACA have only done 
preliminary work on selected outcomes such as employment, full-time work, hours, and 
job change. By building on these basic estimates from prior work, I take a more detailed 
approach estimating the changes in job separation, full-time versus part-time work, hours 
worked, working more than one job, having the same employer, and working in private 
sector vs. being self-employed. By evaluating education as a determinant for wages and 
hours worked to assess if levels of education impact these outcomes, my work advances 
the research on levels of educational attainment on wages of young adults post-ACA.  
My third contribution is investigating sub-groups of the young adults’ population 
to analyze whether different groups experience different outcomes. No other study, to my 
knowledge, has done this. I examine subgroups based on gender, marital status, and race. 
Fourth, my analysis includes two event study models as checks for robustness that no 
prior work on young adults has done; these models estimate any employment and full-
                                                        
36 Some of these earlier studies are mentioned in chapter 1. Only 1 study has examined labor outcomes for young adults after the ACA 
and uses 1 year of post implementation data and offers limited analysis of labor outcomes.   
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time employment by age and year separately to assess whether outcomes are affected by 
any pre-existing trends and to ensure all changes are policy related.  
My analysis looks at the differences in above-mentioned labor market outcomes 
before and after the ACA to estimate the average impact of the policy on labor outcomes 
for young adults using nationally representative data from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS). I use a difference in differences (DD) model to estimate changes as a result of the 
law using 26-30 year olds as counterfactuals.37 I re-estimate outcomes for hours worked 
and estimate wages for young adults using education (low vs. high) as a further control 
group using a triple differences (DDD) model. For the triple differences model, I only 
include older young adults aged 23-25 since they are more likely to have reached higher 
educational levels. I also run other models for checking the robustness of my results; 
these include the original regression with only post-ACA states and event study models. 
These models and the results are discussed in the later sections.  
 
Summary of results 
I find the ACA had a significant impact on outcomes such as employment and 
full-time work while it didn’t impact job mobility for young adults. The overall impact of 
the law resulted in a decline in employment, which is consistent with the prior literature. 
The decline in employment is statistically significant at 1.7 percentage points. The results 
also find a decline in full-time work, a decline in hours worked, and a decline in the 
probability of working more than one job as a result of the ACA. The decline indicates 
                                                        
37 I use the older individuals (26-30) as a comparison group for 19-25 year olds as they closely follow similar trends and make similar 
decisions for work 
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workers are less likely to be tied down by ESI.38 The treatment group is less likely to 
work full time after the law as they have access to alternative source of health insurance 
coverage. However, the results did not find a statistically significant outcome for job 
separation.39 It is possible that the economic slowdown during the years prior to and after 
the ACA compelled young adults to stay with the same employer. Lastly, the analysis 
from the triple differences model shows educational attainment as having no influence 
over wages earned or hours worked.  
The result from the analysis of subgroups indicates that men experienced a greater 
likelihood of job separation and reduced full-time work compared to women. Among 
married and unmarried women, the unmarried women were less likely to work part-time 
compared to married women. The estimates for employment for married and unmarried 
women are not significant. They are however, significant for Hispanics compared to Non-
Hispanics. Hispanics are less likely to work full-time compared to Non-Hispanics, they 
are also less likely to be employed. This result is significant at a 5 percent significance 
level.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the 
background and summarizes prior work on health insurance and labor market outcomes. 
This section also discusses the limited work done on job mobility for young adults and on 
job choices when health insurance is available through an alternative to ESI.40 Section 2.3 
discusses data and methodology used in this chapter. This section also includes the 
measures used to estimate outcomes and how they are coded. The results follow in the 
                                                        
38 Since ESI is usually associated with full-time work 
39 Job separation refers to changing employers 
40 Most of the prior literature on young adult labor outcome is restricted to state based mandates passed prior to the ACA. 
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data and methodology Section 2.4. The results are broken down by main DD results, 
followed by results from the triple differences estimator, sub-group analysis, and 
robustness checks. The chapter concludes with Section 2.5 with a discussion and 
summary of the findings.  
 
2.2 Background  
 
The literature review finds health insurance changes labor market decisions for all 
age groups. Almost all studies find that having health insurance from another source not 
tied to employment will reduce labor supply. I add to this literature by including a new 
age group that hasn’t been previously studied.41 I also evaluate previously untested 
impacts of the law. I assess whether young adults are more likely to work full time or 
reduce their number of hours and also assess their earnings, likelihood to work more than 
one job, work in private sector over being self-employed, and sub-groups of race, marital 
status, and gender.   
Most studies conclude that health insurance coverage through Employer 
Sponsored Insurance (ESI) is a deciding factor in choosing a job. ESI can tie an 
individual to their employers. Young adults, although healthier than other age groups 
such as the elderly or the middle aged, also make job decisions based on ESI. Young 
adults often work in low wage and entry-level positions, which makes comprehensive 
coverage difficult. They are also more likely to change jobs frequently and due to 
frequent moves, are less likely to be offered ESI (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015). 
                                                        
41 As discussed earlier under contributions and additions to the existing literature 
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Depew (2015) finds prior state based provisions for extending health insurance to young 
adults resulted in a decline in the labor supply of young adults.  
 
Health Insurance and Labor Supply 
 
ESI and labor participation has been a widely debated topic with economists as 
they study life transitions for different demographic groups. These groups include low-
income single mothers, married couples, construction workers etc. Moffitt and Wolfe 
(1992) use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data to estimate the 
impact of Medicaid on female heads of family. They find Medicaid to have a strong and 
significant negative effect on the labor participation of women while having private 
insurance has the reverse outcome. Other studies such as those by Winkler (1991) and 
Montgomery & Navin (2000) also find significant reduction in labor supply of single 
mothers as Medicaid increases. Gruber and Madrian (2002) don’t find any significant 
relationships between having health insurance and determining labor supply for low-
income mothers. However, they do find a significant relationship between having health 
insurance and the labor supply decisions of secondary earners and that health insurance 
can have a role in job mobility.  
Several other studies have also looked into population subgroups to see effects of 
health insurance coverage on labor participation. Adams (2004) assesses married men 
between the ages of 25-55 to estimate the impact of ESI on job mobility. Using CPS data, 
he finds ESI lowers job mobility for those without alternative coverage by approximately 
22.5 percentage points; there is a strong evidence of job lock as a result of ESI. Similarly 
Bansak & Raphael (2008) look at working fathers to see whether the State Children’s 
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Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) impacts job mobility. They estimate that married 
working fathers were more likely to separate from their current employer after the 
introduction of the SCHIP initiative. Evaluating only unmarried men, Gilleskie & Lutz 
(1999) use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to find that unmarried 
males aged 24-35 experience drops in job mobility by 10-15 percent indicating the 
outcomes can be different for married and unmarried men depending on available 
alternatives to ESI.  
Health insurance coverage also has implications for worker retention (Kim & 
Phillips, 2010). Using SIPP data, they find full-time construction workers working in the 
industry to have retention rates between 30 to 41 percent for unionized and 13-18 percent 
for non-unionized workers when offered health insurance. In the same vein, Rashad & 
Sarpong (2008) assess single employed individuals using National Health Interview 
Survey (NHIS) data and find that having ESI increased employee retention. They find 
that employees with ESI were 16 percent more likely to stay with the same employer and 
were 60 percent less likely to voluntarily leave compared to those with other means of 
coverage.  
Health insurance coverage impacts retirement decisions as well. Several studies 
have documented the impact of health coverage on leaving work. Blau and Gilleskie 
(2001) study men between the ages of 50 and 61 to estimate the impact of employer 
provided retiree health insurance. The study finds an increase in the exit rate from the 
labor force by about 2 percent when employees share the retiree health insurance cost 
with the employer. This number increases to 4.3 percent if employer bears all the cost. 
French & Bailey (2011) also find exit rates at age 62 to be 8.5 percentage points higher 
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when workers have health coverage not tied to work. Other studies find similar results 
estimating an increase in the likelihood to retire by  5 to 7.5 percentage points (Marton, 
Woodbury, & Wolfe, 2007) and by 29-55 percent when other options for coverage are 
available  (Marton & Woodbury, 2010) 
While most studies on the topic find some effect of ESI on employment and other 
labor outcomes, a small number of studies also find little or no effect. Holtz-Eakin (1994) 
finds little to no evidence that health insurance provision impacts job mobility. While 
there is some evidence for married females being impacted, there was no evidence for 
married males. Berger, Black, and Scott (2004) find no evidence of job lock. Using SIPP 
data, the study doesn’t find a statistically significant evidence of job lock. However, they 
do find some evidence of shorter employment spells for those with ESI and spousal 
insurance and longer employment spells for those with ESI and large families. Similarly 
Kapur (1998) also finds no significant effects, using National Medical Expenditure 
Survey (NMES) data, she finds insignificant estimates to indicate any kind of job lock 
even though she uses the same data set as an older study that did find evidence of job 
lock. 
 
Labor Supply by Subgroups 
 
The employment outcomes of having health insurance coverage from a source 
other than ESI differs for married couples by gender. For both married women and men, 
health insurance availability affects labor participation. All studies on this topic find that 
the labor force participation of married women is tied to the availability of health 
insurance through their spouse’s employment. Labor force participation for married 
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women declined between 6 to 12 percent according to Buchmueller & Valletta (1999). 
Similarly, Olson (1998) estimated a 7 percent decline for married women with access to 
spousal insurance. Another study by Wellington &Cobb-Clark (2000) finds a greater 
decline compared to some previous studies. According to their estimates, married 
women’s labor participation declined by 20-percent. Murasko (2008) finds married 
women work 1 hour less per week, which translates to 7.9 percent reduction in the 
likelihood to work when access to spousal coverage is available. In a more detailed 
analysis of the impact of health insurance on the labor supply for married women, 
Hamersma & Matthew (2009) find Medicaid expansion reduced job lock for unmarried 
women. They find for every 100 USD change in Medicaid threshold, unmarried women’s 
probability of quitting their job increased by 1.1 percentage points, which represents a 4 
percent increase in turnover relative to the baseline.  
Bradely, Neumark, & Barokowski (2013) assess the employed married women 
population to understand the effect of employment contingent insurance on married 
women with breast cancer diagnosis. They compare women who are dependent on their 
own employment for insurance with women who are less dependent on employer 
coverage. They find that women who depend on their jobs for health insurance reduce 
their labor supply less that non-dependent women following breast cancer diagnosis. 
Similarly, Bradely, Neumark, Luo, & Bednarek (2007) find a negative health diagnosis 
for women leads to the decreased likelihood of working compared to women on their 
own coverage.42  
 
Job Choice 
                                                        
42 Negative health diagnosis includes a breast cancer diagnosis or a chronic condition 
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The literature on health insurance and job choice offers an insight into job 
mobility decisions. It could also explain job choice and job mobility decisions of young 
adults. Several studies have found mixed results indicating significant as well as 
insignificant effects of job choice and health insurance. Buchmuellar and Valletta (1996) 
find strong evidence of job lock in women while weak in men. Holtz-Eakinn, Penrod, & 
Rosen (1996) & Kapur (1998) find no such evidence. Other studies find ESI would 
reduce job mobility for those who find coverage expensive (Anderson, 1997) and those 
who frequently change jobs are more likely to be employed in positions that don’t carry 
any benefits (Slade, 1997). Job mobility also varies for those dealing with their own or a 
family member’s chronic illness (Stroupe, Kinney, & Kniesner, 2001). It could depend on 
demand for ESI by an individual; the higher the demand the lower the job turnover (Dey, 
2001). Gooptu, Moriya, and Simon (2010) study the expansion of Medicaid under the 
ACA to access the impact on labor outcomes. They test for eased job lock for non-elderly 
as they believe newly available insurance not through ESI for this population group will 
enable them to move to other jobs. Their findings indicate no evidence of strong effects 
from the expansion of the mandate on job mobility. 
Another aspect of job choice is the option to become self-employed. A source 
other than ESI can mean individuals can become self-employed, as they no longer need 
employer benefits. DeCicca (2010) examines the impact of New Jersey’s individual 
health coverage plan on self-employment. He finds evidence indicating the program-
increased self-employment by 14-20 percent compared to some neighboring states that 
didn’t have similar programs. He also found larger estimates for those who are 
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unmarried, older, and have health issues such as obesity. Another study by Fairlie, Kapur, 
& Gates (2011) finds large negative effects of health insurance demand on self-
employment for those without spousal coverage compared to those with spousal 
coverage. Additionally, they also examine business ownership in males in the months just 
before turning 65 years old and in the months just after turning 65 year old. They find the 
rates of business ownership increase from under the age of 65 to over the age of 65 while 
no changes in the months before and after for other ages in their sample.43  
 
 
Job mobility in young adults 
 
The literature on young adults and labor market has been growing as research and 
interest on this topic gathers momentum. Most current work is limited to the pre-ACA 
time period or for states like Massachusetts where universal coverage and dependent 
coverage have been available since 2007. Only one post-ACA study examines the impact 
of the ACA on young adults and their labor market choices.  Studies indicate a decline in 
overall labor supply. Heim & Lurie (2014) look at evidence from the Massachusetts 
health reform to examine if it led to increased job mobility. They used tax returns data 
from 2002-2010 and identify job changes based on employer information on W-2 forms. 
Their estimates of job separation lie between 1.5 and 3.8 percentage points. In a more 
updated version of the tax returns study for Massachusetts, Heim, Lurie, and Simon 
(2014) look at the impacts of the ACA on labor market outcomes. Using tax records from 
2008 to 2012, they compare young adults whose parents have access to benefits to 
                                                        
43 Under 65 being pre Medicare, over 65 being post Medicare. Therefore, the study finds when Medicare kicks in, individuals 
are more likely to be business owners compared to those ineligible for Medicare. Additionally, bundling of health insurance 
and employment creates a “lock” that might lead to an inefficient level of business creation. 
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slightly older age group before and after the law. They find young adults to be more 
likely to work in lower paying jobs that offer no benefits or to become self- employed. 
Dillender (2014) examines wages for young adults and finds having insurance through an 
alternative source other than ESI leads young adults to have greater wages, which could 
suggest increased job mobility. He finds that for those aged 18 and younger, having 
dependent coverage increased wages by 1.6 percent and predicts that the ACA will have 
greater future impacts on wages for this group.44 Similarly Depew (2015) examines states 
that mandated early extended coverage provisions for young adults and finds that state 
mandates led to a decrease in labor supply of young adults.  
 
 
Current Chapter 
 
This chapter adds to the limited prior work done on looking at ACA’s impact on 
labor market outcomes for young adults. It also adds to the past research looking at the 
impact of having health insurance coverage from an alternative source. While most 
studies have found significant impacts of having an alternative to ESI, only preliminary 
work has been done on ACA and its impact on young adults. In this chapter, I examine 
these impacts in greater detail.  Using 10 years of monthly data (2005-2015) that gives 
me five years of post-implementation data as well as five years of pre implementation 
data to examine outcomes such as employment, hours worked, full-time/part-time work, 
having the same employer, working in the private sector vs. self-employed, and wages. 
The ACA is expected to have significant impacts on different populations. As in Chapter 
1, it impacts young adults by increasing their levels of coverage. In this chapter, I assess 
                                                        
44 Dillender (2014) estimates are based on states with dependent coverage provisions passed prior to the ACA. 
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how the law will go beyond access to coverage and impact the labor market outcomes for 
this group.  
This chapter contributes by examining the labor market outcomes for young 
adults post-ACA by analyzing employment and full-time versus part-time work for this 
age group. This chapter also examines the law’s impact on young adult wages, their hours 
worked as well as several other outcomes such as job mobility, type of employment, and 
the likelihood of working multiple jobs making it the first study to do so. The chapter 
also assesses differences in outcomes by subgroups to estimate the heterogeneity in 
results. I examine all states regardless of whether they had prior dependent coverage 
mandates. Next, I estimate employment outcomes for this age group in comparison to the 
counterfactual age group. To estimate employment choices and hours, I use a quasi-
experimental model discussed in the next section. Lastly, I also estimate wage change for 
young adults. Prior work on ACA’s impact on young adults are limited to job choices 
(full/part) and hours worked. I add to this by assessing the ACA’s impact on several other 
outcomes for young adults; these are discussed in the subsequent sections.  
 
2.3 Data & Methods  
 
Data 
 
For this chapter, I use the Current Population Survey (CPS) monthly data from 
2005 to 2015. CPS collects monthly demographic and labor market data from individuals. 
Data are collected on a rotation basis from 60,000 households. These data are collected 
for four months after which there is a gap for eights months following which interviews 
commence for the next round, which is again four months. As a result, households are 
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interviewed eight times over a 16-month period. Those being interviewed in the 4th and 
8th month of the sample are referred to as Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORG). These 
groups account for all earnings data collected in the CPS.  
CPS provides certain advantages when looking at the labor outcomes for 
individuals in the United States. First, CPS is the primary source of information on labor 
force characteristics of the US population; this allows me to estimate several additional 
labor market outcomes than previously examined. Second, it provides estimates at several 
levels (national, regional, state, and metropolitan level); this allows me to run separate 
models for pre and post ACA states for estimation of labor market outcomes to assess 
any differences. Third, the rotational method used by CPS improves estimates, as the 
probability of keeping the same respondents in their monthly survey remains high. The 
data collection design (collecting data for four months with an interim gap of eight) 
enables a higher percentage of the same respondents for the monthly data as it provides 
some year-to-year overlap and improves estimates of change on a month-to-month and 
year-to-year basis. Approximately 75 percent of the respondents between successive 
monthly data remain the same while 50 percent for the yearly data, thereby providing 
better estimates of change (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016).  CPS also provides 
earnings data from its Outgoing Rotation Groups, which is where earnings information 
used in this chapter is obtained. Fourth, using CPS data for outcomes such as 
employment is the way in which the variable gets defined and coded in the CPS. All 
individuals in the CPS are classified as employed if they worked in any kind of paid 
position last week. This could include working for themselves, family business, farm 
work etc. Those who work but are temporarily absent from their jobs are also included. 
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The unemployed population includes those not working in the reference week or those 
actively looking for work but not employed. This allows me to code my employment 
variable to include all those who worked last week or held a position last week even if 
absent from work as being employed. Everyone not employed or looking for work but 
not employed gets coded as unemployed. This enables a higher accuracy when estimating 
change in employment as a result of the law. These measures are discussed further in the 
measures section. Other advantages of using CPS for estimating labor outcomes is the 
detailed data on employment status by demographics, occupation, industry, class of 
worker, work status, number of jobs held, all of which are utilized in this chapter.  
There are some limitations, however to using these data. One limitation in using 
Current Population Survey data for measuring the employment outcomes for young 
adults is the lack of data availability for young adults not living with their parents. This 
implies not knowing whether the parents of young adults will have access to ESI, which 
has implications for dependent coverage. All data on young adults used in this chapter 
ignores the parent’s health insurance status.  
From the monthly data set I only keep individual aged 19-30, this gives me a total 
of 2,649,121 observations that includes young adults aged 19-25 and the older 
comparison group aged 26-30. Out of this 1,525,897 observations are 19-25 year olds and 
1,123,224 observations are 26-30 year olds. This number represents all states. For the 
post-ACA states analysis, I drop 29 states, which leaves me with 1,114,091 observations 
for 21 states and District of Columbia. These include 639,772 observations for 19-25 year 
olds and 474,319 for 26-30 year olds.  
  72
I begin by examining whether young adults are more or less likely to be 
unemployed, working full-time or working for the same employer. I also look at their 
hours worked, type of employment (private vs. self-employed), and whether they hold 
more than one job. Having ESI is closely tied to job lock while having a source of health 
insurance other than ESI could imply freedom from job lock. The analysis looks at all 
these measures of the new labor market outcome for young adults post ACA. These 
measures are discussed below.  
 
 
 
Measures 
 
This section of the chapter discusses the different measures used for estimating 
changes in labor market outcomes as a result of the ACA. I begin by assessing the overall 
employment for young adults to evaluate whether they are more likely to be employed as 
a result of having dependent coverage. Following this, I examine their full-time and part-
time work to see changes associated with having insurance. My third measure examines 
whether young adults are more or less likely to work for the same employer. This is a 
measure of job mobility. I also evaluate whether young adults are more/less likely to 
work in the private sector, or as a result of increased job-mobility, become self-employed. 
The next measure examines hours worked to assess any changes in work hours as a result 
of the law. My last set of measures estimates the probability of working more than one 
job and wages earned.  
Employment: The first measure evaluated is employment of young adults to see 
whether the ACA has had some impact on their employment. In Table 2.1, employment 
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rates are shown for the treatment and comparison groups. The employment percentage 
drops from 2008 to 2009. However, young adults are expected to have increased rates of 
unemployment given their limited education and lack of requisite skills compared to 
other groups. Employment in the CPS is coded under various categories and includes 
employed, unemployed, not in labor force, armed forces etc. As mentioned earlier the 
“employed” measure here includes everyone who worked in any kind of paid position 
last week. This could include working for themselves, family business, farm work etc. 
People who work but are temporarily absent from their jobs are also included. Classified 
as “unemployed” are individuals not working in the reference week or individuals 
actively looking for work but not employed. For the purpose of estimation, employment 
is coded as a binary variable; anyone who is employed is coded 1, otherwise the variable 
is coded as 0.  
Full-time/Part-time work: Young adults are likely to work less given the option of 
dependent coverage. From the literature review it becomes evident that when presented 
with an alternative to ESI, full-time work declines. A similar trend is expected with 
young adults who show greater inclination to work part-time. This measure examines 
full-time and part-time employment for young adults. The CPS codes full-time work as 
working over 35 hours, working full-time hours but not at work, or working full-time 
hours but working part-time for economic reasons. Part-time work is considered as 
working less than 35 hours and includes part-time hours; these part-time hours could be 
for economic as well as non-economic reasons. This measure is split into two outcomes, 
which are estimated separately. The variable full-time is coded as 1 if the number of 
reported working hours are greater than 35 hours per week and also includes those 
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reporting full-time work but not at work; it gets coded as a 0 if no work is reported. Part-
time is coded as 1 if reporting less than 35 hours of work per week or those who are full-
time but working part-time for economic reasons else 0 if no work is reported.45   
Hours: The number of hours worked by young adults is also expected to go down 
as they shift from full-time to part-time employment. Since they are not tied to ESI, 
young adults have a choice to work part-time or fewer hours. This measure examines 
both hours and log hours to see if implementing the mandate led to a reduction in hours 
worked by young adults. Hours worked last week measure the total number of hours 
respondents were at work during the previous week. It includes all the hours spend on 
work or attending to business. It also includes hours working on family business or at a 
farm. I use hours worked last week as an outcome variable to assess whether there is a 
reduction in working hours for young adults.  
Job change: With greater job mobility and access to other positions young adults 
might be more likely than others to switch jobs if they are no longer dependent on ESI. 
Since they are less likely to have reached financial independence and stability, young 
adults might look for better paying jobs with higher wages that increases job mobility 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015). Previously, if they were covered through ESI, job 
mobility was limited. After the ACA, job mobility is expected to increase for this age 
group making them more likely to switch employment as they look to work fewer hours 
or for a different employer. I examine whether the ACA has increased the probability of 
young adults switching employers. The CPS asks respondents whether they are still 
                                                        
45 The full time and part-time variables get coded from the “WKSTAT” variable from the CPS. This variable includes those working 
greater than 35 hours and those working less than 35 hours last week, those who work full time and part-time but were not at work last 
week, and those who are unemployed and not in the labor force.  
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working with the same employer. I code this as a binary variable indicating 1 if 
respondents answer yes and 0 otherwise.  
Private sector employment and self-employment: Mentioned earlier, having 
freedom from job lock enables young adults to seek other employment opportunities. 
They are free to move about the labor market seeking alternative opportunities. Many can 
also shift from working in private industry to becoming self-employed. Using this 
measure, I seek to examine if there’s a shift in work sector for young adults. Private 
sector work and self-employment are treated as separate measures. Since there is some 
decline in employment expected from the reform, it is also likely that some decline will 
be seen in private sector employment. I code these variables using type of work variable 
in the CPS that measures the respondents’ job sector in the previous week.46 I only 
include those who report working currently in private sector or those who report being 
self-employed. Both the private sector employment and self-employment variables are 
coded as binary variables indicating 1 for working in private sector or being self-
employed, else coded 0. 
More than one job: This measure looks at the probability of working more than 
one job. Young adults will often work multiple jobs to make up for their lower wages.. 
They are more likely to be working fewer hours per job or part-time. This measure 
analyzes how the ACA impacts the probability of young adults working more than one 
job since they experience different working conditions post-ACA. Working additional 
jobs can include working part-time, weekends, or evenings. I code this variable as a 
binary indicating 1 if responding to working more than one job and 0 otherwise. 
                                                        
46 In the CPS, the variable “classwrk” indicates whether the respondent was employed in the private sector, self-employed, public 
sector, or armed forces.  
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Wages: The last measure looks at wages to examine if wages changed for young 
adults as a result of the law while using level of educational attainment as a further 
control. Studies show that employers pass the increased cost of providing benefits down 
to the employee in the form of lower wages. The labor effects from the Massachusetts 
Health Reform suggests that employer mandate put into effect as part of the reform led to 
an decline in wages (Kolstad & Kowalski, 2012). For the purpose of looking at how the 
ACA impacts wages of young adults, I examine weekly wages for employees. Using the 
Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORG) in the CPS, I use log of wages estimate percentage 
changes in wages to examine the impact of the reform.  
 
 
Methods  
 
To estimate the impact of the ACA on labor outcomes of young adults, I use a 
difference-in-difference (DD) strategy comparing them to an older comparison group 
aged 26-30. I use the older comparison group since they show similar trends to young 
adults when it comes to employment decisions and are more likely to be employed 
compared to younger individuals (16-18 year olds). It is also known that while the 
comparison group doesn’t get impacted by the law, they are more likely to have 
insurance through their employer compared to young adults. My analysis estimates 
several outcomes for my treatment group, as discussed earlier in this section.  
The analysis compares difference in labor outcomes for this age group pre and 
post ACA using data from the CPS. I use a DD regression model to estimate the policy 
effects based on the assumption that the comparison group will account for other time 
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varying factors that would have led the treatment group to experience different outcomes 
post reform. For ease of estimation, all specifications are linear probability models.  
 
The DD model specification is:  
 
Yist = β0 + β1PostACA t + β2Treat + β3 (PostACA t * Treat ) + X ist + ς t + σ s + ε ist  
 
 
Where Yist  is the labor market outcome for individual i in range g, state s and time t.47 
Any demographic factors such as gender, race, marital status, student status can impact 
the outcome and are controlled for, these are denoted by Xist  
  denotes state dummies that account for any state variability such as differences across 
states in population composition and ς t denotes year dummies.48   
The dummy variable for the year after the reform implementation is denoted by PostACAt 
and is coded as 1 for years after 2010 and 0 for the years before 2010.  
The dummy variable for age is Treat and coded as 1 for being 19-25 else 0.  
The coefficient of the interaction term between year and age is captured by the term β3 
and denotes the reform impact after implementation.  
  
A second set of analysis involves using a difference- in difference- in differences 
(DDD) estimation utilizing education as a further control group to estimate weekly wages 
and the hours worked. Education as a further control group is a dummy where bachelors’ 
degree and higher gets coded 1, else 0. It is expected that higher education would be an 
indicator for increased wages and hours worked since full-time work is associated with 
                                                        
47 This can be employment, full-time/part-time work, hours worked, private employment/self employment, working more than one 
job. 
48 The demographic controls included in the model are gender (male/female), race (white, black, Hispanic, others), marital status 
(married, divorced, single, separated, widowed), and education status (some high school, high school, some college, bachelors and 
above). 
σs
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higher levels of education and higher wages. For this specification, I only include older 
young adults in my treatment group. These are individuals aged 23-25 and are more 
likely to have reached some level of higher educational attainment compared to the 
younger young adults.  
  
The DDD model specification is: 
 
 
 
 
 
Where Yigst denotes the outcome variable log of wages and/or hours worked.  
The ACA and Age specifications are the same as the DD model above.  
The new control group is denoted by Educi is a dummy for education and coded 1 for 
bachelors degree or higher, else 0.  
The coefficients for the interactions for ACA*Age, Age*Educ, and ACA*Educ are 
denoted by . The coefficient for the triple difference estimator is  which denotes 
the triple interaction between Age, ACA, and Education and captures the average policy 
effect.  
  
 
2.4 Results  
 
Descriptive characteristics   
 
In Table 2.2 insured and uninsured rates for young adults are shown by firm size. 
Working in larger firms is associated with lower uninsured rates for young adults as 
Yigst = α + X igst +σ s + γACAt +δAgeg + φEduci +
η(ACAt * Ageg ) +ω(Ageg * Educi) +ν(ACAt * Educi) +
θ(ACAt * Ageg * Educt ) +ε igst
η,ω,ν θ
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larger firms are more likely to offer them full or partial benefits. Approximately 77 
percent of young adults were insured in firms with more than 1,000 employees while 60 
percent were insured in small firms with fewer than 10 employees. This also explains the 
employer mandate; firms with more than 200 employers are required to provide insurance 
or pay a penalty.   
Table 2.3 shows the demographic and labor characteristics by age group for the 
treatment and comparison group. Young adults have higher rates of unemployment 
(compared to 26-30 years olds) while having lower rates of education attainment. About 
64 percent of young adults were employed compared to 76 percent of 26-30 year olds. 
Out of those who were employed, 61 percent were part-time workers. Since young adults 
are more likely to work in part-time positions, they work fewer hours and hence, earn 
less. The weekly wage comparison between the two groups shows the treatment group 
earning $438 compared to $711 by the older group. Looking at some of the basic 
characteristics of young adult employment in Figure 2.1, we see that employment rate 
declines around 2008 and then slowly picks up, but not at the levels prior to 2008. Full 
time work, having the same employer, and having more than one job all show declining 
trends over the years with full-time work, working more than one job, and employment 
rate showing steeper declines.  
 
 
DD estimates 
 
Table 2.4 shows the results from the difference-in-differences model. Separate 
models are run to estimate the impact of the law on labor market outcomes of young 
adults in states with no prior mandates these are discussed later. The results presented in 
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Table 2.4 include all states irrespective of whether they had prior dependent coverage 
laws or not. Outcomes include employment, full-time and part-time employment, 
working for the same employer (to test job mobility), hours, employment in private 
sector, self-employed, and working for more than one employer. For ease of estimation, 
all models are run as linear probability models.   
The results indicate that the law is associated with a decline in employment of 
about 1.7 percentage points, which is approximately a 2.6 percent decline in overall 
employment. This coefficient is small but statistically significant. Table 2.4 also shows a 
significant result for the overall decline in full-time work as a result of the law by 
approximately 3 percentage points or about a 5.5 percent decline. This finding is also 
consistent with prior work on health insurance access from a source other than ESI and 
decline in full-time work.49 Since the probability of working full-time declines, it is also 
expected that hours of work will decline. Hours worked show a decline in Table 2.4 with 
a statistically significant coefficient. Figure 2.2 shows the decline in the hours of work 
over time. The work hours show a declining trend starting in 2008 that continues post-
ACA.  
The next set of specifications assess whether young adults are more or less likely 
to have the same employer. The results indicate a statistically insignificant coefficient on 
having the same employer. Post-ACA young adults are less likely to work more than one 
job; the probability of young adults having more than one job declines by about 2 
percentage points indicating a reduced labor supply. Employment in the private sector 
declines by 2 percentage points, which can be attributed to a decline in full-time 
                                                        
49 E.g. Heim & Lurie (2014) find declines in full-time work between 1.5 and 3.8 percent.  
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employment as well as young adults seeking alternative opportunities as a result of 
freedom from job-lock. An increase in the probability of being self-employed was one of 
the hypothesized outcomes. However, the results do not indicate as such.  
The overall DD results indicate decline in full-time work and hours worked with 
declines in the probability of being employed but don’t really show any indication of 
increase job mobility or any evidence of movement between employers. It is possible that 
the lack of job mobility indicated in the results might have to do with the economic 
downturn around the time, which could have impacted young adults more than others.  
 
 
DDD estimates 
 
Table 2.5 shows the estimates from the triple differences model. For estimating 
the triple differences, I only use young adults aged between 23-25, as they are more 
likely to have reached some level of higher education compared to the younger young 
adults aged 19-22. Separate models are run for log wages, hours, and log hours. Higher 
education indicates higher wages and impacts hours worked. Full-time positions are 
associated with higher educational levels. All the results indicate insignificant 
coefficients even as the coefficient signs are in the expected direction.  In Figure 2.3, 
wages rise from a base of around $400 per week for young adults and then drop around 
2009. After 2009 the wages stagnate and then increase after 2012, possibly indicating a 
shift in employment after the economic downturn or higher wages due to the fact that this 
age group was less likely to depend on ESI.  
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The lack of any significance in the DDD estimation results could indicate that 
there is not much difference when education is added as a further control group and that 
the treatment group shows no difference from the control group due to the possibility that 
there is little difference between the treatment group and the comparison group. Labor 
market outcomes for older young adults (23-25) are more likely to resemble the control 
group (26-30) and therefore, fail to show any significant difference. Using education as a 
further control group and by limiting the age to 23-25 from 19-25 was expected to show 
some difference but it didn’t.  
 
 
Subgroups 
 
According to prior literature, employment outcomes for married individuals 
particularly women are different than those experienced by unmarried women. According 
to studies by Olson (1998) and Buchmueller & Valletta (1999) a reduction in labor force 
ranging anywhere from 6 to 12 percent was reported for married women. Since it’s 
possible that married women can get health insurance coverage through their spouse, 
their labor supply will decline compared to others. It is also possible that this trend might 
be similar for young adults as well. To test if married women’s labor outcomes are 
impacted by the ACA, I run additional models to estimate whether they are more likely to 
be employed as well as work part-time compared to full-time.  
I also analyze the impact on employment outcomes for both men and women to 
see if the ACA had a significant impact for either group. Lastly, I analyze employment 
outcomes by race evaluating Hispanics to estimate if they are more/less likely to have the 
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same employment outcomes as non-Hispanics. The results for these models are show in 
Table 2.6.  
Table 2.6 shows results for different subgroups by employment and working full-
time. Men experience a greater decline in employment and full-time work compared to 
women, although the difference between the declines in full-time work for the two groups 
is not that different. Differences exist between the declines in full-time employment of 
married vs. unmarried women. Married women are more likely to reduce full-time work 
by 3 percentage points compared to 1 percentage point decline for unmarried women. 
These results are significant at the 10 and 5 percent significance levels respectively. 
Lastly, comparing Hispanics vs. Non-Hispanics finds a greater decline in full-time 
employment for Hispanics.  
Figure 2.4 shows both male and female young adults having parallel trends in 
employment. However, males show greater declines compared to females. Next, as 
shown in Figure 2.5, married women experience lower rates of employment compared to 
unmarried women. Unmarried women experienced a steeper drop in employment rates 
right before the 2010 law, which could also be possible due to the economic downturn 
but have traditionally higher rates of employment compared to married women. The 
differences between Hispanics and Non-Hispanics in Figure 2.6 shows Hispanics having 
a lower rate of employment and experiencing greater declines in employment compared 
to Non-Hispanics.  
Overall the results show employment to be somewhat similar for subgroups and 
even insignificant in the case of married and unmarried women. The statistically 
significant changes are for full-time work for the subgroups as some show greater 
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declines in full-time employment. Married women can get health insurance coverage 
through their spouses hence they are more likely to reduce the number of hours worked 
compared to unmarried women. Hispanics are more likely to have greater declines in full-
time work as they are one group expected to have higher take up rates of coverage post-
ACA compared to others since Hispanic young adults’ typically experienced higher 
uninsured rates in the past and with health insurance access are more likely to reduce full-
time work.  
 
Robustness checks  
 
In this section, I run separate models to check for the robustness of my results. 
This involves running the same specification as earlier but only for 21 states and 
Washington DC. I also run the above specification by dropping 2008 and 2009 to assess 
the impact without the recession years. Next, I only include the older young adults aged 
23-25 as they are more likely to be working compared to 19-22 year olds.  Lastly, I 
conduct an event study analysis that looks at how employment and full-time work 
changes based on age and year. These are run as two separate models. These checks are 
further discussed in the following paragraphs.  
The first set of specifications include running the original model using only the 
post-ACA states (states that had no prior dependent coverage provisions). The results for 
these specifications are presented in Table 2.7. When only considering the post-ACA 
states, the effect sizes are greater compared to the main model. In Table 2.7, employment 
declined in post-ACA states by 2.5 percentage points while full-time employment 
declined by 4 percentage points compared to 1.6 and 3 percentage points shown in the 
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main results. Both results indicate strong statistical significance. Other significant results 
indicate decline in private employment, reduced hours and working more than one job. 
This set of checks shows greater impacts on states that mandated dependent coverage 
after 2010, which means that while ACA did impact all states by reducing full-time 
employment, hours worked etc. for young adults, it had bigger impacts on late adopters 
as these states had no prior laws for dependent coverage. Figures 2.7 & 2.8 show 
differences between pre-ACA and post-ACA states for the two age groups. Figure 2.7 
shows employment trends for 19-25 and 26-30 year olds. The trends between the two 
groups are parallel; employment is higher for the two groups in the pre-ACA states. This 
corroborates finding higher impacts when my model only includes post-ACA states. 
Similarly, Figure 2.8 shows full-time work, which declines in both pre and post ACA 
states with a higher decline in post-ACA states after 2010.50  
Table 2.8 and 2.9 show additional specifications. Table 2.8 shows results when 
the years 2008 and 2009 are dropped from the analysis. As mentioned previously, job 
separation was not significant due to the possibility of the economic downturn around 
2008 and 2009. I rerun the original regressions without observations from these two 
years. I don’t find any changes in my outcome, as job separation is still insignificant 
indicating the years of economic downturn cannot explain the lack of any job separation. 
I also run an alternative specification with only older young adults aged 22-25 shown in 
Table 2.9. I find the coefficients for employment and full-time work are still significant 
however, smaller. For instance, decline in full-time work drops to approximately 2 
percentage points compared to over 3 percentage points from the main model. These 
                                                        
50 Note that for 19-25 year olds the employment and full-time work is almost the same in 2005 and over time gets more pronounced 
for the post-ACA states. 
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results indicate older young adults were less likely to be affected compared to younger 
young adults. 
The last set of specifications involves conducting an event study that defines the 
event of interest and identifies the time period over which the changes in employment 
and full-time work get examined. The period over which events get examined is known 
as an event window and in this case it will be examining ages ranging from 19-30 years 
and for the years 2005-2015 as used in this chapter. This allows for the analysis along the 
timeline of the event. Event study analysis is used here to check the robustness of results 
to ensure the results are not driven by pre-existing trends existing in the labor market. 
The models presented below include age and year dummies with their interactions as 
shown in specification (1) and year and treatment dummies with their interactions as 
shown in specification (2).  
 
 
By Age 
 
Yit = β0 + β119 + β220 + β321+ β4 22 + β523+ β624 + β725
+β826 + β927 + β1028 + β1129 + β12Post + β13(19 * Post) + β14 (20 * Post)
+β15(21* Post) + β16(22 * Post) + β17(23* Post) + β18(24 * Post) + β19(25 * Post)
+β20(26* Post) + β21(27* Post) + β22(28 * Post) + β23(29 * Post) +ε it
 
 
 --------------(1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By Year 
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Yit = β0 + β12006 + β22007 + β32008 + β4 2009 + β52010 + β62011
+β72012 + β82013+ β92014 + β102015 + β11Treat + β12(2006* Treat)
+β13(2007* Treat) + β14 (2008*Treat) + β15(2009* Treat) + β16(2010* Treat)
+β17(2011* Treat) + β18(2012* Treat) + β19(2013* Treat) + β20(2014 * Treat) + β21(2015*Treat) +ε it
  
----------------(2) 
 
 
For the two specifications above, the outcome variable employment and full time 
employment is denoted by Yit . In equation 1,  
β1 to β11 denotes the coefficient of individual dummy for age from 19 to 29 years old; 
Post is the dummy variable denoting time after the ACA, and  
β13 to β23 denoting the coefficient of interaction between the dummy for age and time 
 
In equation 2,  
β1 to β10 denotes the coefficient of individual dummy for year;  
Treat denotes the dummy for treatment group, and  
β12 to β21 denotes the coefficient of interaction between the treatment dummy and year 
 
In specification (1) those aged 30 are used as a comparison group (omitted group) while 
in specification (2) the comparison year is 2005. The results for these two specifications 
are presented in Tables 2.10 and 2.11.51    
  
 
                                                        
51 The dummy variables included in the event study models are coded similarly to the dummy variables in the main model. 
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The results from the two specifications are presented in Table 2.10 and 2.11. For 
specification (1), the output shows the treatment group to be the one impacted by the 
ACA shown by the statistically significant results for both employment and full-time 
work indicating no impact on the control group. Secondly, the treatment effect is the 
greatest for younger young adults compared to older young adults which confirms that 
younger young adults are more likely to not be working or work part-time compared to 
older young adults. For instance, in Table 2.10, coefficients for the treatment group are 
significant post-enactment (5.9 percentage point decline in full-time work for 21 year 
olds) compared to the comparison group. In specification (2), the estimates shows the 
time trends before and after that ACA. In Table 2.11, starting in 2006, the results show no 
significance until 2009 as employment and full-time work declined. The ACA impact 
starting in 2010 for young adults shows a strong statistical significance for the year’s post 
2010.  
 
2.5 Discussion 
 
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of changes in labor outcomes for 
young adults following the ACA. I analyze several key labor outcomes to determine how 
the law impacts the young adult population using monthly data from the CPS (2005-
2015). I find that dependent coverage laws allowing young adults to be on parental 
insurance impacted the labor supply of this age group. The overall decline in employment 
is approximately 1.7 percentage points, which is a statistically significant change. 
However, the major decline was in full-time work by this age group, which declined by a 
little over 3-percentage points. These coefficients change in the models that only look at 
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states with dependent coverage mandates post-ACA. Using separate models for several 
labor outcomes such as full-time work, part-time work, hours worked, private vs. self 
employed this chapter illustrates the difference for young adults by comparing them to an 
older group aged 26-30.  
Consistent with prior literature on the relationship between health insurance and 
employment, this chapter finds that the ACA impacted employment and full-time work. 
Changes were statistically significant for both states with prior dependent coverage 
mandate and those with dependent mandates post-ACA, even though the impacts were 
larger for post-ACA states. While full-time work declined so did the probability for 
working more than one job, which declined by approximately 2 percentage points. This 
result is consistent with an overall decline in hours of work. As young adults work fewer 
hours post-ACA, the probability of them working additional jobs also declines.  
The results are consistent with earlier studies on changes in employment and non-
employer based health insurance coverage. Studies find job separation in the range of 15 
to 25 percent. While earlier studies find big drops in job separation, this chapter does not 
find any evidence of job separation (change in job mobility). However, as mentioned 
above, the results are consistent with changes in employment when an alternate source of 
health insurance is available even as I examine a very different age group. The estimates 
for change in employment levels for young adults are also consistent with estimates in 
studies done on the Massachusetts Health Reform of 2006 by Heim & Lurie (2014). 
Young adults tend to be different than other age groups or more specifically, those 
working in a particular industry as discussed in the literature review. It is possible that 
declines in employment for young adults will differ when analyzed by industry type. 
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Their decisions are different from those of other age groups when it comes to 
employment or full-time and part-time work. For instance, they can still decide to be 
employed and work fewer hours while investing more time on education once they have 
the dependent coverage option. While the results do not indicate a significant increase in 
young adults becoming self-employed, there is a significant decline in private sector 
employment. It’s possible that leaving private sector employment indicates willingness to 
work in other sectors or in positions that might not offer any benefits and includes 
independent work, working for a family business or small business, or not work.  
Using education as a further control group, I estimated a triple differences model 
to evaluate whether having higher education among older young adults has any impact on 
wages and hours worked. However, the results are not significant, implying that 
education does not have any impact in this age group. It’s more likely that the control and 
treatment groups are similar since labor market outcomes for older young adults aged 23-
25 could closely resemble 26-30 year olds.  
I also examine the differences between selected subgroups to estimate labor 
outcomes. The literature review provides overwhelming support for existing differences 
between married and unmarried women’s labor force participation. I find insignificant 
results for employment for the two groups but significant estimates for working full-time. 
Consistent with prior work, I find married women to reduce their number of work hours 
compared to unmarried women. Analyzing other subgroups, I don’t find significant 
differences between men and women however; working full-time among Hispanics and 
Non-Hispanics shows a strong significance indicating Hispanics are more likely to work 
  91
part-time. Regardless of gender, marital status, and race, employment is not impacted by 
the ACA as much as working full-time.  
To check the validity of my results I run additional models that only look at post-
ACA implementation states. I find results with larger coefficients on these states 
indicating that the ACA had bigger impacts on late adopter states. Next, I run two other 
specifications. First, I drop the years 2008 and 2009 from the analysis to see if job 
separation becomes significant, as these are the recession years. Despite dropping these 
years, I don’t find the results to be statistically significant. It might be possible for future 
research to test this result with other additional controls such as access to parental 
insurance or source of insurance to see if the results become significant. Second, I run 
another specification with older young adults. The results indicate smaller coefficients 
indicating lesser impact on older young adults compared to younger young adults. I also 
run two separate event analysis models to check whether the results are driven by pre-
existing trends. I find consistent results from the event study model indicating no prior 
trends between the treatment and control group in the first model when employment and 
full-time work are estimated. There is also a lack of evidence showing any specific trends 
for the same employment and full-time work variables when the second model is run 
using years prior to the ACA. Any change that can be attributed to the economic 
downturn happened before 2010 as the results from this model show. The recession 
accounts for declines from 2008 to 2009. The ACA was effective in 2010 and therefore, 
the results show statistical significance starting in the year the law was signed, not earlier. 
This indicates any impact the law had on young adults was after 2010.  
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The results show no significant impact on job mobility even though they indicate 
a significant decline in job separation and in full-time work. Unlike prior literature that 
finds increased job mobility, I do not find any evidence of job mobility. This is likely as 
outcomes such as job lock or job mobility are expected to be different depending on the 
population studied. Young adults might not show the same willingness to separate from 
work as some older age groups who might be closer to retirement or switching jobs 
compared to more experienced workers. Similarly, the literature review in this chapter 
highlights several groups such as married women from different age groups as well as 
those with diagnosed illnesses. Their employment outcomes will also be very different 
compared to the outcomes for young adults when health insurance is available from a 
source other than ESI. The decreased job mobility could have indicated young adult’s 
unwillingness to leave their current employer given the recession and recovery during the 
years before and after the ACA that make any instances of job lock or job mobility hard 
to distinguish. However, even after I drop the two recession years from the analysis, I 
don’t see any changes in young adult job mobility. Despite this finding, it is seen that 
young adults are less likely to work multiple jobs. In the future, it is possible the 
individual mandate requiring mandatory coverage, which came into effect starting in 
2014, might change some outcomes as the economic conditions continue to improve. One 
such change might include increased coverage for those who previously didn’t get 
coverage under dependent plans.  
It is also possible that job mobility isn’t significant since premiums on new plans 
under the ACA might be a factor in impacting job mobility. If adding a individual on 
dependent coverage increases premium than its possible that those with access to 
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employer plans might decide to keep them instead of switching to dependent coverage. 
Higher premiums would have a negative effect on job mobility for young adults when 
they get added to a dependent coverage plan compared to having ESI. If dependent 
coverage is not as comprehensive as the ESI then the marginal benefit of adding an 
additional individual to the plan outweighs the marginal cost when ESI is available.  
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Table 2.1: Employment rates 
Year 19-25 year olds 26-30 year olds 
2005 .691 .791 
2006 .697 .796 
2007 .693 .800 
2008 .679 .788 
2009 .631 .751 
2010 .620 .747 
2011 .618 .746 
2012 .625 .757 
2013 .628 .761 
2014 .638 .768 
2015 .644 .771 
Note: Weighted tabulations of the Current Population Survey data. Table  
      shows percentage of employed 19-25 year olds and 26-30 year olds from 
      2005-2015. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Working young adults by firm size and health 
insurance (percentage) 
Firm size (employees) Uninsured Insured 
Under 10 .402 .598 
10-24 .358 .642 
10-49 .319 .681 
25-99 .323 .677 
50-99 .289 .711 
100-499 .267 .733 
500-999 .249 .751 
Over 1,000 .233 .767 
Note: Weighted tabulations of the Current Population Survey data. Table shows percentage of uninsured and insured employed young 
adults by firm size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  95
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics 
 19-25 year olds 26-30 year olds 
Age (years) 22.04 28.01 
   
Employed .643 .761 
Unemployed .357 .239 
Full-time employment .388 .590 
Part-time employment .612 .410 
Private employment .630 .660 
   
Weekly wages $437.90 $711.30 
Hours (average) 35.55 39.54 
   
Some high school .119 .109 
High school diploma .315 .274 
Some college .430 .295 
Bachelors and higher .137 .323 
   
   
Male .498 .485 
Female .502 .515 
   
NH-White .587 .601 
NH-Black .121 .111 
Hispanic .172 .164 
Others .120 .117 
   
N 1,525,897 1,123,224 
Note: Tabulations of the 2005-2015 Current Population Survey monthly data. 
    
9
6
 
Table 2.4: DD estimates of the impact of ACA on labor market outcomes of young adults (all states) 
 Employed Full-time Part-time Hours Same-Emp Private-Emp Self-Emp Working >1 job 
PostACA -0.0290*** -0.0336*** -0.0287*** -0.434***  0.00332*** -0.00807*** -0.00403 0.0248***  
 (0.00288) (0.00333)  (0.00331)  (0.0671) (0.000950 (0.00226) (0.00160) (0.00258) 
Treat -0.0884*** -0.134***  -0.0171*** -3.340*** -0.0119*** -0.0403*** -0.0228*** -0.0858*** 
 (0.00464)  (0.00567) (0.00358) (0.0949) (0.00124) (0.00423) (0.00122) (0.00461) 
PostACA*Treat 
(DD) 
-0.0166*** -0.0311*** 0.00789 -0.471*** 0.000546  -0.0202*** 0.00211  -0.0186*** 
 (0.00323) (0.00378) (0.00517) (0.133) (0.00164) (0.00424)  0.00165) (0.00347) 
Notes: The average impact (DD impact) is the interaction of the dummy variable for the treatment variable and the dummy variable for the enactment (time) period. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and are clustered at the state level. All regressions are weighted using person level weights. Data: Monthly CPS data from 2005-2015. Outcome variables are employed in column 1 
and indicates 1 if employed 0 otherwise. Working full time in column 2 and indicates working over 35 hours as 1 and 0 if not working. Working part-time in column 3 and indicated working 
less than 35 hours as 1 and 0 if not working at all. Column 4 outcome variable is number of hours per week individual works. In column 5 whether the individual has the same employer coded 
as 1 if yes and 0 otherwise.  In column 6 and 7 whether the individual is private or self-employed, 1 indicates a yes response and 0 otherwise. The last column the indicator variable equals 1 if 
working more than 1 job else 0.  
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 
Table 2.5: DDD estimates of the impact of ACA on specific labor 
outcomes for young adults (by education) 
 Log wages Log hours Hours 
Enact 0.00134 -0.0157*** -0.558*** 
 (0.0170)  (0.00316)  (0.106) 
Treatment -0.177***  -0.0479*** -1.489*** 
 (0.00921) (0.00349) (0.0800) 
Education 0.489*** 0.0712*** 2.607*** 
 (0.0209) (0.00765)  (0.208) 
Enact*Treatment -0.0409* -0.0151 -0.354* 
 (0.0178) (0.00758) (0.145) 
Treatment*Education 0.00535 -0.00272 -0.00804 
 (0.0225) (0.00692) (0.229) 
Enact*Education -0.0951*** -0.00426 -0.385 
 (0.0182) (0.00627) (0.189) 
Impact (DDD) 0.0556 0.0155 0.333 
 (0.0384) (0.00978) (0.361) 
Notes: Includes only 23-25 year olds, standard errors are in parentheses. The outcome variable is log wages, 
hours, and log of hours in the first, second, and third column respectively. The coefficients in the first, 
second, and third row are the coefficients for enactment period of the ACA, the treatment age group, and 
education; all dummy variables. In the 4th row, the coefficient is the interaction between enactment and 
treatment. In the 5th row the coefficient is the interaction between treatment and education. In the 6th row the 
coefficient in the interaction between enactment and education. The last row is the triple differences 
estimator, which is the three-way interaction between enactment, treatment, and education. * p<0.05** 
p<0.01*** p<0.001
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Table 2.6: Subgroups 
 Employed Full-time 
Sex   
Male -0.0225*** -0.0278*** 
 (0.00538) (0.00405) 
Female -0.0139*** -0.0241*** 
 (0.00346) (0.00345) 
Marital Status   
Married females -0.0159 -0.0300** 
 (0.00994) (0.00916) 
Unmarried females -0.00936 -0.0107* 
 (0.00524)  (0.00460) 
Race    
Hispanic -0.0192* -0.0394*** 
 (0.00739) (0.00494) 
Non-Hispanic -0.0180*** -0.0224*** 
 (0.00369) (0.00338) 
Notes: Estimates based on weighted samples from the 2005-2015 CPS. The outcome variable Employed is a  
dummy for being employed indicating 1 else 0. The outcome variable Full-time is a dummy indicating 1 if 
working greater than 35 hours else 0. Standard errors are in parentheses.* p<0.05** p<0.01*** p<0.001
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Table 2.7: Models for robustness checks (Post-ACA states only) 
 Employed Full-time Part-time Hours Same-Emp Private-Emp Self-Emp Working >1 job 
PostACA -0.0307*** -0.0357*** -0.0288*** -0.523***  0.00374* -0.00648* -0.00705** -0.0252*** 
 (0.00438) (0.00473)  (0.00527)  (0.0714) (0.00144) (0.00266) (0.00224) (0.00407) 
Treat -0.0823*** -0.127***  -0.0124 -3.386*** -0.0102*** -0.0354*** -0.0235*** 0.0773*** 
 (0.00722) (0.00882) (0.00733) (0.126) (0.00220) (0.00595) (0.00231) (0.00686) 
PostACA*Treat (DD) -0.0252*** -0.0403*** -0.00179 -0.501*  0.00101 -0.0316*** 0.00457 -0.0298*** 
 (0.00403) (0.00502) (0.00635)  (0.207) (0.00241) (0.00562) (0.00265) (0.00395) 
Notes: See notes in Table 2.4. Only includes 21 states and District of Columbia  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.8: Models for robustness checks (years 2008 and 2009 dropped) 
 Employed Full-time Part-time Hours Same-Emp Private-Emp Self-Emp Working >1 job 
PostACA -0.0359*** -0.0434*** -0.0263*** -0.681*** 0.00477*** -0.0115*** -0.00387* -0.0313*** 
 (0.00321) (0.00368) (0.00402) (0.0761) (0.00107)  (0.00215) (0.00185) (0.00290) 
Treat -0.0864*** -0.130*** -0.0132** -3.325*** -0.0117*** -0.0383*** -0.0229*** -0.0840*** 
 (0.00440) (0.00550) (0.00438) (0.104) (0.00147) (0.00418) (0.00171) (0.00452) 
PostACA*Treat (DD) -0.0188*** -0.0352*** 0.00308 -0.483** 0.000594  -0.0216*** 0.00217 -0.0203*** 
 (0.00362) (0.00472) (0.00629) (0.162) (0.00175)  (0.00493) (0.00195) (0.00378) 
Notes: See notes in Table 2.4. Only includes years 2005-2007 & 2010-2015 
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Table 2.9: Models for robustness checks (ages 23-25 years only for treatment group) 
 Employed Full-time Part-time Hours Same-Emp Private-Emp Self-Emp Working >1 job 
PostACA -0.0300*** -0.0356*** -0.0286*** -0.487*** 0.00325** -0.00917*** -0.00402* -0.0258*** 
 (0.00287) (0.00342) (0.00322) (0.0683) (0.000945) (0.00230) (0.00159) (0.00259) 
Treat -0.0358*** -0.0510*** -0.00433 -1.533***  -0.00663*** -0.00128 -0.0168*** 0.0367*** 
 (0.00374) (0.00462) (0.00352) (0.0636) (0.000954)  (0.00345) (0.00151) (0.00385) 
PostACA*Treat (DD) -0.0110** -0.0196*** 0.00585 -0.280* 0.000421 -0.190** 0.000522 -0.0123** 
 (0.00342) (0.00458) (0.00512) (0.118) (0.00128) (0.00423) (0.00219) (0.00374) 
 Notes: See notes in Table 2.4. Only includes older young adults (23-25) in the treatment group. 
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Table 2.10: Results of event study by age 
Age Employed Full-time 
19 -0.0665*** -0.339*** 
 (0.00412)  (0.00863) 
20 -0.0473*** -0.247*** 
 (0.00285)  (0.00761)  
21 -0.0315*** -0.199*** 
 (0.00249)  (0.00740) 
22 -0.0305*** -0.123*** 
 (0.00273)  (0.00527) 
23 -0.0220*** -0.0684*** 
 (0.00199)  (0.00518) 
24 -0.0170*** -0.0388*** 
 (0.00269) (0.00402) 
25 -0.00685** -0.0189*** 
 (0.00253) (0.00309) 
26 -0.00560* -0.00636 
 (0.00254) (0.00483) 
27 -0.00334 0.000428 
 (0.00270) (0.00355) 
28 -0.00400  0.00417 
 (0.00291) 0.00489 
29 -0.000488  0.00489 
 (0.00234)  (0.00362) 
Enactment -0.0166*** 0.00233 
 (0.00364)  (0.00458) 
19*post -0.0241*** -0.0493*** 
 (0.00569)  (0.00918) 
20*post -0.0156*  -0.0660*** 
 (0.00641)  (0.0108) 
21*post -0.0157** -0.0594*** 
 (0.00489) (0.00928) 
22*post -0.00735  -0.0552*** 
 (0.00511)  (0.00688) 
23*post -0.00605 -0.0320*** 
 (0.00416) (0.00662) 
24*post -0.00172 -0.0292*** 
 (0.00526) (0.00578) 
25*post -0.0112* -0.0210** 
 (0.00434) (0.00616) 
26*post 0.00175 -0.0219** 
 (0.00485) (0.00747) 
27*post 0.000320 -0.00755 
 (0.00457) (0.00579) 
28*post -0.00207 -0.00758 
 (0.00440) (0.00604) 
29*post -0.00181 -0.0164* 
 (0.00380) (0.00628) 
Notes: Individuals in both the treatment and comparison groups are 
included and are coded as dummies; age 30 is left out as the 
comparison. Post is a dummy variable indicating the years after the 
reform implementation. The interaction between Post and age gives 
the employment and full-time work coefficients for the specific ages 
after the ACA. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.05 
**p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Table 2.11: Results of event study by year 
Year Employed Full-time 
2006 0.00518  0.00418 
 (0.00331) (0.00320) 
2007 0.00673 0.00167 
 (0.00339)  (0.00355)  
2008 -0.00800* -0.00336 
 (0.00318)  (0.00368) 
2009 -0.0449*** -0.0491*** 
 (0.00380) (0.00349) 
2010 -0.0486*** 0.0258*** 
 (0.00377) (0.00400) 
2011 -0.0508*** -0.0244*** 
 (0.00341) (0.00386) 
2012 -0.0421*** -0.0194*** 
 (0.00339) (0.00411) 
2013 -0.0394*** -0.0108* 
 (0.00369) (0.00411) 
2014 -0.0344*** -0.0169*** 
 (0.00390)  (0.00385) 
2015 -0.0282*** -0.0191*** 
 (0.00376) (0.00386) 
Treat -0.0708*** -0.104*** 
 (0.00505) (0.00481) 
Treat*2006 -0.000543 0.00221 
 (0.00452) (0.00406) 
Treat*2007 -0.00755 0.00864 
 (0.00459) (0.00513) 
Treat*2008 -0.00950 -0.00738 
 (0.00504) (0.00597) 
Treat*2009 -0.0204** -0.0208** 
 (0.00586)  (0.00688) 
Treat*2010 -0.0275*** -0.0413*** 
 (0.00706) (0.00537) 
Treat*2011 -0.0276*** -0.0481*** 
 (0.00551) (0.00730) 
Treat*2012 -0.0302*** -0.0486*** 
 (0.00674) (0.00696) 
Treat*2013 -0.0323*** -0.0438*** 
 (0.00722) (0.00698) 
Treat*2014 -0.0273*** -0.0311*** 
 (0.00645) (0.00751) 
Treat*2015 -0.0230**  -0.0232** 
 (0.00718)  (0.00665) 
Notes: Years include 2005 to 2006 with 2005 being left out for comparison  
and are coded as dummies. Treat is a dummy indicating being in 
the treatment or comparison group. The interactions between Treat 
and year give the employment and full-time work coefficients for 
years before and after the ACA. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Figure 2.1: Basic employment characteristics 
 
Note: Tabulations from the 2005-2015 CPS monthly data 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Average Hours and log of hours worked per week 
Note: Tabulations from the 2005-2015 CPS monthly data 
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Figure 2.3: Weekly wages 
 
Note: Tabulations from the 2005-2015 CPS monthly data 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Employment 
 
Note: Tabulations from the 2005-2015 CPS monthly data 
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Figure 2.5: Employment  
 
Note: Tabulations from the 2005-2015 CPS monthly data 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Employment 
 
Note: Tabulations from the 2005-2015 CPS monthly data 
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Figure 2.7: Employment (Pre and Post-ACA states) 
 
Note: Tabulations from the 2005-2015 CPS monthly data 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Full-time work (Pre and Post-ACA states) 
 
Note: Tabulations from the 2005-2015 CPS monthly data 
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Chapter 3: DOES HAVING DEPENDENT COVERGE FROM THE ACA 
IMPACT EDUCATIONAL ENROLLMENT  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I assess the ACA’s impact on educational outcomes for young 
adults. The impact of access to dependent insurance coverage on education of young 
adults is an unexplored topic. As we saw in Chapter 2, the flexibility of not being tied to 
Employer Sponsored Insurance (ESI) offers young adults opportunities for changing their 
employment status. Additionally, young adults might also be more likely to enroll as 
students, given the declines in full-time work.52  
Health insurance for children and young adults is strongly correlated to their 
parent’s income and employment (Kriss et al., 2008). For college going young adults, it is 
also correlated to their enrollment status. Those enrolled in college full-time prior to the 
ACA had dependent coverage access due to their full-time enrollment status. However, 
insurance coverage for young adults not enrolled in college was different from those 
enrolled in full-time college. Prior to the ACA, financial aid, fellowships and the 
availability of parental health insurance were possible incentives for a student to remain 
enrolled full-time. Full-time students are more likely to complete college degrees than 
part-time students (Chen & Carroll, 2007). As a result parental health insurance provided 
full-time students with an opportunity to complete college and also, with a significant tax 
break (Jung, Hall, & Rhoads, 2013)53.  
                                                        
52 Implies some level of college enrollment 
53 When students get dependent coverage, they or their parents no longer have to pay a fee they would have owed if the dependent 
weren’t covered. Also dependent coverage is income tax free.  
  107
Prior to the ACA, young adults going to college at later ages such as 22 or 23 
might not have had the same incentives to be a college student as they do now. 
Previously, employers allowed their employees’ children to be on dependent coverage 
until the age of 22, making the opportunity cost of attending college after 22 higher 
compared to the forgone wages. Since ESI provides more comprehensive coverage 
compared to individual insurance, it was convenient to choose work over attending 
college (Dillender, 2014). Because having dependent coverage makes it possible to have 
similar comprehensive coverage and not require obtaining it through work, alternatives 
such as post-secondary education become possible as a result of the ACA. Another 
possible advantage of having dependent coverage is the reduction in cost of college, 
which often includes the cost of health insurance.  This can reduce the psychological and 
financial burden associated with paying tuition.54  
To understand the potential benefits of ACA for educational attainment we can 
think of how enacted policies impact education and college enrollment levels. Policies 
such as merit based state scholarships and Federal grants have shown to be effective in 
increasing college enrollment for those from disadvantaged backgrounds.55 In this case, 
the dependent coverage provision of the ACA was implemented keeping young adults in 
mind since they are more likely to be uninsured. At the same time, the law had some 
secondary benefits for this age group. As discussed in Chapter 2, freedom from job-lock 
creates opportunities for young adults. Another benefit of freedom from job-lock is 
freedom to pursue post-secondary education as either a full-time or part-time student and 
                                                        
54 Most colleges require students to have health insurance. According to the GAO, 57 percent of all colleges (public, private, two year) 
offer health insurance, which is a part of the tuition package. While 82 percent of 4-year colleges nationwide offer health insurance to 
students, only 29 percent of two year colleges offer health insurance. In 2008, 30 percent of colleges required students to have health 
insurance (Government Accountability Office, 2008) 
55 Some of these policies get discussed in the literature review  
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enroll in either a 2-year or a 4-year college. Dependent coverage provision can mean 
increased opportunities for pursuing higher education and in turn higher future wages 
throughout adulthood. Allowing individuals to go back to school at later ages could also 
result in more specialized and advanced degrees and an increase in their earning potential 
over their lifetime.  
Prior to the ACA, many students, particularly, those from disadvantaged 
backgrounds might not have had an opportunity at a post-secondary education since most 
colleges required mandatory insurance. Minorities along with students from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds are usually less likely to be insured (Governmental 
Accountability Office, 2008). The percentage of college-going students uninsured stood 
at 20 percent or 1.7 million students in 2006. These uninsured students incurred between 
$120 million and $255 million in uncompensated care for non-injury related medical 
events in 2005 (Government Accountability Office, 2008). Hence, not having insurance 
impacts not only those who are not enrolled in college but also those who are. The cost of 
attending college and the additional cost of health insurance made higher education out of 
reach for many.  
 As a result of dependent coverage under the ACA, higher education is an option 
even if one enrolls as a student at a later age. Having the option of dependent coverage 
also gives young adults other options such as enrolling in vocational training programs. 
At the same time, enrollment in a 2-yr college or part-time enrollment also becomes a 
possibility since enrollment status does not determine insurance coverage anymore since 
dependent coverage extends up to the 26th birthday.  
 
  109
 Main Hypothesis 
This chapter evaluates the impact of the ACA on educational outcomes for young 
adults. My analysis investigates whether the availability of dependent coverage has an 
effect on the college enrollment of young adults. I investigate whether young adults are 
more likely to be full-time or part-time students, attend a 2-year college over a 4-year 
college, or be enrolled in some vocational training program. 
To understand how the law might impact young adults consider Figure 3.1. Prior 
to the ACA, those young adults aged 22 years and younger had a lower incentive to work 
full-time and a higher incentive be enrolled as full-time students to benefit from the 
dependent coverage allowed for full-time college going students compared to older 
young adults.56 After the ACA, the full-time enrollment requirement was removed.  All 
young adults were eligible for dependent coverage up to their 26th birthday regardless of 
college enrollment status. Therefore, post-ACA, there is a greater likelihood to attend a 2-
year college instead of a 4-year college as it’s cheaper, and one could work part-time 
since there was no longer a full-time enrollment requirement.57 This allows more 
flexibility in pursuing education while still working. Figure 3.1 also shows older young 
adults (23-25) had low incentives to enroll in college and a higher incentive to work pre-
ACA. Post-ACA the same group were less likely to participate in full-time work and 
become more likely to be enrolled in college. It is also more likely that they attend 
college part-time and work.58 Therefore, I hypothesize that the ACA will likely lead to an 
                                                        
56 Young adults aged 19-22 can be referred to as younger young adults while 22-25 are older young adults 
57 As already discussed in chapter 2, ACA reduced full-time work and increased part-time work among young adults.  
58 Chapter 2 discusses freedom from job lock as a result of the ACA. In the same vein, it is also possible that the ACA causes freedom 
from college lock as it grants dependent coverage to all despite their enrollment status and increases incentive to avoid college. While 
many might be reluctant to drop out of college, they might choose an alternate by enrolling in a 2-year college and finishing up 
sooner.  
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increased enrollment in 2-yr colleges and a decline in enrollment in 4-yr and full-time 
colleges.59 The increase in 2-year college is hypothesized due to tuition cost, insurance 
through the ACA, and enrollment at a later age. The decline in 4-year college is 
hypothesized due to increased enrollment in 2-year colleges. Additionally, prior literature 
on college enrollment also finds increased access to community colleges diverts students 
from attending a 4-year college (Rouse, 1995). 
Contribution 
In this chapter, I evaluate the potential impact of the ACA on educational 
outcomes for young adults. I make several contributions in this chapter. First, no prior 
work has evaluated the impacts on education resulting from the ACA. The limited prior 
work done by Dillender (2014) evaluated educational outcomes resulting from the state 
dependent coverage mandates prior to the ACA. Another study by Yasekwich (2015) 
compares New Jersey to Pennsylvania to evaluate if dependent coverage in New Jersey 
impacted college enrollment. My study makes a contribution using CPS data for multiple 
years and evaluating previously unexplored outcomes such as enrollment in a 2-year 
college versus a 4-year college to understand change in trends of enrollment as a result of 
the provision.60 I also evaluate whether the law impacted vocational training for young 
adults.  
Second, I estimate educational outcomes for different subgroups of young adults 
to evaluate if some subgroups are more sensitive to the effects of the law compared to 
others. I include subgroups by gender, race, and marital status. I include these particular 
                                                        
59 The hypothesis is based on the assumption that those indifferent between 2-year and 4-year college will enroll in a 4-year college 
however, those sensitive to costs such as minorities and those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds will opt for a either a 2-year or 
a part-time college.  
60 Additionally, I evaluate 2-year full-time, 2-year part-time, 4-year full-time and 4-year part-time enrollment. 
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subgroups based on my findings from prior chapters. The differences between 
men/women, Hispanics/Non-Hispanics, and married/unmarried individuals have been 
significant in my earlier chapters on health insurance and labor market outcomes, and I 
include these to further understand how the ACA influences their educational outcomes. 
 Third, I include separate models as robustness checks. These models estimate 
results using placebo regression, where I assume the law went into effect in a different 
year. I also estimate other models as robustness checks by dropping the recession years of 
2008 and 2009, using post-ACA states only, and by only including the older age group 
(26-30) as a counterfactual.   
Fourth, I estimate a multinomial logistic model to evaluate the effect on 
employment and education. The model is a cross category model offering a choice 
between any employment and any type of college enrollment.  
Fifth, I estimate an event study model that examines changes in enrollment (2-
yr/4-yr college enrollment and full-time/part-time enrollment) over the study period 
(2006-2014). These models assess whether pre-existing trends are likely to impact 
outcomes and ensure all observed changes are policy related.  
My analysis uses CPS data to evaluate the differences in the above-mentioned 
outcomes before and after the ACA to estimate average policy impact. I use a difference 
in differences (DD) estimation using a younger (16-18) and an older (26-30) age group as 
the comparison groups. Both groups follow similar trends to the treatment group of 
young adults aged 19-25. I select these counterfactuals based on my assumptions from 
earlier chapters.61  
                                                        
61 For additional explanation on selection of comparison groups, please refer to chapter 1. 
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 Summary of results 
I find that the ACA has a significant impact on young adults’ educational 
outcomes. In particular, I find that young adults are more likely to enroll in a two-year 
college over a four-year college. I also find a decline in four-year public and private 
college enrollment and an increase in two-year public college enrollment. My results 
show a decline in full-time college enrollment, which is statistically significant. However, 
I find insignificant results for part-time college enrollment even though the results 
indicate an increase in part-time enrollment. In summation, while the law appears to 
impact college enrollment, there is strong evidence of a decline in full-time and four-year 
college enrollment due to freedom from college-lock.62  
The results from the analysis of subgroups indicate differences in enrollment 
levels. Overall enrollment rates for men are higher than for women. Men are also more 
likely to be enrolled part-time and in a two-year college. Overall enrollment rates are 
higher for unmarried young adults compared to those who are married. The results also 
indicate statistical significance for unmarried young adults as being more likely to be 
enrolled part-time and in a two-year college while married young adults are more likely 
to be enrolled in a four-year college.63 Lastly, comparing Hispanics with Non-Hispanics I 
find Hispanics to be more likely to be enrolled full-time and in a 4-yr college, possibly 
due to their traditionally lower enrollment rates in 4-yr colleges.64  
                                                        
62 College lock implies being enrolled as a full-time student in order to be eligible for health insurance coverage pre-ACA. 
63 Married individuals are considered as being more likely to have reached some financial stability.  
64 The increased enrollment among Hispanics is due to having a much lower base enrollment rate compared to Non-Hispanics 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the 
prior work on policy impacts on education and college enrollment. The section also cites 
limited work done on dependent health coverage and education.  Section 3.3 presents the 
data and methodology and the measures used to estimate educational outcomes for young 
adults. Results-- summary statistics, DD model results, and subgroup analysis are 
discussed in Section 3.4. In addition, a discussion of enrollment levels by public/private 
schools, age (19-22 and 23-25), and family income levels is also presented in Section 3.4. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion and summary of findings in Section 3.5. 
 
3.2 Background 
 
Three literature streams are discussed in the three chapters of this thesis. Chapter 
1 examines the overall impact of dependent coverage laws on young adults. Chapter 2 
presents a literature review on the impact of insurance coverage on labor market 
outcomes. Chapter 3 presents literature on the impact of various types of policies on 
educational attainment. Only limited work has evaluated the impact of dependent 
coverage on education. However, the literature on policies targeting post-secondary 
education is vast. Prior research has found that policies passed at the state level such as 
the Adams scholarship in Massachusetts or the Pell grant at the Federal level have been 
successful in improving college enrollment. Studies find that policies targeting low-
income families are most effective in increasing enrollment compared to merit based 
scholarships open to all as are incentives offered in the form of scholarship or aid that 
offsets tuition costs (Yaskewich, 2014).  
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The labor supply of young adults declines as a result of the ACA as already 
estimated in chapter 2. As a result, there will be a decline in on-the-job training (Depew, 
2012)65. Exiting the labor force could possibly mean young adults making alternative 
decisions such as reinvesting in post-secondary education by enrolling in college. 
Estimating young adults’ college enrollment levels post-ACA tells us their preference for 
enrolling either full-time or part-time or whether they are more likely to attend a 2-year 
college over a 4-year college.  
Prior work evaluating state dependent coverage mandates finds some implications 
for education. Using data from the American Community Survey, Dillender (2014) finds 
that extended provisions at the state level prior to the ACA increased education, with a 
higher attainment for men compared to women. He finds men to experience an average of 
.17 years in educational increase. Depew (2013) found that having insurance through the 
state based dependent coverage mandate increased the probability of being a full time 
student for both males and females. Apart from the two studies mentioned here, only two 
other studies evaluate the impact of dependent coverage on education. These are 
discussed in the sections below. 
 
State and Federal policies targeting education 
Previous studies have found that college attendance increases with parental 
education and income. Also, college attendance decreases as tuition increases; Hemelt & 
Marcotte (2011) find a $100 increase in tuition leads to a decline in enrollment by .25 
percent. However, tuition has a lower impact on students with high-income families. 
                                                        
65 With a declining labor supply of young adults, low retention levels, and transitions in employment, employers are less willing to 
provide on the job training.  
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Studies also find that the effect of parental education on college enrollment decisions 
declines as family income rises (Kohn, Mansk, & Mundel, 1976). Using data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) Sorokina (2013) estimates about 20 
percent of college going youth will be less likely to attend college due to credit 
limitations. Hence, one can assume that policies aimed at those with lower family 
incomes would benefit from college enrollment. Bishop (1977) found tuition costs and 
high admission standards to have negative impact on college attendance and impacts 
students in the low-income strata the most. He also finds public policies targeted at lower 
income students in the form of subsidy programs improved college attendance. Wright et 
al. (2012) using the example of Tennessee found students from low-income families are 
more likely to delay college completion, which has further implications for near-term 
labor market outcomes such as income.  
Most studies evaluating the effect of merit based scholarship programs assess 
whether policies introduced either in the form of a state sponsored scholarship program 
or financial aid change access to higher education. Over the years, states have moved 
from need-based financial aid to introducing merit-based programs. State mandates 
providing scholarships have impacted college enrollment. Goodman (2008) evaluates one 
such program introduced in Massachusetts in 2004 - the Adams Scholarship program 
providing free tuition to all public colleges in Massachusetts. As a result of this policy, 
Goodman (2008) found a 6 percent increase in the likelihood of scholarship recipients 
attending public universities. A similar study evaluating the Tennessee Education Lottery 
Scholarship Program of 2002 finds that while the program did not increase enrollment, it 
did improve the quality of institutions students choose and made students more likely to 
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opt for a four-year college over a two-year college (Bruce & Carruthers, 2014). Other 
studies done at the state level on programs such as Georgia’s Hope scholarship finds 
large impact on college attendance in the range of an increase of 7 to 7.9 percentage 
points (Dynarski, 2000) and of 5.9 percent (Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006). 
Federal programs such as the Pell Grant and Stafford Loans have provided the 
majority of the aid to students from low-income backgrounds.66 However, studies have 
found conflicting impacts resulting from these policies. Kane (1995) found no evidence 
of an impact from the introduction of the Pell Grant on college enrollment of low-income 
students. More recent studies done by Seftor & Turner (2002) and Bettinger (2004) find 
evidence supporting Pell grant’s impact on the likelihood of attending college. Using 
CPS data Seftor & Turner (2002) find Pell Grant impacts students in their 20s and 30s. 
Their results indicate significant effects with older students being more likely to attend 
college once eligible for the grant. Bettinger (2004) finds that state and Federal needs-
based aid policies such as the Pell Grant matter, and influence the likelihood of continued 
enrollment in college and thus affect educational attainment. In the same vein, Dynarski 
(2003) finds an additional spending in the amount of $1,000 dollars in Federal aid 
increased college attendance by 3.6 percentage points. Similarly, a decrease in a state’s 
funding for grants leads to a decline in enrollment, with greater impacts for community 
college enrollment (Heller, 1999).   
Other work examining the impact of policies on education finds financial aid 
ineligibility to impact college enrollment. Changes made to the Higher Education Act 
                                                        
66 Programs such as Pell Grant and Stafford loans provide the bulk of the aid to college students. Pell grants offer aid to families with 
incomes below $40,000. In addition to the two sources of aid, the Hope and Lifetime Learning tax credits are also available for paying 
college tuition. Parents can also claim children under 24 as dependents for tax credits if the children are enrolled in college.  
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that made students convicted of drug offences ineligible for financial aid for two years 
were found to have a negative impact on college attendance. Using data from the NLSY, 
Lovenheim & Owens (2014) find a financial aid ban increased the time between 
graduating high school and enrollment in college by two years. They also find affected 
students to be less likely to be enrolled in college by 16 percentage points.   
 
Health insurance access and college enrollment 
The impact of health insurance on educational outcomes or college retention is a 
relatively new topic. The limited work in this area focuses on whether dependent 
coverage impacts college enrollment. Having dependent parental coverage has been 
linked to improved educational outcomes according to Levine & Schanzenbach (2009). 
They find a 50-percentage point increase in health insurance eligibility to improve 
educational outcomes in reading test scores by .09 standard deviations. Jung, Hall & 
Rhoads (2013) use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to estimate 
enrollment levels for those with access to parental coverage. Their results indicate that 
having dependent parental coverage makes a student 5.5 percent more likely to enroll as a 
full-time student compared to a student without access to parental coverage. They also 
find students with parental coverage to be 2.6 percent less likely to enroll as part-time 
students.  
In another study Yaskewich (2015) compares a state that had dependent coverage 
mandate prior to the ACA to another state with no dependent coverage mandate for ages 
19-22 and finds having dependent coverage results in reduced college enrollment. 
Yaskewich (2015) compares New Jersey, which passed dependent coverage laws prior to 
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the ACA, to Pennsylvania, which had no such laws. He finds college enrollment in New 
Jersey declined by 15-24 percent relative to Pennsylvania for those in upper income 
households, although the rates of enrollment for students from low-income backgrounds 
increased between 14.5-27 percent.67 Cohodes et al. (2015) assess the impact of 
expansions in entitlement programs such as Medicaid in the 1980s and 1990s to find a 10 
percentage point increase in Medicaid eligibility increased college enrollment by .35 
percentage points as well as attaining a bachelor’s degree by .66 percentage points.  
 
Change in type of insurance 
 It is possible that the shift in the type of insurance frees additional resources that 
would have typically been used to cover insurance costs. As individuals change their 
coverage type from a private option to a public option, they free up resources. The shift in 
insurance from private to public insurance, also known as crowd-out, is a much-explored 
topic (Cutler & Gruber, 1996; Dubay & Kenney, 1996; Shore-Sheppard, 2005; Gruber 
and Simon, 2008).68 Although crowd-out is more relevant to actual public insurance 
programs such as Medicaid and Medicare, it is also possible in the case of ACA. While 
the shift might not be a movement from private sector insurance to public insurance since 
dependent coverage is still considered private insurance, adding a dependent to a parental 
coverage plan is cheaper compared to buying individual insurance for young adults, 
which frees up resources. These resources in turn could be used towards other pursuits 
such as education. Prior research finds program expansions such as Medicaid in the 
                                                        
67 Enrollment for 19-22 year olds from upper income households declined as this group has the highest likelihood of attending college 
and therefore, dependent coverage lead to weakening in college lock. For those from low income background, the increases were also 
expected, due to the low level of college enrollment for this group prior to the law in New Jersey. 
68 Crowd-out refers to decline in private insurance as a result of increased take up of public insurance. 
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1980s & 1990s allowed household spending to increase significantly in other areas. 
Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) find households targeted by Medicaid expansions significant 
increase their spending in other areas such as education.  
 
Current Chapter 
This chapter is a new addition to the literature on the Affordable Care Act’s 
impact on education and builds on the limited work done prior to the ACA on dependent 
coverage and educational outcomes in states with dependent coverage laws. No prior 
work to my knowledge has examined the impacts of the ACA on educational outcomes of 
young adults, making this the first study to do so. The literature review assessing the 
impact of dependent coverage at the state level have found dependent coverage to impact 
college enrollment. Those on dependent coverage were found to be more likely to be 
enrolled in college when access to dependent coverage became available. In this chapter, 
I estimate college enrollment outcomes for young adults to evaluate the impact of the 
ACA. Using 8 years of data (2006-2014), I examine the above-mentioned outcomes by 
estimating the likelihood of attending college full-time vs. part-time. I also evaluate 
educational outcomes including 2-year and 4-year college enrollment (along with 2-year 
full-time & part-time, 4-year full-time & part-time), public vs. private college enrollment, 
vocational training, and impact on subgroups of the young adult population.  
From these educational outcomes, I will evaluate the impact of the ACA on 
enrollment status of young adults. In doing so the chapter makes the following 
contributions: it examines the likelihood of a change in young adults’ college enrollment 
status as a result of the Affordable Care Act. It also examines if they more likely to attend 
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a two-year public or private college, a four-year college public or private college, full-
time enrollment, and part-time enrollment. Mentioned earlier, while there is motivation to 
go back to school, it is likely that there is a preference for a two-year college over 4-year 
college due to tuition costs, time it take to complete a degree, and freedom from college-
lock. Similarly, young adults may also prefer to be enrolled part-time over full-time as 
they might choose to work part-time. The chapter also includes an analysis of different 
subgroups of young adults based on marital status, race, and gender. Prior work on 
impact of policies targeting education has shown men to experience greater educational 
increases compared to women. In this chapter I examine subgroups to evaluate whether 
some subgroups are more likely to enroll in a particular type of college than others. 
Lastly, to check the validity of my results, I include several models to check for the 
robustness of my results. All results are discussed in the subsequent sections.  
 
 
3.3 Data and methods 
 
Data 
 
For this chapter, I use the educational supplement from the CPS also known as the 
October Supplement, from 2006 to 2014. Since 1968, the CPS provides the educational 
supplement surveying school enrollment and educational related outcomes such as grade 
levels, vocational training, current enrollment status, year of most recent enrollment, etc. 
The supplement is administered every October and surveys the status of individuals from 
ages three and older.  
 The October supplement of the CPS collects school and college enrollment status 
every October and the survey asks respondents their most recent enrollment status. For 
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instance, whether they have obtained a high school degree or a GED, associates, 
bachelor’s degree. Also, whether the respondents are enrolled in public or private college, 
whether they’ve had any vocational training, current year enrollment status, prior year 
enrollment status, and years of college credit completed. All of these questions are 
utilized in this chapter to assess the impact of the ACA. Unlike the ASEC (March 
supplement) of the CPS, which asks respondents information from last year, the October 
supplement assesses the individual’s current educational status. This provides more up-
to-date information and reduces recall bias. The March supplement does contain some 
information on education. However, the school or college enrollment information is 
limited to individuals’ aged 16-24. For this reason, the March supplement cannot be used 
in this chapter.69   
A limitation of using the October supplement is that it cannot be linked to the 
March supplement of the CPS. This makes it impossible to have the health insurance 
variables and the educational variables in the same data set. Therefore, it not possible to 
estimate enrollment levels based on type of insurance. It is also not possible to determine 
whether those not living with their parents and have access to parental coverage are more 
or less likely to attend a 4-yr college over a 2-yr college.  
From the October supplement for the years 2006-2014 I only keep those aged 16-
30 in the sample. This gives me a total of 230,697 observations. The treatment group 
comprising young adults accounts for104,037 observations. The younger comparison 
group of 16-18 year olds accounts for 49,401 observations while the older comparison 
group aged 26-30 has 77,259 observations. This includes observations from all states and 
                                                        
69 The variable SCHLCOLL in CPS indicated whether respondents were enrolled in high school or college during the previous week 
and limits the age of respondents from 16-24. 
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the District of Columbia. For the post-ACA states analysis, estimating outcomes for 
states with dependent coverage provisions enacted after the ACA, I drop the 29 states that 
had prior state provisions and only keep 21 states and the District of Columbia. After I 
drop the 29 states, I have 96,324 observations. Out of this 43,487 are in the treatment 
group, 20,296 in the younger comparison group, and 32,541 in the older comparison 
group.  
 
 
 
Outcome Measures 
 
This section of the chapter discusses the different measures used for estimating 
educational outcomes for young adults as a result of the ACA. I begin by examining 
whether young adults are currently enrolled in school and if the current enrollment rates 
are different compared to enrollment in the prior year. Following this, I assess whether 
young adults attend school full-time or part-time. My next set of measures examine the 
likelihood of being enrolled in a two-year college vs. a four-year college and whether the 
ACA impacts enrollment in vocational training programs. Lastly, I examine levels of 
family income to evaluate enrollment levels since family income is a determinant of 
college income. These measures are further discussed below. 
Currently attending/enrolled in school: The first outcome measure evaluated is 
current school/college enrollment status. Table 3.1 shows the current enrollment rates for 
the sample. Enrollment rates increase from 2008 to 2011 for young adults. They also 
increase for 16-18 year olds however, these increases are small while enrollment rates 
decline after 2011 for 26-30 year olds. To estimate whether young adults are enrolled in 
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some kind of college (associates, bachelors, graduate), I use current enrollment status as 
my first measure. This variable identifies whether a respondent is currently enrolled 
regardless of whether the respondent is enrolled full time or part time. The variable 
includes all who are either enrolled or not enrolled currently; I code this as an indicator 
variable, indicating 1 for those currently enrolled and 0 otherwise.  
Enrolled in school in the previous year: This measure is somewhat similar to the 
first measure except that it looks at the enrollment status in the previous year. This 
variable examines school status for respondents in the previous year and includes regular 
school, college, universities, and professional schools and is coded the same as the first 
measure (an indicator variable for prior year enrollment status coded as enrolled (1) or 
not enrolled (0) in school in the previous year). Respondents could be enrolled full-time 
or part-time.  
Attending college full-time/part-time: I also estimate whether ACA impacts full-
time vs. part-time college attendance, for young adults. The expectation is that college 
enrollment will increase. However, some people might still have to work either full-time 
or part-time while attending college part time. Table 3.1 shows the full-time and part-
time enrollment rates over time for young adults and the older comparison group. Full-
time enrollment declines starting in 2009 and 2010 while part-time enrollment increases 
for young adults for the same time period. Mentioned previously, as per the ACA 
legislation, students are not required to enroll in college as a condition for having 
dependent coverage. This variable covers all those attending college full-time and part-
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time. I code these outcomes as separate indicator variables indicating whether the 
respondent is enrolled full or part-time.70  
Two-year vs. four-year college: If the ACA is expected to increase educational 
levels for young adults, it is also likely that despite having access to dependent coverage 
some might opt to attend a two-year college compared to a four-year college due to 
higher tuition costs and length of time it takes to finish a four-year degree. The 2-year 
and 4-year enrollment rates are shown in Table 3.1 from 2006 to 2014. The rates show an 
increase from 23.9 percent in 2009 to 26 percent in 2010 for 2-year enrollment while a 
decline in 4-year enrollment from 72 percent in 2009 to 68.8 percent in 2010. 
 As Figure 3.1 shows, it is likely that there’s an incentive to attend 2-year college 
over a 4-year college, as dependent coverage is more readily available and because of the 
possibility that older young adults seeking a degree might prefer enrolling in a program 
that takes a shorter time to finish. It is also likely that 2-yr colleges divert students from 
4-yr colleges, given lower tuition costs and early degree completion. As mentioned in the 
literature 4-yr colleges are typically preferred over 2-yr if a scholarship and financial aid 
are available and if the individual is indifferent to costs. However, the ACA does not 
directly focus on the tuition cost, rather eases college-lock. To evaluate if the ACA 
changes 2-yr/4-yr enrollment rates, I include this measure. The CPS includes all those 
over 15 years and older who are either enrolled in a 2-year or 4-year college. I code the 
two outcomes separately as indicator variables, coded as 1 in enrolled in 2 year or 4-year 
college, else coded as 0.  
                                                        
70 The CPS does not explicitly state the coding scheme for full-time or part-time enrollment based on credit hours or any other factor. 
The variable is coded in the CPS as those who are enrolled as full-time and those enrolled as part-time.  
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Enrolled in vocational training: It is also possible that instead of attending a 
college, young adults might choose vocational training to enhance their existing skill set. 
Vocational training typically includes training programs other than regular schools as 
well as on the job training such as business, technical, trade, or correspondence courses. 
These programs are often cheaper than attending college and can take less time to 
complete.  Vocational training rates for the period of the study are shown in Table 3.1 
and have remained relatively stable over the years. Vocational training is coded as a 
yes/no question in the CPS for any respondent who answers yes for being enrolled in a 
vocational program. I code this as an indicator variable where enrollment in a vocational 
training program is coded as 1.  
Bachelors/Grad-school: To access whether the ACA increases the likelihood of 
getting a bachelors or graduate degree, I include all those who have a bachelors or a 
graduate degree in my sample. I code these variables separately as indicator variables 
where having a bachelor’s degree or a graduate degree is coded as 1, else 0.  
Current college enrollment level: This variable identifies the respondent’s current 
level of college enrollment. The variable includes all those currently enrolled in any kind 
of college by the freshman, sophomore, junior, and senior level to assess any changes in 
enrollment rates. Table 3.1 shows the current college enrollment levels for young adults 
and shows them as being likely have more than one year of college. I code all outcome 
variables as dummies. For this specification, I only include the older comparison group 
since I am estimating college enrollment levels even though some 16-18 year olds are 
enrolled at the freshman and sophomore level. I individually code each of these as 1 if a 
respondent is a freshman, sophomore, junior, or senior and 0 otherwise.  
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Public/Private enrollment: Along with assessing enrollment status by full-
time/part-time and 2-year/4-year enrollment, I am also interested in examining whether 
public/private school enrollment changes. The October supplement of the CPS identifies 
all those enrolled in school by Public/Private School and those not enrolled. Public and 
private enrollment rates for young adults are shown in Table 3.1. Public enrollment is on 
the rise while private enrollment on the decline, which is consistent with my hypothesis. I 
code these as separate indicator variables indicating a 2-year public, 2-year private, 4-
year public, and 4-year private school enrollment to assess the type of school enrollment 
along with the 2-year or 4-year enrollment status. I code these as 1 for being enrolled in 
2-year public, 2-year private, 4-year public, and 4-year private schools and 0 if not 
enrolled. 
 
Methods 
 
 To estimate the impact of the ACA on educational outcomes of young adults 
aged 19-25, I use a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy comparing them to a younger 
(aged 16-18) and older comparison group (aged 26-30). Both comparison groups are 
included as they account for other factors that might have caused the treatment group to 
experience different enrollment rates post-ACA. The younger control group often has 
parental coverage and the older control group has access to coverage through 
employment or private coverage, and with the appropriate controls mentioned below, can 
be a reasonable counterfactual.71 The ACA is unlikely to affect the comparison groups as 
the dependent coverage mandate is intended for those aged 19-25 only.                        
                                                        
71 I control for gender, race, marital status, employment, and any state variability 
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The analysis compares changes in educational outcomes for young adults pre-and post 
ACA. I use a DD regression model to estimate the policy effects based on the assumption 
that the comparison groups will account for other time varying factors that would have 
led the treatment group to experience different outcomes post reform. All specifications 
are estimated using linear probability models.  
The main DD specification is:  
 
Yist = β1 + β2PostACA t + β3Treat + β3(PostACA t * Treat ) + X ist + ς t + σ s + ε ist   
  
(Equation 1) 
 
 
Where Yist denotes any educational outcome for individual i, state s and time t and can 
indicate current enrollment, prior year enrollment, 2-year or 4-year college enrollment, 
full-time or part-time enrollment, or vocational training. Since the law was signed in the 
year 2010, and the changes being estimated are evaluating the differences in the time 
periods before and after the law was enacted I code the dummy variable for the year after 
the reform implementation, denoted by PostACAt , as 1 for years after 2010 and 0 
otherwise.  
Age is coded using a dummy variable Treatg and is coded as 1 for being in the treatment 
group aged 19-25 and 0 for the comparison group aged 16-18 or 26-30.  
The coefficient of interest here is β3, which is the coefficient of the interaction between 
time and age and is the difference-in-differences estimator for the effect of ACA’s 
dependent coverage laws on young adults’ educational outcomes. 
Demographic factors such as gender, race, and marital status are controlled for in the 
model and are denoted by Xist. The model also includes state dummies that account for 
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any state variability such as the differences across states in population composition; these 
are denoted by  and year dummies denoted by ς t.   
  
Besides the full model (equation 1), the chapter also includes tests for robustness 
with restricted control groups. I restrict the analysis to the older comparison group to see 
the change in coefficients of my outcomes. I also run a specification dropping the 29 
states with prior dependent coverage mandates as well as dropping the recession years of 
2008 and 2009. Similarly, the younger control group is omitted for all results estimating 
any kind of college enrollment. I also include an event study analysis model. These 
specifications are discussed in more detail in the results section.  
 
3.4 Results  
 
Descriptive characteristics 
 
Table 3.2 shows the demographic and educational characteristics by age group for 
the treatment and comparison groups. Young adults are more likely to be enrolled in 
college compared to the older comparison group who are more likely to be employed. 
The younger comparison group, on account of its age is more likely to be enrolled in high 
school. However, small portions of 16-18 year olds are also enrolled in college. As Table 
3.2 shows, 13.2 percent of 16-18 year olds are enrolled in full-time college and 9.2 
percent of them are in a 4-year college. Young adults enrollment in full-time college was 
almost 80 percent and their 4-year college enrollment stood at 71 percent with another 24 
percent being enrolled in a 2-year college. The older comparison group had 
σs
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approximately 58 percent full-time enrollment and a 7- percent 4-year college enrollment, 
which is not different from the young adult population.  
Table 3.2 also shows part-time enrollment rates in college of 19-25 and 26-30 
year olds. Young adults are more likely to be enrolled in full-time college whereas 26-30 
year olds are more likely to be enrolled in part-time college. Enrollment in 2-year 
colleges is at 24 percent for young adults compared to 28 percent for the older 
comparison group. The older comparison group is also more likely to be enrolled in a 
private school compared to young adults who are more likely to be enrolled in public 
schools. Comparing the vocational training rates for the two groups also show that young 
adults are more likely to be enrolled in a vocational training program compared to 26-30 
year olds.  
Graphical representation for enrollment rates over time for 19-25 year olds are 
shown in Figure 3.2 and are shown as full-time, part-time, 4-year and 2-year enrollment 
rates from 2006 to 2014. The graph shows a steep decline for full-time college enrollment 
from 2009 to 2010, with a eventual rise from 2013 to 2014. Part-time enrollment shows a 
small increase and then remains stable up until 2012. Consistent with the hypothesis, 4-
year college enrollment is on the decline while as 2-year college enrollment rises in 2010 
and again in 2012.  
Differences in enrollment trends between pre and post-ACA states are graphically 
shown in Figure 3.3. Overall enrollment in pre-ACA and post-ACA states indicate after 
2010 enrollment levels declined for both starting around 2011 which is consistent with 
the expectation that ACA lead to decline in overall enrollment rates. Full-time enrollment 
levels indicate after 2010, there’s a decline in full-time enrollment for pre-ACA states 
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while an increase in enrollment in post-ACA states. This trend changes in 2011 when 
full-time enrollment increases in post-ACA states and drops in pre-ACA states. Pre-ACA 
states show a drop in 2-year college enrollment from 2010 to 2011, after which 
enrollment levels rise. The 2-year college enrollment levels also increase for post-ACA 
states steadily, but remain lower than pre-ACA states. Part-time enrollment rises in pre-
ACA states after 2010 while enrollment in part-time college remains lower in post-ACA 
states. The trends differ by 4-year college enrollment as the enrollment level decline 
steadily in post-ACA states while as the rise in pre-ACA states followed by a decline. 
Detailed results from the analysis of models including post-ACA states only are 
discussed later in the chapter. 
 
Main DD estimates  
 
The results from the main (equation 1) DD analysis are shown in Table 3.3. The 
results shown in Table 3.3 represent the full model and include all states and the District 
of Columbia. Outcomes include current enrollment, prior year enrollment, full-time and 
part-time college enrollment, 2-year and 4-year college enrollment, vocational training, 
Bachelors degree, and Graduate school. All specifications are run as linear probability 
models. Separate models for robustness checking were run to estimate impacts on states 
with no prior mandates. These are discussed later. 
The results indicate that the ACA increased the probability of being enrolled; the 
result is significant at the 1 percent level of significance. However, enrollment level for 
the prior year shows a stronger significance, which could imply that the ACA has lead to 
some decline in overall enrollment. The ACA led to a decline in full-time college 
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enrollment by approximately 3 percentage points, a statistically significant result. The 
part-time college enrollment as a result of the ACA was not significant. The ACA also 
led to a decline in 4-year college by about 4 percentage points however, an increase in the 
likelihood of 2-year college enrollment by 1.7 percentage points and significant at the 5 
percent level of significance.  
Vocational training shows a small but significant coefficient indicating the 
likelihood of increasing enrollment in vocational training program for those preferring 
vocational school to traditional school. Consistent with the declines in full-time and 4-
year college enrollment, the ACA also is more likely to have reduced the probability of 
attaining a bachelor’s degree. The results indicate a 2-percentage point decline in 
bachelor’s degree while as no significant impact of graduate school.  
I further explore the current college enrollment levels and public/private 
enrollment levels; these results are shown in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. Table 3.4 shows 
estimates at the freshman, sophomore, junior, and senior levels. The results from Table 
3.4 show a decline in enrollment status at the junior and senior level in college by 2 and 
1.5 percentage points respectively while the coefficients for freshman and sophomore are 
not statistically significant. The statistically significant negative coefficients are 
consistent with the earlier results indicating a decline in four-year college enrollment post 
ACA.  
To test whether there exists any preference for a public college over a private 
college, I estimate DD outcomes shown in Table 3.5. When considering tuition costs, it 
might be likely that young adults prefer to attend public colleges. Also, as mentioned in 
the literature, many state-based scholarship programs provide full funding to state public 
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colleges. Keeping this in mind, I evaluate the type of 2-year/4-year college program. 
Table 3.5 shows the estimates for public/private college enrollment broken down by 2yr 
public/private and 4-yr public/private college. As a result of the reform, enrollment in 
two-year public colleges increased by approximately 2 percentage points while it 
declined in four-year public and private colleges by 2.5 and 1.6 percentage points 
respectively. These are all significant at the 5 percent level of significance. From the 
above results discussed in this section, it can be concluded that the ACA led to a decline 
in full-time and 4-year college and it increased the probability of being enrolled in a 2-
year public college. 
The last specification combines enrollment variables for 2-year, 4-year, full-time, 
and part-time college enrollment. I estimate 2-year full-time, 2-year part-time, 4-year 
full-time and 4-year part-time enrollment. The estimates from these analyses are 
presented in the appendix Table 1 for chapter 3. Consistent with my main model, I find 
an increase in 2-year part-time college enrollment by 3.9 percentage points, which is a 16 
percent increase in enrollment. The 4-year full-time college shows a decline by about 5.4 
percentage points or a 7.6 percent decline.  
 
Subgroups  
 
 I run separate models for subgroups of young adults based on gender, marital 
status, and race. I selected these sub-groups based on differences in results as shown in 
the prior two chapters and the literature review from the prior two chapters. However, 
with educational outcomes, there is no specific literature that informs whether any 
differences will exist. Although, as estimated in the prior chapters when assessing 
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subgroups by marital status, married individuals were less sensitive to the effects of the 
reform compared to those who were unmarried. Similarly, it is expected that ACA will 
have a less of an impact on educational outcomes of the married, as dependent coverage 
doesn’t influence their decisions if they have access to spousal coverage. Similarly, from 
prior chapters, men have benefitted more compared to women and Hispanics have 
experienced higher take up rates of insurance and higher rates of decline in employment 
compared to non-Hispanics. 
Estimates provided in Table 3.6 show males experience statistically significant 
increases in enrollment compared to females who also show a statistically significant 
coefficient that is smaller and weaker. Overall enrollment rates increase for men by 2.6 
percentage points compared to 1.5 percentage points for women. They also show a 
statistically significant coefficient for enrollment in part-time college. Both males and 
females experience statistically significant increases in 2-year college enrollment with 
females showing a stronger statistically significant coefficient. Comparing enrollment 
rates for males and females over the study period, Figure 3.4 shows increasing enrollment 
rates for both males and females post 2010. Males experienced declines in full-time 
enrollment around 2009 and 2010 while women experienced some increases during the 
same time period. The part-time enrollment trend is similar for both; an increase in part-
time enrollment is seen in Figure 3.4 with both males and females experiencing a 
increase starting in 2009 with declines for females post 2010. Lastly, two-year college 
trends show an increase for males and a decline for females while 4-year enrollment rates 
decline for both from 2009 to 2010, with males showing greater declines.  
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The next set of estimates assesses the differences between married and unmarried 
young adults. In Table 3.6 unmarried young adults show an increase in enrollment that is 
statistically significant by approximately 3 percentage points compared to married young 
adults. Their part-time enrollment increased by .7 percentage points and two-year college 
enrollment increased by 1.5 percentage points. These results are significant at the 10 
percent and .1 percent significance levels respectively. Married individuals show an 
increase in four-year college enrollment by 1.8 percentage points possibly because 
married individuals are more likely to be financially stable. Figure 3.5 shows the trends 
for married and unmarried young adults over time. Married young adults show lower 
rates of overall enrollment as well as lower full-time enrollment rates. Married young 
adults do show higher part-time enrollment rates as well as two-year college enrollment 
rates compared to unmarried young adults. However, their 2-yr enrollment rates decline 
sharply after 2012. Unmarried young adults have higher enrollment rates in 4-yr college 
compared to married young adults. The rates show a declining trend over the years while 
married young adults show a spike in enrollment rates in four-year college from about 65 
percent in 2012 to 73 percent in 2013.  
Lastly, Hispanics show a statistically significant increase in enrollment by about 3 
percentage points. Due to traditionally lower rates of enrollment in college, the results in 
Table 3.6 show statistically significant coefficients for Hispanic young adults for full-
time, part-time, 2-year, and 4-year college enrollment in the years after the ACA. The 
only statistically significant coefficient for Non-Hispanics is for 2-year college, 
consistent with the overall results indicating the increased likelihood of being enrolled in 
a 2-year college post-ACA. Looking at the trends over the years between the two groups 
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in Figure 3.6, enrollment shows an increase leading up to 2010 and keeps increasing post 
2010 for Hispanics. They also experience increased full-time enrollment post 2010 with 
Non-Hispanics show a declining trend in part-time enrollment. The two-year and four-
year college enrollment for Hispanics shows an increasing trend particularly, with four-
year college enrollment starting in 2010, yet their enrollment rates remain lower 
compared to Non-Hispanics.  
 
Enrollment by age  
 
I also estimate enrollment by younger young adults aged 19-22 and older young 
adults aged 23-25 and by gender. Prior work by Stratton, O’Toole, and Wetzel (2004) 
finds younger students being more likely to enroll as full-time students. To see if any 
differences or similarities exist between enrollment patterns based on age, I estimate full-
time, part-time, 2-yr, and 4-yr college enrollments. The results from the analysis are 
shown in Table 3.7.  
The results don’t indicate any major differences between 19-22 year and 23-25 
year old young adults. The younger age category (19-22) shows statistically significant 
outcomes for part-time and 2-year college enrollment while the older category (23-25) 
shows a greater likelihood for 2-year college enrollment. There isn’t any difference when 
I look at these two categories by gender either, with the exception of 19-22 year old 
males showing a statistically significant coefficient of 1.7 percentage point increase in 
part-time college enrollment. Both males and females in the older young adult category 
do not show any significant results by types of enrollment.  
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Cross category model for education and employment 
To understand and combine the effects of the law on employment and college 
enrollment, I run a multinomial logistic regression as a function of difference-in-
differences. Using a categorical outcome variable, I estimate an alternative specification. 
The outcome variable is coded from 1-4, 1 indicating individual reporting no work and 
no college enrollment, 2 indicating any work and no college enrollment, 3 indicating no 
work and any college enrollment, and 4 indicating any work and any college enrollment. 
The model can be written as the equation below. 
 
log it(Empedu ) = β0 + β1PostACA t + β2Treat + β3(PostACA t * Treat ) + X ist + ς t + σ s + ε ist
 
Where Empedu is the categorical variable coded 1 to 4. The variable is a cross-
categorical variable indicating any kind of college enrollment and employment. The right 
hand side of the equation is the same as the main model. The baseline (comparison) 
category is 1, denoting any individual reporting no work and no college enrollment. 
Table 2 in the appendix reports the outcomes from this model as relative risk ratios (rrr).  
The estimates in appendix Table 2 for chapter 3 show the joint decision for 
education and employment effects to be isolated. In (2) coded as any work and no college 
enrollment, the estimates are not significant. The estimate also implies a decline in the 
relative risk by a factor of .968 for a 1-unit increase in the baseline (no work and no 
college enrollment). The estimates show significance for (3) and (4), in (3) coded as no 
work and any college enrollment, the estimates are significant and show a 6.7 percent 
increase in the odds of not working and being enrolled in any college. Finally, in (4) 
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coded as any work and any college enrollment, the estimates show a 16 percent increase 
in the odds of being employed or being enrolled in any college.  
These results are a preliminary investigation on young adult’s joint decisions on 
college enrollment and employment making this the first study to do so. These results 
indicate “college-lock” does impact young adults and the hypothesis stating freedom 
from “college-lock” has enrollment implications holds water. While these results only 
estimate overall college enrollment, future research can look into college enrollment by 
part-time and full-time enrollment, 2-year and 4-year enrollment, and even by subgroups 
of young adults.  
 
Robustness checks  
 
Placebo regression: In Table 3.8 I run a placebo regression to check the 
robustness of my results. A placebo regression estimates a placebo effect and can be run 
using a variable that indicates time (years) before the ACA mandate. Here, the coefficient 
of interest is the DD estimator, which measures the average difference in the treatment 
group and the comparison group. For a placebo regression, I assume that the dummy 
variable for time of enactment is replaced by another time period that represents the time 
before the ACA. If the coefficient of interest (the DD estimator) is not very close to 0, 
then that implies that the treatment and comparison group experienced similar outcomes 
even before the ACA was mandated. For the purpose of estimation, I assume the date of 
implementation to be 2009. The placebo regression results from Table 3.8 indicate a 
different estimate for enrollment levels.  The coefficients are much smaller and 
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statistically insignificant such as 2-year college enrollment, 4-year college enrollment, 
and a bachelor’s degree. 
 
Additional robustness checks: I run additional specifications to check for the 
robustness of my results. These additional specifications include estimating the 
specification with the exclusion of recession years of 2008 and 2009, with the older 
comparison group only, with post-ACA states only, and running event study analysis to 
look at changes in full-time/part-time enrollment and 2-yr/4-yr enrollment over the period 
of the event. 
I drop the recession years of 2008 and 2009 to re-estimate my main specification. 
Table 3.9 shows the estimates. Dropping these two years makes the estimates for current 
year and prior year enrollment different.72 The coefficients for full-time and part-time 
enrollment are not similar to the results in the main model. Also, 2-year college 
enrollment is statistically significant with a positive coefficient and so is enrollment in 4-
year college with a negative coefficient, consistent with the estimates from the main DD 
results. The recession years did not seem to have an impact on the educational enrollment 
of young adults although, the results do indicate declining overall enrollment.  
The next specification only includes post-ACA states. These are all the states that 
did not have any prior dependent coverage mandate. These include 21 states and the 
District of Columbia. The results from this alternative specification are presented in 
Table 3.10. When only considering these post-ACA states we see that while current and 
prior year enrollment is not very different, the outcomes of interest i.e. 2-year and 4-year 
college show a significant difference. As the main results indicate, the ACA is associated 
                                                        
72 Compared to the results in the main estimates 
  139
with a decline in 4-year college enrollment and an increase in 2-year college enrollment. 
Assessing the coefficients for post-ACA states, we see an increase in the effect sizes. 
Enrollment in 4-year college declines by 5.5 percentage points and enrollment in 2-year 
colleges increases by 2.6 percentage points approximately. This set of checks shows 
greater impacts on states that mandated dependent coverage after 2010, which means 
even as the ACA changed educational outcomes for young adults overall, its impacts 
were greater for late adopters.  
I also estimate the main DD regression with the older comparison group only. The 
outcomes presented in Table 3.11 shows the coefficients of interest change once the 
younger comparison group is not included. Enrollment levels declined as estimates 
indicate, full-time college enrollment declined by 2.8 percentage points in the main 
model whereas it declines by 4.4 percentage points with the older comparison group. 
Part-time enrollment, not statistically significant in the main model now becomes 
significant. It increases by 3.5 percentage points and is statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. However, 2-year college enrollment is no longer significant. It is possible 
that using the older comparison group only, the likelihood of attending a two-year college 
goes down while a preference for attending college part-time goes up. The full-time and 
part-time trends over the years between 19-25 and 26-30 year olds are very different. 
While young adults are more likely to be enrolled full-time, individuals in the 26-30 age 
brackets show a greater inclination to be enrolled part-time.  
Event study analysis: Lastly, I continue to use the event study analysis model as 
checks along the timeline of the event. For my event study analysis I use similar models 
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shows in the earlier chapters. The model presented below include year dummies with 
their interactions as shown in specification below: 
 
Yit = β0 + β12007t + β22008t + β32009t + β4 2010t + β52011t + β62012t
+β72013t + β82014 t + β9Treati + β10(2007t *Treati) + β11(2008t * Treati)
+β12(2009t *Treati) + β13(2010t * Treati) + β14 (2011t *Treati) + β15(2012t *Treati)
+β16(2013t *Treati) + β17(2014 t * Treati) +ε it
 
 
 
  
 
 
For the specifications above, the outcome variable is denoted by Yit  and is coded as a 
binary variable. It indicates type of enrollment (full-time/part-time/2-yr/4-yr) and is 
coded as 1 if indicating enrollment, else indicating 0 
β1 to β8 denotes the coefficient of individual dummy for year and is coded as 1 of the 
particular year, else 0. 
Treat denotes the dummy for treatment group and is coded as 1 for young adults aged 19-
25 and 0 for 26-30 year olds, and  
β10 to β17 denotes the coefficients of interaction between the treatment dummy and year, 
these are the coefficients of interest and show estimated for change in enrollment levels 
for young adults from 2007 to 2014.  
 
The result from the above specification is shown in Table 3.12. In Table 3.12, the 
enrollment status for young adults shows changes in full-time/part-time/2-year/4-year 
enrollment. In the years prior to the ACA enrollment coefficients are small and 
insignificant indicating the no pre-existing trend that could have led to any changes. In 
  141
2010, both full-time and part-time enrollment show declines of 3.6 and 2.4 percentage 
points respectively. Similarly, the coefficient for 4-year college enrollment shows a 
statistically significant coefficient of decline in enrollment by almost 8-percentage point 
and indicates a consistent decline over time. Enrollment in 2-year college is significant at 
the 5-percent level of significance in 2011 and becomes insignificant with time.  
 
3.5 Discussion 
 
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the Affordable Care Act’s impact on 
education outcomes for young adults. Using the October Supplement of the CPS (2006-
2014), I evaluate key outcomes to determine how the law impacts the young adult 
population. I find dependent coverage laws change enrollment status for young adults by 
making them more likely to be enrolled in a 2-year public college compared to a 4-year 
college. The law also leads to a decline in full-time college enrollment for young adults 
as well as an overall decline in college enrollment. As a result of the law, full-time 
enrollment declined by 2.8 percentage points. I find that these coefficients increase when 
I only include the older comparison group in my model.  
The ACA impacts education for young adults by changing the incentive structure 
for college enrollment. Since a full-time enrollment status is no longer required, 
dependent coverage incentivizes 2-year college enrollment while 4-year college 
enrollment declines as it might be too expensive and time consuming for some young 
adults who might possibly want to continue to work. In other words, the incentive to 
attend a college part-time or attend a 2-yr college is higher. Just like the idea of job-lock 
discussed in chapter 2, “college-lock” is a term used to describe the circumstance where 
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young adults previously were tied down to their full-time student status in order to keep 
their coverage. As a result of the ACA, the full-time enrollment status is not required 
since dependent coverage becomes available to all. Freedom from “college-lock” allows 
young adults to attend alternatives to 4-yr colleges such as 2-yr colleges and vocational 
training programs and also to enroll in colleges at later ages. It is also likely that some 
students postpone graduation.  
While there is no other study documenting the impact of the Affordable Care Act 
on education, there is some prior work evaluating the impact of dependent coverage laws 
enacted before the ACA in certain states. These studies find an increase in educational 
attainment for men compared to women. My results are consistent with this finding. In 
my analysis of subgroups, I find men as being more likely to be enrolled part-time and in 
2-year colleges compared to women. Other subgroups in the analysis include young 
adults by marital status and race. I find unmarried young adults to have higher enrollment 
rates compared to married young adults. Unmarried young adults are also more likely to 
be enrolled part-time and in 2-year college, while married individuals are more likely to 
be enrolled in 4-year college. Lastly, the law is also associated with increased overall 
enrollment rates for Hispanics compared to non-Hispanics. Hispanics are also more likely 
to be enrolled full-time as well as part-time when compared to non-Hispanics.  
The results also indicate a decline in enrollment in public and private college 
enrollment. Enrollment in 4-year public colleges declined by 2.5 percentage points 
compared to a decline of 1.6 percentage points in 4-year private colleges. At the same 
time, enrollment in 2-year public colleges increased by 1.9 percentage point. Therefore, 
the results from the main DD model and the analysis presented in this chapter indicate 
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that the ACA increased 2-year public college enrollment. Vocational training enrollment 
also indicates an increase; the coefficient is small but statistically significant indicating 
that as full-time and 4-year college enrollment declines, young adults are also more likely 
to enroll in vocational training programs.  
Just as in my prior two chapters, I run robustness checks to test my results. My 
checks include running specifications with post-ACA states, an older comparison group, 
and event study models.  I find post-ACA states to have bigger coefficients. For instance, 
2-year college enrollment is higher in post-ACA states compared to the overall model. 
Similarly, decline in 4-year college enrollment rates are also higher for the post-ACA 
states. Next, I run my specification with the older comparison group only. I find higher 
declines in full-time enrollment. However, a statistically insignificant coefficient for 2-
year college enrollment, possibly due to the rates of enrollment for the treatment and 
comparison group in 2-year colleges not being very different. 
The result from the event study analysis also corroborates the findings. The 
analysis shows young adults to be more likely to attend part-time and 2-year colleges and 
attend school at later ages. It wasn’t expected that the ACA would impact education as 
the policy had unintended consequences for education. However, as the results indicate, 
young adults might be more likely to be enrolled as college students at later ages, as they 
are no longer bound by the age restriction to qualify for dependent coverage.  
The impact of the law on young adults’ education is consistent with the literature 
on state and Federal policies aimed at increasing enrollment. However, the difference 
here is that impact on educational enrollment is an unintended consequence of the ACA 
as its focus is health insurance and providing means for increased coverage. Due to the 
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unique nature of this age group, the role of education cannot be understated. The ACA 
impacts educational outcomes differently than some of the policies that solely focus on 
grants and aid. It provides an indirect impetus to young adults by allowing them to access 
dependent coverage despite their college enrollment status and age, which allows them to 
enroll in 2-year college, enrolled part-time, or enroll at later ages. As 4-yr colleges 
become out of reach for many due to higher costs associated with attending them, 
alternatives such as community colleges, 2-yr colleges, and vocational training are 
gaining popularity. Prior to the ACA, 71 percent of 4-year private colleges and 82 percent 
of 4-year public colleges offered student health insurance, while only 29 percent of 2-
year public colleges offered health insurance (GAO, 2008). After enactment, it was 
immaterial whether colleges offered insurance as long as students enrolling could access 
dependent coverage.  
The literature review shows scholarships and aid do impact enrollment in 4-year 
public colleges. Given a choice, those indifferent between a 4-year and 2-year college are 
more likely to attend the 4-year college. Those who are more sensitive to costs will 
choose a 2-year college. A 2-year college might also be suitable for those who are 
working. As seen in chapter 2, full-time employment levels have declined for young 
adults. One of the implications of declined full-time work can be an increase in college 
enrollment for the same age group, if they previously weren’t enrolled in a post-
secondary educational institution.  
While my result indicates the ACA impacted college enrollment for the 19-25 
year olds, it is also likely that their college enrollment decisions go beyond access to 
dependent coverage. Since dependent coverage only offsets a small part of costs 
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associated with college, other factors such as access to loans, scholarships, and financial 
aid also factor into college enrollment decisions. The results from the ACA also do not 
imply the increased enrollment in 2-yr colleges will have an impact on the socio-
economic status of young adults as those finishing 4-yr colleges are still more likely to 
earn more than those with a 2-yr college degree. However, it does give those young 
adults who otherwise might not have had the opportunity to get a post-secondary 
education enroll in college.   
At the same time, the effect on college enrollment has some important 
implications for the labor market. Previously, students attending 4-yr colleges took a 
longer time to graduate and were less likely to be working. As a result of getting 
dependent coverage, it is likely that young adults might enter the labor force much sooner 
if they pick a 2-yr college over a 4-yr college. 
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Table 3.1: Enrollment rates over time 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Age group          
16-18 .877 .879 .880 .880 .890 .895 .898 .871 ..869 
19-25 .345 .356 .364 .388 .383 .400 .394 .380 .369 
26-30 .103 .107 .111 .112 .125 .130 .112 .101 .111 
          
Rates of enrollment for 19-25          
Less than 1 year .075 .073 .075 .072 .075 .071 .072 .073 .065 
Freshman .210 .212 .202 .200 .204 .201 .183 .187 .200 
Sophomore .224 .240 .246 .245 .240 .248 .240 .231 .226 
Junior .185 .169 .163 .174 .153 .159 .163 .171 .166 
Senior .054 .047 .051 .045 .051 .057 .062 .060 .069 
          
Public/Private enrollment for           
19-25           
Public  .798 .788 .802 .801 .820 .822 .810 .818 .824 
Private .202 .212 .198 .192 .180 .178 .191 .182 .175 
          
FT/PT college enrollment 
rates 
         
19-25 FT .788 .793 .805 .810 .792 .793 .791 .784 .805 
26-30 FT .545 .542 .534 .602 .580 .586 .592 .593 .620 
19-25 PT .166 .162 .149 .150 .157 .161 .154 .168 .142 
26-30 PT .433 .438 .434 .377 .390 .396 .390 .378 .347 
          
2-yr/4-yr college enrollment           
rates          
2-yr 19-25 .217 .242 .248 .239 .261 .252 .263 .247 .221 
2-yr 26-30 .254 .279 .307 .305 .279 .283 .291 .262 .246 
          
4-yr 19-25 .738 .712 .705 .720 .688 .702 .682 .705 .726 
4-yr 26-30 .724 .691 .662 .675 .692 .699 .691 .710 .721 
          
Employment rates          
19-25 .550 .550 .541 .501 .492 .499 .498 .485 .498 
26-30 .719 .725 .706 .633 .630 .631 .651 .627 .677 
          
Vocational Training          
19-25 .030 .029 .032 .035 .033 .035 .030 .032 .030 
26-30 .024 .022 .024 .024 .027 .025 .024 .021 .022 
Source: Weighted tabulations of the 2006-2014 October supplement of the CPS. 
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics  
 16-18 years 19-25 years 26-30 years 
Current enrollment .880 .375 .115 
Prior year enrollment .920 .414 .123 
    
College enrollment    
Attends full-time .132 .795 .579 
Attends part-time .012 .157 .400 
2-year college .052 .243 .280 
4-year college .092 .710 .700 
    
Attended school/college    
Current year .881 .375 .115 
Some previous year .918 .413 .123 
    
Vocational training .040 .031 .023 
Public school .802 .810 .760 
Private school .079 .190 .240 
    
Levels of enrollment    
Less than one year .836 .072 .045 
Freshman .149 .200 .100 
Sophomore .011 .240 .172 
Junior .001 .170 .105 
Senior N.A .055 .052 
    
Married  .008 .146 .449 
Single .982 .829 .484 
    
Male .515 .500 .486 
    
Employed .261 .647 .773 
    
Race    
Nh-White .623 .640 .650 
Nh-Black .120 .111 .100 
Hispanic .165 .160 .160 
Other .090 .090 .093 
    
Some high school .779 .105 .100 
High school .144 .301 .270 
Some college .075 .442 .292 
B.A and greater .002 .150 .340 
    
Age (average) 17 22 28 
    
N 49,401 104,037 77,259 
     Source: Weighted tabulations of the 2006-2014 October supplement of the CPS. 
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Table 3.3: Main results 
 Enrolled in CY Enrolled in PY Full-time Part-time 2-yr college 4-yr college Vocational Bachelors Grad school 
PostACA -0.0183*** -0.0121** 0.0209***  0.0104* 0.00608 0.0252*** -0.00144 0.0233*** 0.00805** 
 (0.00431) (0.00408) (0.00506) (0.00399) (0.00307) (0.00474) (0.00152) (0.00427) (0.00298) 
Treat -0.0626*** -0.0512*** 0.565*** 0.0408*** 0.123*** 0.483*** 0.00437*** 0.579*** 0.0270*** 
 (0.00777) (0.00703) (0.0114) (0.00437) (0.00808)  (0.0158) (0.00103) (0.0108) (0.00485) 
PostACA*Treat (DD) 0.0229** 0.0266*** -0.0286*** 0.00426 0.0170* -0.0413*** 0.00464** -0.0207**  -0.00358 
 (0.00690) (0.00656) (0.00814) (0.00554) (0.00716) (0.0101) (0.00173) (0.00609) (0.00346) 
Notes: The impact (DD) is the interaction of the dummy for the treatment variable and the dummy for the enactment (PostACA) period. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at 
the state level. All regressions are weighted using person level weights. Data: October Educational supplement of the CPS from 2006 to 2014. Outcome variables are enrollment in school in 
the current year in column 1 and indicate 1 if individual is currently enrolled in school. Enrollment in school in the prior year indicates whether individual was enrolled in school last year and 
indicates 1 if enrolled last year, this is presented in column 2. Full-time and part-time enrollments are in column 3 and 4 and indicate whether individuals are enrolled as full-time and part-time. 
Column 5 and 6 shows 2-year and 4-year college attendance. Column 7 shows any kind of vocational training and column 8 and 9 shows bachelors degree and grad school.   
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 3.4: ACA impact by college level 
 Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior 
PostACA 0.00275 0.00524 0.00763* 0.00763*** 
 (0.00428) (0.00277) (0.00323) (0.00142) 
Treat 0.00100 0.234*** 0.197*** 0.146*** 
 (0.00923) (0.00463) (0.00381) (0.00672) 
PostACA*Treat (DD) 0.00672 0.00756 -0.0193* -0.0157** 
 (0.00613)  (0.00635) (0.00761) (0.00526) 
Notes: All outcomes variables are coded as dummies indicating type college enrollment levels. For a detailed description see Table 3.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5: Estimates for public/private college enrollment 
 2-year public 2-year private 4-year public  4-year private 
PostACA 0.00614* -0.0000591 0.0162*** 0.00900*** 
 (0.00283) (0.00138) (0.00393) (0.00238) 
Treat 0.113*** 0.00994*** 0.374*** 0.109*** 
 (0.00768) (0.00202) (0.0127) (0.0132) 
PostACA*Treat (DD) 0.0190* -0.00200 -0.0251* -0.0162* 
 (0.00724) (0.00194) (0.0109) (0.00714) 
Notes: All outcomes variables are coded as dummies indicating type of enrollment including public/private status. For a detailed 
description see Table 3.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6: Subgroups 
 Enrolled in CY Full-time Part-time 2-year college 4-year college 
Male 0.0266*** 0.00302 0.0118** 0.0148* 0.0076 
 (0.00696) (0.00557) (0.00359) (0.00627) (0.00590) 
Female 0.0152* 0.00886 0.00180 0.0123*** -0.00164 
 (0.00707) (0.00734) (0.00402) (0.00306) (0.00582) 
      
Married 0.0199* 0.0178 0.00274 0.00209 0.0184* 
 (0.00935) (0.00950) (0.00598) (0.00398) (0.00878) 
Unmarried 0.0291*** -0.000245 0.00736** 0.0151*** -0.00796 
 (0.00671) (0.00483) (0.00249) (0.00408) (0.00553) 
      
Hispanic 0.0294* 0.0450** 0.0122** 0.0321*** 0.0250** 
 (0.0120) (0.0129) (0.00352) (0.00523) (0.00847) 
Non-Hispanic 0.0216** -0.000405 0.00545 0.00925* -0.00420 
 (0.00635) (0.00493) (0.00273) (0.00375) (0.00485) 
Notes: For a detailed description see Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.7: Estimates by age (19-22 and 23-25) 
 Full-time Part-Time 2-year college 4-year college 
19-22 year olds 0.0132 0.0104** 0.0133* 0.0103 
 (0.00841) (0.00316) (0.00550) (0.00893) 
23-25 year olds 0.00462 0.00705 0.00781* 0.00386 
 (0.00627) (0.00421) (0.00315) (0.00495) 
19-22 Male 0.00510 0.0176*** 0.0181 0.00462 
 (0.00988)  (0.00308) (0.00988) (0.0120) 
19-22 Female 0.0208 0.00299 0.00821 0.0156 
 (0.0105) (0.00518) (0.00494) (0.00945) 
23-25 Male 0.00445 0.0112 0.00713 0.00848 
 (0.0106) (0.00568) (0.00570) (0.00815) 
23-25 Female 0.00464 0.00277 0.00841 -0.00100 
 (0.00745) (0.00712) (0.00435) (0.00747) 
Notes: Columns indicate enrollment by college types and rows indicate two groups of young adults, 19-22 and 23-25.  
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Table 3.8: Placebo DD regression results 
 Enrolled in CY Enrolled in PY Full-time Part-time 2-yr college 4-year college Vocational  Bachelors Grad school 
PostACA -0.0287*** -0.0197*** 0.0116 0.000184 -0.00265 0.0144* -0.00464* 0.00971 0.00205 
 (0.00527) (0.00459) (0.00779) (0.00395) (0.00490) (0.00697) (0.00217) (0.00641) (0.00304) 
Treat -0.0585*** -0.0455*** 0.556*** 0.0408*** 0.130*** 0.467*** 0.00441*** 0.573*** 0.0246*** 
 (0.00747) (0.00650) (0.0121) (0.00463) (0.00933) (0.0172) (0.00126) (0.0102) (0.00457) 
PostACA*Treat(DD) 0.0244*  0.0215* -0.0230* 0.0152 0.00966 -0.0174 0.00593* -0.0147 0.00691 
 (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0112) (0.00805) (0.0111) (0.0121) (0.00237) (0.0100) (0.00534) 
Notes: Assumes reform took place in 2009 instead of 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.9: Results with recession years 2008 and 2009 dropped 
 Enrolled in CY Enrolled in PY Full-time Part-time 2-yr college  4-yr college Vocational Bachelors Grad school 
PostACA -0.0270*** -0.0292*** 0.0313*** 0.0164** 0.0181*** 0.0295*** 0.00891 0.0394*** 0.00826* 
 (0.00470) (0.00473) (0.00616) (0.00573) (0.00516) (0.00598) (0.00475) (0.00632) 0.00826* 
Treat -0.0758*** -0.0694*** 0.565*** 0.0521*** 0.126*** 0.491*** 0.00815 0.594*** 0.0225*** 
 (0.00970) (0.0100) (0.0128) (0.00696) (0.00877) (0.0149) (0.00468) (0.0142) (0.00642) 
PostACA*Treat (DD) 0.0333*** 0.0434*** -0.0278** -0.00739 0.0150* -0.0502*** -0.00405 -0.0364*** 0.00114 
 (0.00635) (0.00678) (0.00920) (0.00584) (0.00781) (0.0129) (0.00578) (0.00997) (0.00549) 
Notes: Years 2008 and 2009 are dropped from the analysis. 
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Table 3.10: Post-ACA states only 
 Enrolled in CY Enrolled in PY Full-time Part-time 2-yr college  4-yr college Vocational Bachelors Grad school 
PostACA -0.0137* -0.00981* 0.0202* 0.0117 0.00491 0.0269*** 0.00271 0.0301***  0.00176 
33 (0.00600) (0.00411) (0.00743) (0.00712) (0.00527) (0.00667) (0.00210) (0.00670) (0.00436) 
Treat -0.0623*** -0.0543*** 0.559*** 0.0405*** 0.128*** 0.472*** 0.00184 -0.599*** 0.0203*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0141) (0.0217) (0.00607) (0.0126) (0.0297) (0.00135) (0.0184) (0.00476) 
PostACA*Treat (DD) 0.0215* 0.0221**  -0.0283* -0.000913 0.0257* -0.0549*** -0.000924 0.0292***  0.000108 
 (0.00932) (0.00745) (0.0102) (0.00800) (0.0105) (0.00976) (0.00283) (0.00513) (0.00542) 
Notes: Only includes 21 states and District of Columbia. States with no prior dependent coverage mandate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.11: Older comparison group only 
 Enrolled in 
CY 
Enrolled in PY Full-time Part-time 2-yr college 4-year college Vocational  Bachelors Grad school 
PostACA -0.00102 0.00121 0.0320 -0.0204 -0.00441 0.0160 0.00177 0.0303* -0.0188 
 (0.00377)  (0.00321) (0.0164)  (0.0161) (0.0110) (0.0118) (0.00161) (0.0148) (0.0157) 
Treat 0.192***  0.222*** 0.179*** -0.188*** -0.0206 0.0120 0.00724*** 0.245*** -0.254*** 
 (0.00702) (0.00655) (0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0126) (0.0117) (0.00109) (0.0125) (0.0131) 
PostACA*Treat 
(DD) 
0.0167** 0.0245*** -0.0438* 0.0348* 0.0237 -0.0326* 0.000218 -0.0322* 0.0233 
 (0.00544) (0.00510) (0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0141) (0.0155) (0.00163) (0.0135) (0.0139) 
Notes: Only includes older comparison group  
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Table 3.12: Event study results by year 
Year Full-time Part-time 2-year college  4-year college 
2007 0.0154 0.00244  0.00604  0.0118 
 (0.00785)  (0.00414)  (0.00471) (0.00736) 
2008 0.0292***  0.00708  0.0201***  0.0161 
 (0.00832)  (0.00420) (0.00615) (0.00846) 
2009 0.0360*** 0.0120* 0.0221*** 0.0259*** 
 (0.00811) (0.00540)  (0.00615) (0.00710)  
2010 0.0403***  0.0207*** 0.0239***  0.0371*** 
 (0.00825) (0.00557) (0.00590)  (0.00862) 
2011 0.0388***  0.0174***  0.0161** 0.0400*** 
 (0.00815)  (0.00488)  (0.00525) (0.00803) 
2012 0.0348***  0.0143* 0.0212***  0.0279*** 
 (0.00704)  (0.00545) (0.00487) (0.00731) 
2013 0.0348***  0.0144** 0.0131* 0.0360*** 
 (0.00833) (0.00484)  (0.00503) (0.00728) 
2014 0.0372***  0.00720 0.00830  0.0361*** 
 (0.00800) (0.00406) (0.00461)  (0.00808) 
Treat 0.590*** 0.0591***  0.118***  0.532*** 
 (0.0141)  (0.00840)  (0.00789)  (0.0145) 
Treat*2007 -0.0108 -0.00753 0.0180 -0.0364 
 (0.0130) (0.00894) (0.00911) (0.0122) 
Treat*2008 -0.0127 -0.0224* 0.0109 -0.0461 
 (0.0139) (0.00976) (0.0101) (0.0143) 
Treat*2009 -0.0152 -0.0210 0.00103 -0.0373** 
 (0.0128) (0.0108) (0.0100) (0.0134) 
Treat*2010 -0.0358**  -0.0239** 0.0200 -0.0797*** 
 (0.0128) (0.00865) (0.0118) (0.0167) 
Treat*2011 -0.0314* -0.0136 0.0214* -0.0665*** 
 (0.0118) (0.00888)  (0.0106) (0.0138) 
Treat*2012 -0.0280* -0.0164 0.0276 -0.0720*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0103) (0.0150) (0.0160) 
Treat*2013 -0.0351** -0.00332 0.0165 -0.0549** 
 (0.0112) (0.0100) (0.0121) (0.0160) 
Treat*2014 -0.0178 -0.0198 -0.00440 -0.0332** 
 (0.0139) (0.0104) 0.0102) (0.0123) 
Notes: Years include 2007 to 2014 with 2006 being left out for comparison and are coded as dummies. Treat is a dummy indicating 
being the treatment or comparison group. The interaction between Treat and year gives the coefficients for 2-yr college, 4-year college, 
full-time, and part-time enrollment. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0. 001 
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Figure 3.1: Pre and Post ACA college reform 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
Pre-
ACA
College goimg students 
(typically 18-23 year olds)
Stay on parental coverage 
till 22 if enrolled full-time 
in college
Low incentive to work 
full-time. HIgh incentive 
to attend 4-year college
Post-
ACA
No longer need to be 
enrolled in full-time 
college as ACA makes 
dependent coverage 
available for all young 
adults.
High incentive to reduce 
full-time work. High 
incentive to atend 2-year 
college
Older individuals (23 and older) 
were no longer eligible for 
coverage
Low incentive to attend college 
full-time. High incentive to work
Dependent coverage available till 
26th birthday
Reduced incentive to work full-
time, more likely to work part-time
More likely to attend part-time 
college
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Figure 3.2: Enrollment status of 19-25 year olds 
Source: Tabulations of the October supplement of the CPS 2006-2014 
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Figure 3.3: Pre and post ACA states enrollment levels
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Figure 3.4: Subgroups: Males vs. Female
Tabulations from the October supplement of the CPS 2006-2014 
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Figure 3.5: Subgroups: Married vs. Unmarried
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Figure 3.6: Subgroups: Hispanics vs. Non-Hispanics 
 
Tabulations from the October Supplement of the CPS 2006-2014 
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Chapter 4: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
4.1 Implications 
 
 
In my three substantive chapters, I have examined three different outcomes of the 
ACA on the young adult population. This concluding chapter briefly discusses some of 
the implications followed by a conclusion and ideas for future research. The policy 
implications get discussed in this section; I begin with discussing some of the outcomes 
from the ACA and the implications from those outcomes and conclude this section by 
discussing how policymakers could address shortcomings.   
The ACA has extended health insurance coverage to millions of young adults. 
The analysis in this dissertation finds that those with traditionally lower access to 
insurance experienced greater take up rates of health insurance coverage after the ACA; 
in particular, younger young adults between 19-22 years and single young adults. 
However, despite the dependent coverage mandate, minorities continue to have lower 
insurance rates than the broader young adult population. The ACA is not effective for 
individuals those whose parents lack employer sponsored health insurance, which is more 
often the case for minorities. As a next step, the individual mandate, requiring all to be 
covered as of January 2014 might change coverage to those without access to parental 
dependent coverage.    
The ACA not only reduces cost of coverage but also increases access to coverage 
and reduces uncompensated care in hospitals. Dependent coverage provision can also be 
applicable to young adults’ need for emergency care since increased coverage for this age 
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group could imply declines in uncompensated hospital care and trips to the emergency 
room. Prior to the ACA, states had to bear the burden of providing uncompensated care 
to those who couldn’t afford it. The law lowers the risks associated with not having 
health insurance coverage for young adults and provides a health and financial safety net. 
Even prior to the ACA, states with universal coverage such as Massachusetts had spent 
millions in uncompensated care, significantly reduced any such spending after mandating 
universal coverage in the state.73  
However, many young adults still remain uninsured. These include individuals 
falling through eligibility loopholes for Medicaid or those who might not have access to 
parental dependent coverage. The individual mandate enacted in 2014 may offer 
coverage to those young adults without access to parental dependent coverage in the form 
of subsidies, but despite that, the remaining out of pocket costs still pose a serious barrier 
to coverage. Even those getting coverage through their parents will experience increase in 
premiums in existing plans. These added costs are not borne just by the parents who are 
the health insurance policyholder but also the employers. But as previously seen, 
employers on their part eventually shift the cost of providing coverage back to the 
employee in the form of lower wages (Gruber, 1994; Bhattacharya & Bundorf, 2009), the 
ultimate burden will fall on the policy holder. The most common alternative for coverage 
is the non-group market option for those young adults without access to ESI as the costs 
in this market can be lower than dependent coverage (Cantor et al, 2012). The cost issue 
is key as it is one of the ultimate factors in determining whether uninsured rates for young 
adults will decline. Prior to the ACA, some states required parents to pay an incremental 
                                                        
73 In 2004/2005 Massachusetts spent nearly $1 billion on uncompensated care (Mass.Gov) 
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cost for covering young adults. After the ACA, even though this practice might be 
eliminated, those adding dependent coverage will face significant cost increases as they 
add more family members74.  
A key finding from chapter 2 is the overall decline in employment. From the 
analysis in chapter 2, a decline in labor supply for 19-25 year olds is estimated with a 
small decline in overall employment and a bigger estimate for decline in full-time work 
since full-time work is associated with employer sponsored health insurance. With a 
decline in employment and full-time work, this age group was free to explore options 
such as education. Surprisingly, Chapter 2 results also indicate no evidence of job 
mobility, which was unexpected. It is likely that due to recession and lower levels of 
education and work experience, young adults were less likely to separate from their 
current employer. 
Increased job mobility can have implications for other outcomes, such as 
education, as discussed in Chapter 3. The literature review showed that health insurance 
options not tied to ESI can mean greater movement and ease in job-lock. Policies such as 
the Common Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) were passed to ease job-
lock by allowing employees to remain on ESI for 18 months after leaving their job. 
Similarly, the expanded coverage provision for young adults was expected to increase job 
mobility for a group already know to have higher rates of movements between jobs and 
between working and not working. The lack of job mobility from the results in this 
                                                        
74 The marginal cost of adding an additional individual to an existing plan depends on the structure of the plan as well as the number 
of members enrolled. Employers can pick between different options such as a two-tiered premium plan, which indicates two different 
prices, one for individual and other for family. The other option is four tiered plan and includes different pricing for individual; 
individual and spouse; individual and children; and individual, spouse and children. Lastly, a multi-tiered plan where premiums 
increase for each additional member added. For employers using the two and four-tiered plan, the marginal cost of adding another 
individual is zero. However, employers might be motivated to move towards the multi-tiered plan that charge higher premiums for 
each added beneficiary. 
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dissertation indicate the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 most likely created job-lock 
that most likely spilled over into the next few years and made job separation statistically 
insignificant.  
Having dependent coverage has important implications for educational enrollment 
of young adults. It allows 19-25 year olds an opportunity at career advancement through 
additional years of post-secondary education or vocational training and boosting incomes 
over their lifetime. Having dependent coverage up until their 26th birthday also implies 
young adults delaying graduation to remain on dependent coverage pre-ACA and having 
a lower inclination to enter the labor market now have a better shot at finishing college 
without having to worry about their health insurance. Known as college-lock, the law 
eases college-lock as it allows dependent coverage irrespective of college enrollment 
status. Particularly, for students from low-income families who previously, couldn’t 
afford full-time or 4-yr college enrollment now can attend school part-time or 2-yr 
college. The ease in college-lock has implications not only for enrollment, but also future 
implications for those who previously did not have the opportunity to enroll in colleges.75 
The results indicate certain groups of young adults show greater changes in 
insurance, employment, and enrollment than others. These differences are evaluated by 
gender, marital status, and race. Enrollment outcomes are similar to the overall results 
that indicate increased enrollment in 2-yr college however; the outcomes for Hispanics 
are not similar. Stated earlier, Hispanics experience higher uninsurance rates and have 
lower access to dependent coverage. As a result of the ACA they have experienced 
higher take up rates in insurance. Similarly, their enrollment outcomes also differ as they 
                                                        
75 Future implications include better employment, wages, and socioeconomic status 
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show a higher enrollment rates compared to others. A possible explanation for this is that 
those from traditionally low-income backgrounds experience lower rates of enrollment 
prior to policy change. The literature also confirms that policies and programs focused in 
increasing enrollment by targeting lower income groups are more beneficial than 
standard scholarships. Therefore, if Hispanics have had lower enrollment rates in the 
past, their enrollment rates will be higher than the rest after the intervention.  
A policy implication from the first empirical chapter that could help revamp ACA 
includes focusing on subgroups that continue to show lower take up rates of coverage 
such as minorities. The dependent coverage provision doesn’t work for this group if they 
can’t get access, are not eligible for Medicaid, or qualify for subsidies. Policy makers 
should focus on those from disadvantaged background and young adults living in poverty 
to improve the provision’s effectiveness.  
The results from chapter 3 on educational enrollment have implications for 2-year 
and 4-year college enrollment. Policymakers concerned with declining enrollment in 4-
year colleges could look into reasons for the decline beyond the costs of education. The 
results from this dissertation indicate increase in 2-year college enrollments. 
Policymakers and stakeholders interested in improving 2-year college enrollment could 
focus on improving 2-year college enrollment for those who otherwise might not have 
had the opportunity at any post-secondary education.  
 
4.2 Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I discuss the impacts of the expanded coverage provision of the 
ACA on young adults. From the three chapters it becomes evident that the mandate has 
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not only changed access to insurance for young adults but has also had some impact on 
young adult’s employment and education. The evaluation of the sub-group analysis 
examines the heterogeneity of the policy’s impact. One of the most common sub-groups 
of young adults includes those with access to dependent coverage through parental 
insurance. It is expected that those with this access, are more likely to be insured since 
the marginal cost of adding a dependent to the family plan is lower than the marginal 
benefit. In particular, literature indicates that those young adults with chronic conditions 
have benefitted from dependent parental coverage more than others, as these individuals 
are more likely to value health insurance access. 
Other subgroups that are expected to benefit as estimated from the analysis 
include men, single unmarried individuals, and minorities who traditionally have lower 
insurance rates of health insurance coverage. From the analysis, we can conclude that 
men benefit more from the extended coverage provision compared to women. Women 
are more likely to either keep working if they have the ESI option or in some cases if they 
are married and have access to spousal coverage. In the same vein, married individuals 
did not benefit as much as those who are unmarried; single individuals are expected to 
benefit more from the provision because they are less likely to have spousal coverage to 
begin with76. We also see some racial differences in access to dependent coverage. 
Minority young adults are less likely to have a dependent coverage option through their 
parents as minorities have lower access to ESI. For them the individual mandate is more 
likely to influence take-up rates as they could qualify for subsidies.    
                                                        
76 For those who are married, the benefits might be lesser than those not married. Since married individuals have options such as 
spousal insurance or are more likely to have stable jobs, they might not benefit as much as those who are not married.  
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From the empirical analysis in the 3 chapters it also becomes evident that there is 
a marked difference between pre and post-ACA states. Since prior dependent coverage 
mandates had several restrictions, after the passage of the ACA, the states that had not 
enacted any provisions for young adults coverage (the post-ACA states) showed bigger 
effect sizes for health insurance, labor market, and educational enrollment outcomes. 
However, only a handful of studies acknowledge this difference between the impact on 
states with prior dependent coverage laws and those with no coverage laws up until the 
ACA. Even in states with dependent coverage provisions enacted before the ACA, the 
state based dependent coverage prior to the ACA had restrictions that limited coverage 
and denied access to dependent coverage. The ACA removed all these restrictions.  
The results for education indicate changes in college enrollment for this age 
group. Young adults are expected to enroll in college; they could also chose to enroll at a 
much older age given the availability of dependent coverage up until their 26th birthday. 
They are more likely to enroll in a public 2-yr college as full-time and 4-yr college 
enrollment drops. A more detailed analysis finds increase in 2-year part-time college 
enrollment and a decline in 4-year full-time college enrollment. College might become 
more affordable for this group as they no longer have to worry about adding insurance to 
their overall tuition and expenses, which can make it seem a more attractive option 
leading to the conclusion that an educational attainment increased post reform. The 
freedom from job lock can also mean increased wages due to increase in education and 
vocational training, but also because not having ESI could also mean earning more as 
employers tend to shift the burden of ESI on the employees.  
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 The ACA has added stability to an otherwise unstable group by allowing 
extended coverage for young adults and mandatory coverage starting in 2014. But as I 
write this dissertation the new administration in Washington has increased the possibility 
of repealing the ACA. This could mean reversing the expansion of Medicaid under the 
ACA to cover all those with incomes up to 133 percent of the FPL, allowing states to 
revert to pre-ACA guidelines for Medicaid. New proposals include Health savings 
accounts, high-risk pools, and block grants for Medicaid. However, these have 
documented disadvantages that are likely to increase the number of uninsured.77  
Another issue that has plagued the policy and has been argued as a valid 
justification for repeal has been the rising costs in premiums each year and the inability 
of individuals to keep the same insurance plan or a physician. This has raised further 
questions about the long-term viability of the ACA. Despite the average increase of 25 
percent in premium payments, a vast majority of individuals have also received subsidies. 
However, with the change in administration it is possible that the policy could no longer 
continue to provide a safety net to millions. While there is plenty of talk about repealing 
the ACA, the alternative plan presented to repeal the ACA is estimated to leave millions 
of Americans uninsured and making affordable care out of reach. The new plan 
drastically cuts subsidies to pay for health insurance and removes the individual mandate. 
While the new proposed plan keeps the dependent coverage provision intact, it is too 
early to evaluate whether changes brought on by the new plan will affect young adult 
health insurance coverage.  
                                                        
77 Health savings accounts benefit only healthy younger individuals. Low-income earners don’t make enough to benefit from them. 
These plans are also no insured by the FDIC and hence, are subject to risk. High-risk pools have premiums above the standard health 
insurance market rates; those with pre-existing conditions are excluded for at least 6-12 months, and also have lifetime and annual 
limit on care and prescription drugs along with high deductibles. Block grants cap yearly spending limits, and therefore, limit the 
number of individuals becoming eligible for coverage on state funded programs such as Medicaid.  
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4.3 Future research 
 
As other insurance related changes are implemented, it becomes imperative to 
understand how health insurance might change the life choices that young adults make. 
Those who are not insured through the dependent coverage provision might ultimately be 
covered by the individual mandates. Additional studies could look into the change in 
health insurance markets when young adults enter individual market, a move that might 
improve the risk pool, as this age group tends to be healthier, and which could imply a 
lower premium and reduce overall costs of getting covered.  
The research and findings from this dissertation call for future research on the 
impact of the individual mandate and what would it mean if the mandate was repealed. 
Future research can evaluate the impact of the individual mandate and whether outcomes 
for young adults change after it went into effect in 2014. This is a new topic and no study 
has been done on the impact of the individual mandate to evaluate outcomes for any age 
group. Starting 2014, all individuals are required to get coverage or pay a penalty While 
the mandate does not directly impact young adults, as many can continue to be on 
dependent coverage until their 26th birthday, those who don’t have coverage options 
through their parents can now get their own coverage in the individual marketplace. They 
may also qualify for subsidies. These policy changes will most likely increase insurance 
rates in this age group. The push from the ACA to increase coverage, which takes place 
in a better economic climate compared to 2010, raises the possibility that some of the 
outcomes on health insurance coverage, employment, and education will also change. 
Therefore, future research should look into any changes brought on by the new mandate. 
Additionally, evaluating whether young adults prefer ESI to parental dependent coverage 
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if offered a choice could also be evaluated. If the mandate gets repealed there would be 
much to be gained in assessing the effect of the repeal on insurance, employment and 
education outcomes. 
Due to some data limitations of the CPS some outcomes were not analyzed in this 
dissertation. These include labor and educational outcomes of young adults based on the 
health insurance status of their parents. This dissertation assumes young adults who 
become eligible for coverage will have dependent coverage as their parents are already 
covered. However, in reality, re-estimating outcomes for only those with available 
parental coverage would provide for a robust analysis. Similarly, estimating education 
outcomes based on parental education levels, poverty levels, and access to some kind of 
governmental aid would also assist in understanding the effects of the law on a in more 
concise way. 
Since many provisions of the ACA are not fully implemented, it only makes sense 
to look into the future as some of the other components of the law are enacted and to 
evaluate the changes brought on by them. As of now, the individual mandate of 2014 has 
been the last major provision of the ACA. The next major provision of the law, known as 
the Cadillac tax does not go into effect until 2018. The Cadillac tax is a 40 percent tax 
imposed on insurance providers providing expensive health plans with extensive benefits 
to individuals and families. In 2020, the Medicare prescription drug benefit gap, also 
known as the “doughnut hole”, is set to close78. Provisions such as the Cadillac tax could 
mean reduced private coverage and closing the doughnut hole could imply more 
                                                        
78 Doughnut hole is the Medicare Part D coverage gap. This mean that after a individual and their drug plan have spent a certain 
amount of money for covered drugs, all costs have to be paid out of pocket for prescriptions up to a yearly limit. Once a individual 
reaches the yearly limit, the coverage gap ends and the drug plan pays for covered drugs again.  
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affordable prescription drugs. Future research looking at the long-term impacts of the 
ACA could examine the impact of these mandates to estimate who gets impacted and 
how health insurance coverage is affected.  
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Table 1: Prior State Mandates 
State Implementation date  
Colorado 1/1/2006 
Connecticut 1/1/2009 
Delaware 6/1/2007 
Florida 7/1/2007 
Idaho 7/1/2007 
Illinois 6/1/2009 
Indiana 7/1/2007 
Iowa 7/1/2008 
Kentucky 7/15/2008 
Louisiana 1/1/2009 
Maine 9/20/2007 
Maryland 1/1/2008 
Massachusetts 1/1/2007 
Minnesota 1/1/2008 
Missouri 1/1/2008 
Montana 1/1/2008 
New Hampshire 9/15/2007 
New Jersey 1/1/2006 
New Mexico 7/1/2003 
New York 9/1/2009 
North Dakota 7/1/1995 
Pennsylvania 9/1/2009 
Rhode Island 1/1/2007 
South Dakota 7/1/2007 
Texas 1/1/2004 
Utah 1/1/1995 
Virginia 7/1/2007 
Washington 1/1/2009 
West Virginia  7/1/2007 
Source: Cantor et. al. (2012) 
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Table 2: Total mandates by state 
State Total Mandates State Total Mandates 
AK 37 MT 39 
AL 19 NC 55 
AR 46 ND 40 
AZ 35 NE 47 
CA 56 NH 46 
CO 58 NJ 47 
CT 63 NM 59 
DC 27 NV 45 
DE 29 NY 61 
FL 49 OH 29 
GA 45 OK 43 
HI 24 OR 44 
IA 28 PA 54 
ID 13 RI 70 
IL 49 SC 30 
IN 36 SD 28 
KS 6 TN 41 
KY 47 TX 62 
LA 51 UT 26 
MA 48 VA 70 
MD 67 VT 46 
ME 53 WA 58 
MI 23 WI 43 
MN 65 WV 43 
MO 54 WY 37 
MS 31   
Source: Bunce (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: List of Abbreviations 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act PPACA or ACA 
Employer sponsored insurance  ESI 
State Children’s Health Insurance Plan SCHIP 
Federal Poverty Level FPL 
Common Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act COBRA 
Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services CMS 
Current Population Survey CPS 
Survey of Income and Program Participation SIPP 
Employee Retirement Income and Security Act ERISA 
Kaiser Family Foundation KFF 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SUPPORTING TABLES FOR CHAPTER 3 
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Table 1: Enrollment     
 2-yr FT 2-yr PT 4-yr FT 4-yr PT 
PostACA 0.0229 -0.0228 0.0396* 0.00500 
 (0.0194) (0.0176) (0.0185) (0.0214) 
Treat 0.187*** -0.109*** 0.103*** -0.229*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0128) (0.0115) (0.0183) 
PostACA*Treat (DD) -0.0192 0.0390* -0.0543** 0.00616 
 (0.0217) (0.0192) (0.0203) (0.0231) 
Note: Outcomes indicate, 2-yr full-time college enrollment, 2-yr part-time college enrollment, 4-yr full-time college enrollment and 4-
yr part-time college enrollment. For a detailed description, see Table 3.3 
 
 
Table 2: Results from multinomial logistic regression 
 (2) (3) (4) 
PostACA 0.8475*** 0.8770*** 0.6812*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0334) (0.0272) 
Treat 0.9213*** 0.4089*** 0.9488* 
 (0.0202) (0.0103) (0.0242) 
PostACA*Treat (DD) 0.9680 1.0678* 1.1609*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0351) (0.0391) 
Note: Outcomes presented are results from the multinomial logistic regression run as a function of difference-in-differences. The values 
represent the relative risk ratios (RRR) and standard errors are in parentheses. The baseline specification (1) (comparison) includes 
those reporting no work and no college enrollment. (2) Indicates any work and no college enrollment. (3) Indicates no work and any 
college enrollment. (4) Indicates any work and any college enrollment.  
 
